Introduction

1. Walter Bagehot described the “close union . . . of the executive and legislative powers” as the “efficient secret of the . . . Constitution”.¹ “Efficient” referred to the means by which it works: its rules and practices.² He might just as readily have said that its efficient secret was its evolutionary nature; how it develops over time, influenced by events, by social and political changes and in turn its development yields further transformation. Rules and practices change, and in changing, they change themselves and us.

2. Over recent years our Constitution has evolved substantially. In The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK’s Changing Constitution, Graham Gee, Robert Hazell, Kate Malleson and Patrick O’Brien have set out a detailed and insightful examination of one of the central elements of that evolution: the changing role, practices and structure of the judicial branch of the State.

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² Ibid. at 7.
3. It is, as we all know, ten years since the Constitutional Reform Act entered into force, creating the new Supreme Court and the Judicial Appointments Commission, taking from the Lord Chancellor his historic role as speaker of the House of Lords and his role as head of the judiciary, and transferring the latter to the Lord Chief Justice. It is eight years since the creation of the Ministry of Justice and, separately, the unified Tribunals under the, then, newly created Senior President of Tribunals. It is four years since the Courts and Tribunals Services were merged to form Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS). This was a unique constitutional development: an explicit partnership or joint venture between the Executive and the judiciary, accountable to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice and Senior President. And it is now two years since the Lord Chancellor’s residual role in judicial appointments was, partially, transferred to the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President.

4. This may give the impression that reform was focused solely on the judiciary. It went wider than this. But those other reforms are for other occasions. My focus today is, as Robert Hazell and his co-authors put it, the “the evolving relationships” between “judges and politicians” and the changes to the “hidden wiring” that governs them.3 That I am doing so publicly, just as other judges, such as Lords Woolf, Philips, Neuberger, Dyson, Baroness Hale and Sir Jack Beatson have done before, shows that the wiring is no longer hidden. Our Constitution, its practices and its evolution are very much out in the open; and it is all the better for that.

5. I have considered aspects of these changes in a number of previous lectures. In a lecture given here at the Institute for Government in December 2014,4 I considered the progressive divergence between the judiciary and the two other branches of the State in the years up to 2005.

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and thereafter. I also considered its negative consequences, and why greater engagement between the judiciary, government and Parliament were needed, to remedy the problems it caused. I illustrated what was being done by reference to changes in substantive criminal law and family law and suggested some areas for future engagement.

6. I want this afternoon to look at reform to, or should I say the overhaul of, the machinery of justice. I do so in part because the subject matter is topical, but principally because it illustrates (1) the developing role of the judiciary in the leadership of change, (2) the way in which the judiciary engages with the Executive and Parliament, (3) the workings of judicial governance and (4) the need to address issues of judicial responsibility and accountability in respect of its evolving role.

7. Underlying all of my comments today is that justice is central to the ongoing prosperity and fairness of our democratic society. For this reason, it is imperative to ensure that the judiciary is actively involved in leading and shaping our justice system, in concert with the other branches of the State.

The prelude: a long evolution

8. In looking at the role of the judiciary in relationship to the machinery of justice, there has always been interaction, but that has changed over time.

9. Initially the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary was one of master and servant, with the latter holding office at the former’s pleasure. The Crown exercised soft, and sometimes hard, power where the judiciary was concerned. Judges who failed to act in ways amenable to the Crown did so against a background where they could be and were removed from office, as was Danby, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas during the Wars of the Roses, and as was Colmeley, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in the reign of Edward VI (who was not thought worthy of any but the
briefest mention by Lord Campbell in his lives of the Chief Justice on the
cbasis he was neither eminent in the profession nor connected with the
stirring times in which he lived).\[^5\]

10. One of the great political achievements of our constitutional settlement
was the transformation of that relationship to one where the judiciary
became properly independent of the Executive. The road was a long one
from Magna Carta via Gasgoigne CJ (who is believed to have sent the
future King Henry IV to prison for contempt of court) asserting in *Chedder
v Savage* that the courts were to function independently of the Crown, to
1701 and the Act of Settlement.\[^6\] Political and constitutional progress took
time. It took place against and as part of the maturing of our institutions of
governance. Each step along the way was a profound “political
achievement”, to borrow from The Politics of Judicial Independence.\[^7\]

11. Judicial independence, as it was established by the eighteenth century, did
not, however, produce an inseparable breach between judiciary and
Executive. Rather than master and servant, we interacted on a very fluid
basis. Lord Mansfield CJ was, for a time, a highly influential cabinet
Minister. Lord Ellenborough CJ was a member of the Cabinet in 1806. Sir
John Trevor was simultaneously Master of the Rolls and Speaker of the
House of Commons at the end of the seventeenth century. Until the early
years of the last century, political experience in the House of Commons
played an important part in the appointment of the most senior judges.
There are, of course, other examples of what could be viewed as a
continuum between the various branches of the State and their personnel.

12. Since the eighteenth century these various links between judge and the
Executive have steadily been removed. I have no doubt however that each
step along the road was met by a fear that the flexibility, the informal


\[^7\] Hazell et al at 1.
mixing of judicial and parliamentarian or Executive roles, that was being lost was detrimental to the proper running of the State. Each step has, however, properly drawn the judiciary and the Executive into their proper spheres. When we consider the changes that have occurred over the past ten years, we should bear these past reforms in mind. Each step has not only secured greater judicial independence, but also equally the independence of the Executive and Parliament from the judiciary. The recent reconfiguration of the Lord Chancellor’s role, the removal of its role as a “buckle or linchpin” between the judiciary and Executive is just one more step along a well-trodden road.\(^8\) It is a step that required us to adapt, just as previous reforms had done.

**Reforming the machinery of justice: the contrasting approach**

13. The general pattern of reform over the last two hundred years prior to 2005 was for the Lord Chancellor to appoint a judge or judge-led committee or for the Executive to ensure that a judge-led Royal Commission was appointed to carry out a review. The Lord Chancellor’s role was central. The initiative lay with him. He would have had ready access to the judiciary, and particularly the senior judiciary. He could take soundings from them as to the need for reform. If the need for action became apparent, the Lord Chancellor could act and make an appointment to carry out a review or chair a Royal Commission. Equally, he might not. Once appointed however a judge did not act as such. Although the judge brought to bear his expertise and his understanding of the justice system, he was conducting an inquiry for the Executive; for the purposes of such an inquiry such a judge could be viewed as acting under the cloak of the Executive. Consequently, the recommendations made were a matter for, and responsibility of, the Executive and, if implemented via legislation,

\(^8\) Hazell et al at 31.
Parliament. The judge had no real means to ensure effective implementation of his report.

14. The best known example where this happened was the fundamental reform effected to the machinery of justice system through the Judicature Acts of 1873 to 1875. Those reforms recast our historic great common law courts and the High Court of Chancery as a single, omni-competent High Court. They created the Court of Appeal. They produced a single, simply drafted and trans-substantive procedural code. At the time they were the most significant set of reforms to our justice system that had ever occurred. They were the product of a Royal Commission, which gathered evidence and produced five detailed reform reports.

15. The Commissioners were, in nearly all instances, leading members of the judiciary, or would become so: Baron Cairns, then a judge of the Court of Appeal in Chancery, and soon to be Lord Chancellor, the Commission’s chair; Sir William Page Wood, Vice-Chancellor; Sir Colin Blackburn, then a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, to name but three. The Crown, by the Lord President of the Council, Gathorne Hardy, formally appointed the Commission. The prime movers behind its appointment and then the implementation of its recommendation were however the Lord Chancellors: Chelmsford, Cairns, Hatherley, and Selborne.

16. The approach exemplified by the Judicature Commission was repeated throughout the twentieth Century; and this was despite section 75 of the Judicature Act providing the judiciary with the power and responsibility to enquire into and provide reports for the Executive on the operation of the justice system. That power was used once in the 1890s to propose the creation of the Commercial court and of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Its use was very much the exception. The historic approach prevailed. Lord Evershed MR was, for instance, appointed by Lord Jowitt LC to lead a

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review of civil justice in the post-War years. Lord Woolf was appointed in 1994 by Lord Mackay LC to carry out his Access to Justice Review. More recently, Lord Justice Auld was appointed to carry out a review of the criminal courts. It was the responsibility of the Executive to take steps and it did so regularly. Lord Chancellors took the lead in determining whether to carry out an inquiry, in appointing a judge to carry it out, and then determining whether to and, if so, how it should be implemented.

17. Since 2005 there has been a significant change. It remains entirely possible that the Executive may, in future, take the traditional approach; and appoint a judge or judges to chair a reform process of the historic kind. However, the changes in the 2005 Act have now given the judiciary its own distinct leadership role in respect of the machinery of justice, via the transfer of the role of head of the judiciary from the Lord Chancellor to the Lord Chief Justice, as President of all the courts in England and Wales. Under the Act the Lord Chief Justice holds leadership responsibilities, including a duty to make representations, not least in respect of the administration of justice, to both Parliament and the Executive, thereby establishing this constitutional rebalancing of responsibility.\(^{10}\)

18. Taken together these features of the 2005 settlement articulate both the constitutional duty imposed on the senior judiciary to ensure that the courts are able to carry out their constitutional role, and the means by which they are to do so. The result: the judiciary no longer needs to wait for a Lord Chancellor to appoint a latter-day Lord Woolf. The judiciary – and particularly those with leadership roles – are required themselves to undertake the types of reform effort that had previously been initiated by the Executive.

19. Since 2005 the judiciary has done so on a number of occasions. We are all familiar with them. In 2008, Lord Clarke, as Master of the Rolls, appointed

\(^{10}\) Thomas LCJ, *Judging in the Modern World: Judges beyond the Court Room* (Judicial College Lecture) (12 March 2014).
Lord Justice Jackson to undertake a review of the costs of civil justice. He did so with the support of the Executive.¹¹ In 2011 the President of the Family Division appointed the then Mr Justice Ryder to set out proposals for the Modernisation of Family Justice,¹² following on from David Norgrove’s Family Justice Review. More recently Lord Justice Briggs has carried out a review into Chancery Division modernisation at the request of the Chancellor of the High Court.¹³ Most recently still, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, Sir Brian Leveson, has carried out a searching review of the operation of the criminal justice system.¹⁴ There are other examples. The essential point is that judicial leadership in this area has emerged and can now be regarded as an accepted, feature of our constitutional settlement.

20. In each case the judge appointed brought to bear judicial expertise. Each consulted widely. Each drew on and obtained available evidence. Each formulated ideas, and in appropriate cases tested them through pilot studies. The practical approach taken has little differed from that taken by previous, Executive-appointed, inquiries. The key difference is that the Judiciary now has a clear responsibility and acts on it. It does not however overstep the mark constitutionally. Where necessary, implementation requires proper discussion with, and in many cases, action by the Executive and Parliament. The Jackson reforms, like the Woolf reforms before them, required primary legislation. They were subject to proper scrutiny. They required both the Executive and then Parliament to accept them. The same is true of the more recent Leveson criminal justice reforms; the proposal contained in Chapter 10 are proposals for the Executive to consider and, if

adopted, for legislation by Parliament.

**The overhaul of the machinery of justice**

*Judicial leadership*

21. Each of the reports to which I have referred has addressed an aspect of the administration of justice. However, it had been clear for some time that much more wide ranging reform was needed to the entire machinery of justice. It was generally recognised that maintaining court files on paper was outmoded; that IT could be used more extensively and effectively to improve processes and the court estate needed the kind of full scale review that had taken place in much of continental Europe where, as in the UK, courts had been positioned for a different era of travel and communication.

22. It is to this reform or overhaul of the administration of justice I turn. The details of the plans are not for this lecture, as my focus is on the four topics I wish to cover. I will begin with judicial leadership, as the way in which the judiciary now can lead can be seen in the development of the plans for the overhaul of the machinery of justice,

23. As I have mentioned, part of the evolution after 2005 involved the creation of a new model for the governance of HMCTS. Effective participation by the judiciary in the operation of the court administration had been raised by Sir Nicholas Browne Wilkinson, the then Vice-Chancellor, in his 1987 Francis Mann Lecture “The Independence of the Judiciary in the 1980s”.

No change was made. When unsuccessful attempts were made in the late 1990s and early 2000s to introduce modern IT, the judiciary had no effective voice in the governance of the court service; in retrospect, it was

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one of the causes of the failure.\textsuperscript{16} It was no doubt this failure and the continued influence of the ideas of Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson that led Lord Woolf to propose that as part of the 2003-5 reforms, the judiciary should assume a real and effective role in the administration of the courts. The proposal was rejected by the Executive, but that changed in 2008 with the adoption of the current model of governance of court administration which placed the court administration in the joint control of the judiciary and the Executive,\textsuperscript{17} leaving the day to day management in the hands of a board chaired by an independent chairman and an independent chief executive.

24. It was apparent by the end of 2012 that in the light of the decision of Parliament to approve the Executive’s budget strategy, there would be a significant year on year reduction in the funds that would be provided for court administration (as well as to other aspects of expenditure on the justice system such as legal aid). The prospect was either reform to the court administration or managed decline to a state within a comparatively short period of time when it would no longer be able to support the delivery of justice. Reform was put forward with an initial focus was on the introduction of modern IT and the reconfiguration of the estate and the deployment of the court staff. Various means of financing and future governance were examined, a task in which the judiciary actively participated.

25. It became clear, however, that this would on its own be insufficient. IT could of course improve the existing way in which justice was delivered and make it more cost effective. A reconfigured court estate could be supplemented by the use of video technology. However this would not tackle more fundamental issues. For example, successive cuts to legal aid


\textsuperscript{17} Explained in Hazell et al at p 42-3.
and the escalating costs of lawyers had put access to justice out of the reach of the overwhelming majority of the population. No successful attempt had been made to use technology to address this issue. A more radical and comprehensive overhaul to the administration of justice was needed. Instead of technology being used merely to make the traditional ways of delivering more efficient, the technology needed to be used to devise new ways of delivering justice.

26. As a result of the change in 2005 that had been used by the judiciary to produce the four judicially-led reports to which I have referred, the judiciary did not have to ask the Executive to establish a review or commission to take this forward as had been done in the 200 years preceding 2005. It could itself formulate proposals for reform, but it could also encourage others to come forward with ideas that could use modern IT. There was a need for ideas that would not simply make the existing processes better, but would recast the delivery of justice so that it became again accessible at a cost people could afford and therefore use.

27. There are two recent examples which demonstrate this. The Civil Justice Council produced a report On line Dispute Resolution for low value claims,\(^{18}\) through a Committee chaired by Professor Susskind; and the organisation JUSTICE produced a report entitled “Delivering Justice in an Age of Austerity”,\(^{19}\) through a committee chaired by retired Lord Justice of Appeal Sir Stanley Burnton.

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contemplated without the acceptance of proposals by the Executive, without the finance approved by Parliament and without the ability to implement the ideas through a court administration with the right capacities and capabilities.

29. In March 2014 the Lord Chancellor, Senior President of Tribunals and I jointly announced that more than £700m was to be invested in Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS). Since then, judges and the HMCTS have been working on proposals for reform. The business case is about to be presented to the Treasury explaining how the money would be invested. With a commitment to the resources in place, I hope that we can create a better court and tribunal system, with rules and procedures to ensure that the right work is carried out proportionately by the right judge, with a modernised court and tribunal estate and which uses technology to ensure that cases are dealt with efficiently, speedily and above all justly.

30. The agreement on the principles for the overhaul has therefore only been achieved by the closest cooperation of the judiciary, the Executive and HMCTS as the joint venture accountable to both. For example, the original concept for significant modernisation and investment in HMCTS was put forward by HMCTS’ chairman, Bob Ayling in 2012. The basic preparation of the original financial case was carried out by the then Chief Executive of HMCTS, Peter Handcock, working with the Senior Presiding Judge, Lord Justice Gross, as well as officials within the Judicial Office.

31. Since then, the formulation and the bringing together of a much more radical vision has been carried out by the recently appointed Chief Executive, Natalie Ceeney, in conjunction with the Judicial Executive Board. The engagement of the other arms of the Executive was carried out by Ministers and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, Dame Ursula Brennan and other senior civil servants. The judiciary, as I have
said, not only brought proposals for the reforms to which I have referred, but engaged in all other aspects of the work I have described. In addition they are engaged with the procedural rules committees for the respective jurisdictions.

32. Having witnessed what happened to the plans for reform prior to 2008 when the circumstances of the UK public finances were not as difficult, I am sure that the overhaul of the machinery of justice now to be delivered would never have occurred without the judiciary assuming its new role of leadership and without its active engagement with the Executive, particularly through the joint venture that is HMCTS.

Judicial governance

33. The Constitutional Reform Act by and large vested in the Lord Chief Justice most of the old powers that had been exercised by the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary in relation to England and Wales and most of the new powers to be conferred on the judiciary in relation to the delivery of justice in England and Wales. The Act was essentially silent on the exercise of these powers by the Lord Chief Justice and on the governance of the judiciary. This has enabled the judiciary to develop its own leadership and governance.

34. The structure that has been developed enables decisions on issues that arise in relation to the judiciary itself or matters on which it is engaged with the Executive or Parliament to be made by the Judicial Executive Board. It meets formally each month and generally less formally each week. For example, although it is the Lord Chief Justice who formally signifies his assent or otherwise to the budget proposed for the running of HMCTS, the advice given by the Board of HMCTS is considered by the Judicial Executive Board as a whole before the decision is made. It is possible

20 The description by Hazell et al is at p 141-2.
under the legislation for the Lord Chief Justice to take such decisions without the agreement of the Board, but it is extremely unlikely that he or she would do so. In practice therefore, the powers in relation to the governance of the judiciary are exercised through the Board.

35. But no system of judicial governance could rest on a top down hierarchical structure with the Judicial Executive Board and Lord Chief Justice at its apex. The Judges’ Council, which represents the entire judiciary of the courts, tribunals and the magistracy, fulfils the essential function of enabling the judiciary to participate in decisions that have a wide ranging effect on the judiciary as a whole.\(^{21}\)

36. The initial work in relation to HMCTS reform and its subsequent development into the overhaul of the machinery of justice was led through the Judicial Executive Board in the manner I have described. It was essential for the Heads of Division, the Senior President of Tribunals and the other senior judges (including the Judge responsible for Diversity and the Chairman of the Judicial College) who comprise the Judicial Executive Board to examine the proposals as they came to the Board and agree on them and the overall aims. In the light of the ideas that have been put forward, consensus on the overall aims and on the principles for an overhaul were achieved. This illustrates the central role now played by the Judicial Executive Board, even though the powers are all formally vested in the Lord Chief Justice (or in the case of many powers for the Tribunals in the Senior President).

37. However, as it was clear that even the most modest proposals would affect the entire judiciary, it was both right and necessary to engage with the Judges’ Council. The Council meets regularly three times a year, but it met specially to consider the vision for the reform programme. It would, in my view, have been impossible to make the commitment to the significant

\(^{21}\) The description by Hazell et al is at 142-3.
overhaul envisaged, unless the Judges’ Council had been made aware of what was proposed.

Accountability

38. With the increased responsibility and leadership I have outlined, comes however accountability. Where the Executive and Parliament are concerned, accountability is straightforward. Ministers are accountable to Parliament. They are subject to scrutiny by the courts where questions arise concerning the legality of their actions. Parliament is accountable to the electorate, which if it disagrees with its policies, programme or legislative developments can alter its composition accordingly at the next general election.

39. The judiciary has, I think it is fair to say, traditionally been wary of accountability. This is entirely understandable and constitutionally appropriate. Judicial independence, both institutional and personal, is an essential pre-requisite of the rule of law. A judge or judiciary accountable to Parliament or the Executive for their decisions is one that is subject to their influence and instruction: and such a judge or judiciary is no real one. We rightly, as I noted earlier, had rejected such an approach by the eighteenth Century.

40. However, judicial independence has never been incompatible with accountability in a wider sense. Accountability has always come in the form of judicial decisions being subject to appellate review and in some cases to judicial review. It also comes through the constitutional commitment to open justice: the judiciary are subject to the scrutiny of the public in the courts and through our public judgments. High Court Judges are subject to Parliamentary accountability for good behaviour and, as such, can be removed from office should they not act in ways consistent with ‘good behaviour’. Other judges have an accountability for misconduct through a
process which may culminate in a decision made jointly by the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.

41. However, the judiciary, having assumed responsibilities has acknowledged an increased accountability. First, the judiciary is now more accountable, in terms of explanatory accountability, to Parliamentary and its scrutiny in respect of the areas in which the judiciary now takes a leading role.

42. The Lord Chief Justice has from time to time since 2005 submitted a report to Parliament under section 5(1) of the Constitutional Reform Act; I believe that the disputes in relation to the use of this section are a matter of history. In the light of the increasing responsibilities of the judiciary, I have taken, with the agreement of the Judicial Executive Board, the position that the Lord Chief Justice should present an annual report to Parliament. The first report was submitted in the Michaelmas term of 2014 and the intention is to submit a report every year. It enables the judiciary to explain in what it is hoped is a relatively short and readable document what the judiciary is doing in the areas in which it has a responsibility for the delivery of justice, the problems it faces and what needs to be done to address them.

43. In addition, the Lord Chief Justice now attends annually before House of Lords Constitution Committee, and the House of Commons Justice Committees, to answer questions in accordance with established conventions. This is only right. If Parliament is to be properly informed, and if necessary enact legislation to cure problems, concerning the effective operation of the justice system, the judiciary must provide Parliament with the information it requires. This must however be done in accordance with conventions and guidance that safeguard the impartially and neutrality of the judiciary. It also must provide an annual report which can be the basis of a meaningful dialogue between the Lord Chief Justice and Parliament.

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22 For a description, see Hazell et al at pages 17-22 and 99-101.
when the Lord Chief Justice answers questions.

44. Second, the increased responsibility concerning the administration of the justice system brings with it a concomitant duty placed on the Lord Chief Justice (and Senior President of Tribunals) to superintend the way in which justice is delivered and to correct errors, flaws or problems that arise from reforms the judiciary brings about. It has been described as an amendatory or remedial accountability. For this form of accountability to work effectively, it means that effective mechanisms for the scrutiny of justice system must be put in place, for the proper collective of statistics, of evidence. I mentioned, for example, in the 2014 Report the work that is being done to improve the governance of the magistrates’ courts and the process put in hand for direct accountability to the Judicial Executive Board for performance.

45. The judiciary cannot, of course, do this on its own. There is the essential need to work with and draw from the experience of others: with HMCTS with its responsibility to provide the court administration and the necessary statistical records in relation to the work of the courts; advisory bodies, such as the Civil and Family Justice Councils; independent advisory bodies; citizens advice bureau; consumer bodies; and professional bodies; and above all the Executive and Parliament.

46. An example is given by the unstinting work of the President of the Family Division. Not only has he worked with the Executive and a range of other interested bodies to carry out a fundamental revision of the family justice system; he has also maintained a detailed scrutiny of the implementation of those reforms. The Master of the Rolls and Chancellor are making similar efforts in terms of civil justice reform. And I have no doubt that President of the Queen’s Bench Division will take an equivalent approach to such criminal justice reforms as are implemented arising from his review. And in

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each case that scrutiny means the judiciary is in the optimum position to take remedial action at the earliest possible opportunity.

47. The growth in these two forms of accountability was inevitable given the nature of the 2005 reforms. Increased responsibility cannot but be matched by increased accountability. I ought however to sound a warning. It is possible to see a situation where in order to produce a pliant judiciary an aggressive use of these mechanisms could be used. I cannot see such a situation coming to pass in the United Kingdom; but it is a possibility no matter how remote that the judiciary, the Executive, and Parliament must guard against. Doing so is an aspect of the responsibility of all, to securing the rule of law and to the independence of the judiciary.

Conclusion

48. I have only been able to touch on a small number of issues, ones that form but one aspect of the discussion with *The Politics of Judicial Independence*. I have welcomed the study as a very important contribution to an on-going discussion, and more importantly, an on-going series of constitutional developments.

49. What appears clear is that over the first ten years since the reforms of 2005, the judiciary has evolved a new way of working. It has developed a capacity and a will to lead reform. It has forged a new method of engagement with the Executive and Parliament in this task so that all can work together to bring about an overhaul of the administration of justice. Some will no doubt continue to regret the passing of the old way of doing things: the removal of the Lord Chancellor as the linchpin between the two.

50. However, by 2005 far reaching change was inevitable. Rather than all the weight being placed on the Lord Chancellor, we now have, as I hope I have illustrated, an effective multi-faceted hinge in the shape of the Lord Chief Justice, the Judicial Executive Board and the Judges’ Council which
can lead reform and work with and the Lord Chancellor and the other Ministers. Consequently, provided proper finance is made available by Parliament through HM Treasury, the judiciary will be better able to lead and drive the overhaul of the machinery of justice in the way I have described. By doing this, I very much hope that the centrality of justice to our national life will be strengthened through securing the fair, impartial and cost effective delivery of justice in a way which everyone, whether a business or a consumer, can more easily access and use. As we celebrate the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, the ongoing task of the judiciary is to make clear the centrality of justice for the benefit of society, and to contribute to, and where possible lead, its ongoing improvement.

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