

(1) ACL NETHERLANDS B.V. (AS SUCCESSOR TO AUTONOMY CORPORATION LIMITED)

(2) HEWLETT-PACKARD THE HAGUE BV (AS SUCCESSOR TO HEWLETT-PACKARD VISION BV)

(3) AUTONOMY SYSTEMS LIMITED

(4) HEWLETT-PACKARD ENTERPRISE NEW JERSEY, INC

-v-

MICHAEL RICHARD LYNCH AND SUSHOVAN TAREQUE HUSSAIN

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF MR JUSTICE HILDYARD - 28TH JANUARY 2022

This summary

1. I will summarise my key findings in the statement I am about to make. This is a public statement. However, I will also deliver by 8pm today to the parties' legal representatives, but only to them, a copy of my draft judgment setting out much more fully the reasons for my conclusions. **That draft will remain at all times strictly embargoed.**
2. Neither that draft, nor any part of its contents, is to be made available to persons other than those on the lists notified by the parties' legal representatives to me, and agreed by me. **Any breach of the embargo would be a contempt of court.** My final judgment will be handed down after the usual process of checking and correction is completed. As the judgment is of considerable length, that will take longer than usual. That is the principal reason for this summary of my conclusions today. As with any summary, it may not entirely capture what the much longer document is intended to convey. If there is any conflict between this summary and my judgment as finally delivered, my judgment will prevail.
3. Even this summary of the draft is not short. Copies can be made available. But I do not wish to cause unnecessary suspense. I will start by saying that the Claimants have substantially succeeded in their claims in these proceedings. Quantum will be determined in a later judgment, but I would anticipate that, although substantial, it will be considerably less than claimed.

The proceedings

4. These proceedings relate to acquisition (“the Acquisition”) for approximately \$11.1 billion in cash of the entire issued share capital of Autonomy Corporation Limited (“Autonomy”) by a special purpose vehicle called Hewlett Packard Vision BV, which was incorporated in the Netherlands for the purpose of the Acquisition . I will refer to the acquisition vehicle as “Bidco”. By a merger in 2018, all of the assets and liabilities of Bidco were transferred to the Second Claimant.
5. The Acquisition was declared wholly unconditional on 3 October 2011, and completed on 5 January 2012.
6. The fallout from the Acquisition has spawned not only these proceedings, but also at least two sets of criminal proceedings in the Northern District of California, USA. One has led to the conviction of the Second Defendant (hereafter “Mr Hussain”), for wire fraud under US legislation, and he has been imprisoned. He could not attend this trial. The First Defendant, (hereafter, “Dr Lynch”) has been indicted in a further set of criminal proceedings in Northern California, in respect of which the US authorities now seek to extradite him to face trial there.
7. All of the assets and liabilities of Autonomy, including all claims it has against the Defendants, were transferred to the First Claimant in 2017.
8. The real bidder and acquirer, through Bidco, was Hewlett Packard Company (“HP”). HP was the ultimate holding company in the Hewlett Packard group, one of the first companies to set up in Silicon Valley and since then a household name.
9. Autonomy was and is an English company. Autonomy acted as a holding company for a group of companies, all in the business of infrastructure software (“the Autonomy group”).
10. Autonomy was founded in 1996. It was spun out of a company called Cambridge Neurodynamics, which was an early venture into using “machine learning” to develop software techniques which Dr Lynch had explored in his PhD thesis at Cambridge University and his subsequent research fellowship in “adaptive pattern recognition”.

11. Autonomy, and in particular its core product called IDOL, was the creation of Dr Lynch. IDOL is an acronym for Intelligent Data Operating Layer. IDOL was the core technology at the heart of nearly all of Autonomy's software. IDOL technology was focused on the analysis of unstructured data.
12. Put shortly, using IDOL technology, computers could make sense of unstructured data. There are two types of data: structured and unstructured. Structured data is found in spreadsheets or in prescribed fields in a database. When data is entered into a database it is easily searchable. Unstructured data is data that is not contained in the prescribed fields. Most data is unstructured. Books, newspaper articles, websites, voice recordings, videos and indeed, most forms of communication comprise unstructured data. Unstructured data is obviously much more difficult for computers to interpret and analyse. In 2009, the vast majority of computer software could only process structured information. It was Autonomy's ability, using IDOL technology, to handle unstructured information that set it apart. HP chose barely to acknowledge this in the course of the proceedings, but IDOL was, in words attributed to Meg Whitman, who became CEO of HP, "almost magical"
13. In consequence, by the beginning of the period to which the contested accounting information related, Autonomy had grown from a small start-up into a market leader in enterprise technology, especially in the field of unstructured data analysis. It went public in 1998, with an initial listing on the EASDAQ. It was admitted to the official list of the LSE in November 2000. It joined the FTSE 100 in 2008.
14. The Autonomy group was highly profitable. It generated annual revenue of about \$900 million, collected all the cash it reported, and (as an illustration) held cash reserves of \$1.1 billion at the close of 2010. Its customers included blue-chip companies in every sector. In 2011, based on market capitalisation, it was the largest British software company.
15. On the other side of the Atlantic, HP was a giant company, with an annual turnover of \$130 billion, but it was in the doldrums. Its focus and reputation had remained in hardware, where margins are very tight. A new CEO, Mr Apotheker, wished to change this. He was wanting to effect what he called "transformational change" by the acquisition of a software company to drive a reorientation of HP towards high margin software. Software margins can be well over 60%.

16. However, when, together with other changes in HP's business, the Acquisition was announced, the markets reacted badly. Just over a month later Mr Apotheker was removed. The Defendants' case is that the claim was "manufactured" to cover and justify a change of corporate mind, and to cast the Defendants as scapegoats for what in reality is buyer's remorse coupled with management failings. The Claimants' case is that they were fundamentally misled.

Brief summary of the basis of each Claimant's claim

17. Before giving a brief summary of the various claims, I would note some matters of terminology:
 - 17.1. Throughout this summary, unless stated to the contrary, I use the term "the Claimants" as a shorthand to denote the Claimant making the particular claim. The Claimants do not in reality make any claims jointly. I should also clarify that in terms of describing the acquirer, I use the descriptions HP and Bidco interchangeably. I shall explain why later by reference to an issue in the case which was called the *'Bidco point'*.
 - 17.2. My references to "Autonomy" in the context of the various impugned transactions are by way of short-hand. In the context of an impugned transaction the reference is intended to denote (unless otherwise stated) whichever of the Autonomy group companies was the contracting party.
 - 17.3. References to the "Defendants" are to whichever of the two of them is alleged to have been implicated in wrongdoing. I have sought to identify them individually when issues arise as to that individual's knowledge or involvement. On almost all other matters, Mr Hussain adopted Dr Lynch's arguments.
18. I shall now very briefly summarise the claims. The Claimants' essential complaint in respect of the Acquisition is that they were induced into making the Acquisition by dishonest statements and omissions in Autonomy's published information, and other representations made personally by the Defendants. The Claimants have in these proceedings accused both Defendants of fraud.

19. There are also other claims which do not relate to the Acquisition, but to alleged breaches of duty on the part of the Defendants whilst directors or shadow directors of Autonomy group companies.

The First Claimant's claim

20. By far the largest of the claims is brought under Schedule 10A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the FSMA claim”). The gist of the FSMA claim is fraud on the part of the issuer (Autonomy) in respect of statements or omissions in its published information on which the Claimant relied in making an investment decision. It is claimed that “*persons discharging managerial responsibilities within the issuers*” (“PDMRs”) knew those statements or omissions to be untrue or misleading, or to amount to the dishonest concealment of a material facts. (An issuer’s “published information” is specially defined but for present purposes the ordinary meaning it conveys will suffice.)
21. The FSMA claim depends on establishing first that Autonomy was liable (as issuer) to Bidco, and second, accordingly (as explained below) that the Defendants were liable to Autonomy.
22. It is not disputed that both Defendants were, for the purposes of the FSMA claim, PDMRs within the meaning of Schedule 10 A of FSMA (and previously section 90 A (4) before it’s amendment). The basis for the issuer’s liability is fraud on the part of at least one PDMR.
23. It may at first blush seem surprising that the claimant in the FSMA claim is the First Claimant, ACL Netherlands BV, which is the successor to Autonomy. Autonomy might appear to be suing in respect of its own fraud. The explanation is that its claim is in the nature of what is sometimes called a “dog leg claim”. It is to recover from the Defendants the loss that Autonomy suffered by having (voluntarily) accepted liability for a claim brought by Bidco against it to recover its losses in having been induced to enter into the Acquisition.
24. The amount of accepted liability by Autonomy to Bidco is the sum of \$4.55 Billion USD. That is therefore the principal sum which the First Claimant claims from the Defendants.
25. The reason for the “dog leg” structure of the claim is that under Schedule 10A of FSMA, only the issuer of published information is liable to persons induced to make investment decisions in reliance on dishonest statements or omissions in that published information. The position

was the same under the equivalent provision of FSMA, section 90 A (3) which applied until 30 September 2010 and which Schedule 10A replaced. But a claim by HP against Autonomy would be of no benefit to HP since HP owned Autonomy. What HP/Bidco needed was recourse against the Defendants. Crucially under FSMA, an issuer can seek to lay off its own liability by suing key management persons called PDMRs on the basis that they were responsible for, or at least had knowledge of, the falsities.

26. To enable HP/Bidco to sue the Defendants, the following steps were taken.

26.1. HP/Bidco notified its claim to Autonomy.

26.2. Controlled by HP, Autonomy (whose assets and liabilities are now held by the First Claimant) has admitted liability to Bidco (whose assets and liabilities are now held by the Second Claimant). The Claimants have accepted that this admission does not bind the Court. That liability has to be determined.

26.3. Autonomy then blamed and sued the two Defendants, who are both admitted to be PDMRs, for the loss.

27. No objection in principle was made by the Defendants to the 'dog-leg' nature of the claim, although every part of its substance is contested. The Defendants' case is that Autonomy had no liability to Bidco and should not have submitted to its claims.

28. Bidco's FSMA claim was thus founded upon allegations that, when proceeding with the Acquisition, HP and therefore Bidco reasonably relied on Autonomy's published information, which contained untrue and/or misleading statements and/or dishonestly concealed material facts which were wrongly omitted from the published information.

The Second Claimant's claim

29. The Second Claimant claims an aggregate principal amount of \$420 million against Dr Lynch and Mr Hussain for false representations which it claims were made by them to HP/Bidco knowingly and/or recklessly and/or without reasonable belief in the truth thereof, and which they claim induced the Second Claimant to purchase shares in Autonomy from the First and Second Defendants. Those false representations include reaffirmations of the false statements within the published information.

30. The damages are claimed pursuant section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and/or the tort of deceit.

The Third and Fourth Claimants' claim

31. The Third and Fourth Claimants claim against the Defendants for direct losses suffered by them in loss-making transactions which they claim Dr Lynch and Mr Hussain caused them to enter into in breach of their fiduciary duties or employment contracts.
32. These claims do not arise out of the Acquisition, but out of the Defendants' management conduct. The losses occasioned by those transactions are estimated by the Third and Fourth Claimant to amount to \$76.1 million:
33. In the case of Dr Lynch, the claim is pursued against him as shadow director or assumed fiduciary of Autonomy Systems Limited (hereafter "ASL") and as an officer of Autonomy Inc, pursuant to the Companies Act 2006.
34. In the case of Mr Hussain, the claim is pursued against him as director of ASL under the Companies Act 2006 and under his contractual and fiduciary duties as an employee of ASL in respect of the Fourth Claimant. Those losses include those of another group subsidiary Zantaz Inc ("Zantaz"), the cause of action to which was assigned to Autonomy Inc on 31 October 2014. This is pursued against Mr Hussain on the basis of breach of his fiduciary duties as a director and officer of Zantaz.

The Defendants

35. Dr Lynch was the Director of Autonomy from the time of its incorporation in 1996 up until 30 November 2011. Throughout the period with which this litigation is concerned, he was the driving force and leading figure within Autonomy.
36. Mr Hussain was the Autonomy Group's Chief Financial Officer from June 2001 until 30 November 2011 and was a director of Autonomy from 1 June 2003 until 30 November 2011.

The fraud alleged

37. The fraud alleged, which underlies the legal heads of claim arising out of the Acquisition (the FSMA claim, the direct fraud and/or Misrepresentation Act claims, as distinct from the breach of duty claims for transactional losses) consisted of the publication of information to the market which was known by the Defendants to be false.
38. The allegation was based on (a) the allegedly dishonest description of Autonomy as being a “*pure software company*” when in fact it undertook and had become accustomed to inflating what appeared to be the revenues of its software business by undertaking substantial hardware sales and (b) the allegedly dishonest presentation of its financial performance, which did not disclose (and instead disguised) improper practices which Autonomy adopted to boost and accelerate revenue.
39. The Claimants contended that all this resulted in Autonomy being in fact a considerably less valuable enterprise than it appeared on the basis of its published information.
40. These alleged improper practices included:
 - 40.1. artificially inflating and accelerating Autonomy’s revenues;
 - 40.2. understating Autonomy’s costs of goods sold by characterizing such costs as sales and marketing expenses so as to protect gross margins;
 - 40.3. misrepresenting Autonomy’s rate of organic growth; and
 - 40.4. misrepresenting the nature and quality of Autonomy’s revenues as well as overstating its gross and net profits.

Financial Services and Markets Act claims

41. In the FSMA claims, it is common ground that the Claimants need to make good their case at each stage, ie the liability of Autonomy, and the fraud by the PDMRs .
42. They have accepted also that each of Dr Lynch and Mr Hussain will not be liable except in respect of misstatements or omissions by the issuer about which he himself knew. It is not sufficient for the Claimants to demonstrate that the transactions or the way that they were accounted for was improper (the first limb). They need also to prove personal knowledge and

dishonesty in respect of the false accounting on the part of the Defendants as PDMRs (the second limb).

43. As far as Bidco is concerned, the Defendants contended that no liability was owed to it because no representations were made to it, and it placed no reliance on any statements made. This is the *Bidco point* to which I have referred earlier. I have found that, if the necessary elements are made out, Bidco (and therefore the Second Claimant) have a valid claim (both under FSMA and in respect of direct fraud and Misrepresentation Act 1967 claims against the Defendants).
44. I have accepted the Claimants' argument that the fact that it was HP which claims to have been influenced by Autonomy's published information (and specific representations) and that it was HP which undertook due diligence, does not mean that Bidco cannot satisfy this part of the reliance test. For the purpose of the acquisition, HP can be treated as the controlling mind of Bidco, and HP's reliance can be treated as Bidco's reliance.

Direct Fraud and/or Misrepresentation Act 1967 claims against the Defendants

45. The claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and/or under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 are direct claims against the Defendants: they are based on personal liability, not on the liability of the issuer.
46. Specific representations are averred against the Defendants which in many cases traverse the same territory as the FSMA claims. The quantum of those claims is much lower than the FSMA claims: the damages sought relate only to loss attributable to the shares and share options which the Defendants themselves each held and sold to Bidco. The pleaded quantum of this loss is \$420 million. Any sum recovered under this head of claim will be in the alternative to the FSMA claim. There cannot be double recovery.
47. A point which may be of general interest is that it is no defence to a FSMA or a fraud claim that the claimants had the means of discovering the truth. No defence of contributory negligence is available. Thus, even if (though I have made no finding that it was) HP's due diligence were considered to be rushed and deficient, and HP might have been expected to unearth and probe further into matters about which complaint is now made, that would not be a defence. It would be beguiling but wrong to think that the answer could be "caveat emptor". Of course, had I found that HP was in fact aware, before the Acquisition, of the matters of

which complaint is now made, that would be different, for in those circumstances it could not say that it had reasonably relied on what it saw and read. But I have found that it was not actually aware and that its reliance was reasonable.

Breach of Duty Claims brought By Autonomy Companies Against the Defendants

48. The claims for transactional losses based on breaches of fiduciary and employee duties stand on a different footing. They do not arise in consequence of the Acquisition (except in the sense that they would almost certainly not have been brought if the Defendants still directed Autonomy). They are claims for direct losses suffered by Autonomy Inc, Autonomy's main operating company in the US, incorporated in 1996 (now the Fourth Claimant) and another group subsidiary called Zantaz as a result of the Defendants' breaches of duty in causing the relevant subsidiary to enter into the impugned transactions without regard to the interests of that subsidiary.
49. The Claimants accept that in the ultimate quantification of loss, they must give credit for a recovery of \$45 million made in a settlement of related claims (against Autonomy's auditors), after deducting the cost of such claims and any tax payable in respect of the settlement sum.

Factual basis: the FSMA and direct fraud and / or Misrepresentation Act claims

50. In relation to the first two of the three legal heads of claim that I refer to above (that is to say, in relation to the FSMA and direct fraud and Misrepresentation Act claims), the factual basis of the claims relate to six areas of Autonomy's business and accounting. These claims, each of which is substantial, are very briefly described below.

50.1. The “**hardware case**” relates to the purchase and resale by Autonomy (usually at a loss) of “pure” hardware (in broad terms, hardware unaccompanied by any Autonomy software) in quantities (of over \$100 million). The Claimants allege that these transactions were never disclosed to the market that by boosting apparent revenue, they gave a false impression of the performance of Autonomy's business. The Claimants say that they belied its presentation in its published information as a *pure software company*. The hardware case also raises issues as to (a) whether a proportion of the cost of the sales were improperly accounted for as marketing expenses so as artificially to increase gross margins, and (b) whether Deloitte, who approved

Autonomy's accounting treatment of the sales, were misled as to the true purpose of the hardware sales.

- 50.2.** The “**reseller case**” or “**VAR case**” relates to 37 transactions between Autonomy (or in some cases, Autonomy Inc or Zantaz) and a small group of value-added resellers. The Defendant treated these transactions as sales giving rise to revenue which could be and was recognised immediately in Autonomy's accounts. The Claimants contended that this simply interposed a reseller between Autonomy and a true customer, and that these were not in substance true sales at all. The only true sale was to an end-user, if one eventuated. In many instances no end-user sale did eventuate, giving rise to a difficulty which I explain later. The Claimants' case is that in each VAR sale, the VAR was only a passive placeholder with no further participation expected or permitted of it after the VAR sale. Thus, the VAR sales were, in effect, devices to accelerate recognition of revenue in Autonomy's accounts, with the intended effect of misrepresenting its performance.
- 50.3.** The “**reciprocal transactions case**” relates to certain transactions with the VARs which are described below, and what the Claimants alleged were back-to-back transactions with friendly counterparties. It is claimed that Autonomy purchased from the counterparty software or other goods or services that Autonomy did not need, in order to fund the purchase by that counter party of high margin software from Autonomy. The Claimants contend that these reciprocal, or round-trip transactions, also were contrived with the dishonest purpose of artificially boosting apparent high margin software sales. It is said that this had the effect of giving an exaggerated depiction of the success of Autonomy's core business.
- 50.4.** The “**hosted case**” relates to transactions between Autonomy (or Zantaz) and existing customers. Under these transactions, Autonomy agreed to forego future recurring revenue from the provision of hosted archiving services (which was a substantial and lucrative part of Autonomy's business) for monthly (or other periodic) fees in return for the customer paying a one-off and heavily discounted capital sum for a licence to use Autonomy software outside the hosted environment. The licence was alleged to be illusory, and its issue and sale was said to be for the dishonest purpose of treating it as akin to sale of goods so as to justify the immediate (that is at the transaction date) recognition of the sale proceeds as revenue. Again, it was alleged that the intended effect was artificially to boost apparent revenue in the period in question.

50.5. The “**OEM case**” relates to the presentation in the narrative part of Autonomy’s accounts of information about the revenue from its OEM business, variously described as “*OEM*”, “*OEM derived*” and latterly “*IDOL OEM*”. The Claimants’ case is that revenue so presented would be taken in the market to have been generated by a transaction with an Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”) for Autonomy software to be embedded in the OEM’s hardware. Autonomy would in return receive royalty payments on all their sales of such hardware (and thus a recurring revenue stream). The Claimants say that in fact Autonomy included in what was compendiously described as the “*OEM Metric*”, revenues from one-off sales of software licences to customers which were not OEMs under contracts which did not provide for royalties or any other recurring revenue. The Claimants did not impugn the transactions themselves but contended that it was misleading and dishonest to include the latter revenues within the OEM metric. The Claimants claim that this gave the false impression of a valuable recurring category of revenues, and thereby dishonestly misrepresented the quality and reliability of Autonomy’s revenue and earnings.

50.6. The “**Other Transactions case**” relates to an amorphous collection of four sets of transactions entered into in late 2010 and early 2011 by ASL, Autonomy Spain SL and Autonomy Inc (and which I refer to as the “Other Transactions”). The Claimants’ case in respect of three of those transactions is that what was sold was not simply a piece of software purchased together with separately charged additional services. They say that it was in fact a composite ‘solution’ of which the provision of services was an integral part. The Claimants alleged that it was wrong to recognise revenue at the point of sale (as Autonomy had done) and that revenue recognition was required to be deferred until the delivery of a fully functioning product had been concluded, or at least until some subsequent stage in the installation of the software for the customer had occurred, enabling its use as a working solution. The fourth transaction raised an entirely separate and singular issue about whether the calculation of the “*fair value*” of the licence sold (to a company called Iron Mountain) was correct, which also determined whether revenue from the transaction had been correctly stated or overstated by Autonomy.

Factual basis: the breach of duty claim for transactional losses

51. The third legal head of claim was the breach of duty claim for transactional losses. This relates to four categories of transaction: (i) loss-making “pure hardware” sales; (ii) VAR transactions where a marketing assistance fee (“MAF”) was paid to the VAR; (iii) alleged reciprocal transactions and VAR transactions involving a reciprocal element and (iv) Schedule D hosting transactions.
52. In Schedule 12 of the Re-Re-Amended Points of Claim (“Schedule 12”), the Claimants identified a number of the hosting lump sum transactions (set out specifically in Schedule 12D). Autonomy Inc, the Fourth Claimant, was the contracting party for most of these transactions. Zantaz was the contracting party on three out of four of the Schedule 12D hosting transactions, and also for some of the MAF payments, and reciprocal transactions. ASL, as well as being the company within the group to which losses arising from these transactions were transferred (but not assigned), was also the original contracting or paying party in respect of some of the MAF payments and reciprocal transactions. Zantaz assigned to Autonomy Inc all of its rights, title to and interest in, amongst other matters, any claims, rights and causes of action that Zantaz had against third parties, and notice of such assignment was given to the Defendants on 27 March 2015.

Findings

53. In summary, my findings in relation to each of the heads of claim are as follows:

Findings: the FSMA and direct fraud and / or Misrepresentation Act claims

The hardware case

54. The purpose of the hardware selling strategy was to meet market expectations of revenue maintenance and growth, by misleading the market as to the true market position of Autonomy. These loss-making transactions were not commercially justified on any basis. The justifications advanced by the Defendants were no more than pretexts to increase stated revenue in the accounts. The strategy was not for the purpose of raising software revenue sales. That justification was a pretence, fashioned principally for the audit committee and Deloitte, who would not have approved the accounting treatment without the pretence.

55. Both concealment of the hardware sales and their true cost in Autonomy's accounts and other published information were necessary because revelation of the Autonomy's use of hardware sales, and the erosion of gross margin would have nullified their true purpose. This would have exposed that Autonomy's software business was not generating the accelerating revenue and profits which the market thought it was, and which heavily influenced its price.
56. In my judgment:
- 56.1. The hardware reselling programme was conceived, expanded and implemented in order to enable Autonomy to cover shortfalls in software revenue by selling hardware and including the revenue without differentiation in revenue shown in the accounts as generated by Autonomy's software business.
 - 56.2. To succeed, the hardware reselling had to be concealed from the market, but sufficiently revealed to Autonomy's auditors and audit committee to secure their apparently fully informed approval of the company's accounts.
 - 56.3. The imperative that the reselling should be concealed from the market required a variety of accounting devices which had to be presented in such a way as to secure the approval of the auditors and the audit committee. In particular, their approval had to be secured to treat the costs of the hardware reselling programme, not as Costs of Goods Sold ("COGS"), which would have eroded gross margin and encouraged both analyst and market inquiry and concern, but instead as Sales and Marketing expenses which had no such adverse effect on key investment parameters.
 - 56.4. The means by which this difficult balancing act was achieved are set out in my judgment. Suffice it to say that the auditors and audit committee were persuaded to regard the purpose of all hardware sales as being to generate revenue and new orders for the software business, and to account for hardware costs accordingly.
 - 56.5. The strategy also required that the contribution of hardware reselling revenues to overall revenues should be disguised or concealed, and that again the auditors and audit committee nevertheless being satisfied that such disclosure as was given was sufficient. That balancing act also was successfully achieved.

- 56.6.** The purpose of the hardware reselling strategy/programme was dishonest, and the way it was accounted for depended on its dishonest presentation.
- 56.7.** The Defendants were well aware of this.
- 56.8.** Although I doubt that this justifies the quantum of loss in the amount claimed in respect of it, in terms of liability the Claimants' hardware case has been established.
57. The Claimants reasonably relied on the truth of what was said about the revenue in the accounting material and were induced to buy Autonomy for \$11.1b.
58. These facts satisfy both limbs of the FSMA claim and also give rise to liability on the part of both Defendants to the Claimants in respect of the direct fraud and/or Misrepresentation Act claims, and for breach of duty as employee and/or directors owed to the Autonomy companies in embarking on the hardware selling strategy.

The reseller or VAR case

59. Sales to VARs enabled Autonomy to recognize income before any sale to an end user. This enabled Autonomy to make good shortfalls in software business revenues relative to market forecasts. Dr Lynch and Mr Hussain kept a very careful watch over revenues, especially towards the end of a quarter when Autonomy would have to post its results. If such a shortfall became apparent, a VAR sale would be arranged, usually on the same day, to cover it, with no questions asked. Almost all the impugned VAR sales were to a small group of "friendly" VARs.
60. Although the "VAR buyers" accepted they were legally bound by the terms of the contracts, the impugned VAR transactions had no commercial substance. They were a means by which Autonomy could maintain the appearance of meeting revenue targets at the end of a quarter.
61. In truth there was a pattern which emerged very clearly from all of the impugned VAR transactions. They were all large, entered into at the very end of the quarter, after no investigation by the VAR of the liability they were legally undertaking. The VAR would often not have the financial ability to meet the stated payment obligation out of its own resource, and in reality there was never any expectation or intention that it should do so, there never being any expectation on the part of either Autonomy or the VAR that the contractual terms would

ever be enforced. There was a clear understanding, and it was invariably the fact, that the VAR would play no part in seeking to procure any contract with the end-user. If payment were ever required from a VAR, it would come either from the end-user, or if no contract were made with the end-user, payment would be waived or another transaction would be generated. This would involve Autonomy providing the VAR with the means to meet any obligation it owed under the VAR transaction. No VAR was ever to be left “on the hook” or “carrying the bag”.

62. The purpose of the strategy was to ensure that Autonomy continued to appear to be a company which met its forecasts out of the sales of IDOL and related software and thereby maintained its share price. The VAR strategy became of additional importance and increased in volume when the hardware selling strategy underwent difficulties when Autonomy’s main hardware supplier suddenly drew back from its association with Autonomy. VAR sales and hardware sales were turned on and off by Autonomy at the end of each quarter depending on the levels of revenue required to be shown in the accounts.
63. The VAR strategy was directed by Mr Hussain and encouraged and presided over by Dr Lynch. Both knew that the VAR transactions were not being accounted for according to their true substance. Both knew that the recognition of revenue on the sale to the VAR was improper, and that the accounts were thus false.
64. Deloitte did not see the full picture, or alternatively preferred to accept reassurance that ostensibly negated the true purpose of the VAR transactions. In any event neither the approval of Deloitte nor that of the audit committee was fully and properly informed, and the fact of it does not avail the Defendants, who knew that.
65. The Claimants reasonably relied on the truth of the financial information provided by Autonomy (both numerical and narrative), including what was said about the revenue in the accounting material, and were induced to buy Autonomy for \$11.1billion.
66. These facts satisfy both limbs of the FSMA claim and also give rise to liability on the part of both Defendants to the Claimants in respect of the direct fraud and/or Misrepresentation Act claims, and for breach of duty as employees and/or directors owed to Autonomy companies in embarking on the VAR strategy.

The reciprocal transactions case

67. There were two types of, so called, “reciprocals”.
68. In the case of the VAR reciprocals (related to the VAR case above), which involved the purchase by Autonomy of a product from a VAR, I am satisfied that in each case Autonomy purchased from the VAR a product for which it had little or no identified need or use. It was done in order to funnel funds to the VAR to enable it to appear to discharge its indebtedness to Autonomy under a VAR agreement. The purchase by Autonomy was the means of getting the VAR “off the hook” of the legal obligation to pay, which it was never expected or intended it would in fact be required to meet out of its own resources. No revenue should have been recognized. The Defendants were in each case aware of the contrived nature of Autonomy’s purchase and its true purpose. They had guilty knowledge accordingly.
69. In the case of reciprocal transactions, Autonomy would identify a counterparty with an interest in purchasing Autonomy software, but which would in all probability not make any purchase at the price set by Autonomy unless it could sell Autonomy its own products and use the sale proceeds to fund its own purchase. The strategy was assisted by the fact that Autonomy had no list price for IDOL and could in effect choose its price. This would be a matter of indifference to the reciprocal purchaser, since it would be receiving funds from Autonomy under its reciprocal sale to Autonomy. By increasing the price, Autonomy could maximise its apparent revenue.
70. I am satisfied that in the case of each of the transactions impugned on this ground, the reason for Autonomy’s purchase was to enable the counterparty to purchase a licence for Autonomy software. This would generate recognized revenue which Autonomy could show in its accounts to cover shortfalls in revenue for the relevant quarter. Thus, Autonomy’s purchase was another means of Autonomy buying recognised and reportable revenue at substantial cost. The purchase and sale should have been accounted for on a net basis. I am satisfied that both Defendants knew that these reciprocal or round-trip transactions also were contrived with the dishonest purpose of artificially boosting apparent high margin software sales, with the effect of giving an exaggerated depiction of the success of Autonomy’s core business.
71. As with the VAR, and Hardware cases, I find reasonable reliance on the part of the Claimants, and liability established on the FSMA claim.

72. There are also direct fraud and Misrepresentation Act claims made out in respect of these reciprocal claims. I also find the case made out in respect of those direct claims.

The hosted case

73. The impugned hosted transactions all involved a lump sum payment being made by the existing Autonomy customer who was already making periodic payments for Autonomy hosting its archive, for what on the face of it appeared to be a software licence. An example would be the right to transfer Autonomy software from Autonomy's hardware to the customer's in-house hardware, or to a third-party's directed hardware. These transactions inevitably also involved substantially reduced periodic payments going forward. All of the lump sum would be recognised immediately as income by Autonomy. This was a true way of accounting for that income, if it was truly a payment for software rights. If it was no more than the price paid for the reduction in the later periodic payments for hosting services, then it was misleading to treat what was compensation for a later reduction in revenue as an immediately realized sum.

74. The lump sum arrangements I have just described were in reality almost invariably a response not to customer interest, but to the Defendants' obsession with ensuring Autonomy achieved or came as close as possible to meeting revenue forecasts. The licence was a device calculated to justify revenue recognition which conferred legal rights which neither side intended or expected would ever be deployed.

75. The introduction of a formal legal right of no intended commercial consequence would not in any material way alter the hosting arrangements between the contracting parties, which both parties intended to carry on as before.

76. Both Defendants were aware of the true nature of these lump sum arrangements and that they were driven by income recognition. Any software rights bestowed were never expected to be exercised. They knew it gave a false impression to recognise the income immediately.

77. The Claimants relied on the figures given as to revenue including the lump sum payments and it was reasonable for them to do so.

78. I have concluded that both limbs of the FSMA claim are established.
79. In Schedule 12, the Claimants identified a number of the hosting lump sum transactions (set out specifically in Schedule 12D) which involved significant reductions in periodic payments. The Claimants contended these contracts were commercially unjustifiable. Because they were only motivated by the desire for income recognition, the deals were commercially unfavourable to Autonomy and they had no purpose beyond income recognition, I find the breach of duty established in respect of each of the Schedule 12D transactions.

The OEM case

80. I have concluded that the perception and attraction of the OEM Metric as presented to the market was that it comprised a distinctive revenue stream, which was recurring and reliable because it derived from royalty payments made by or through the OEMs in whose hardware the Autonomy software was embedded. That revenue stream also included incremental revenue from sales to the OEM of updates and upgrades for that software. It was a stream of income which involved little or no further cost of sales. OEMs also usually had established market reputations; and the embedding of Autonomy software in their hardware assisted Autonomy in terms of market penetration. There was evidence that the market placed special value on OEM business for all these reasons.
81. However, a substantial proportion of the sales categorized as OEM sales in the accounting documents, and in the representations made by the Defendants from March 2011 onwards, did not have this recurring nature, nor were they to OEMs. Instead, they were one-off sales to buyers. They would not offer the same advantages, did not yield a recurring royalty or royalty type payment, and they would not ensure the same certainty of incremental purchases of updates and upgrades to protect and enhance the OEM's own product and reputation.
82. I have found that both Defendants knew that the accounts and the representations they made in this regard gave a misleading picture of Autonomy's OEM business. They did so because they knew revenues were included from transactions lacking the characteristics associated with OEM business. They knew that such revenues were considered in the market to generate a particularly dependable and valuable revenue stream.

83. The direct representations which the Defendants made confirmed the depiction of Autonomy's OEM business and the revenue it generated which was given in Autonomy's published information.
84. This was another matter on which HP reasonably relied on in proceeding with its Acquisition for \$11.1 billion.
85. Both the FSMA claim and the direct fraud and/or Misrepresentation Act claims are made out against the Defendants.
86. There are no breach of duty claims under this head

The Other Transactions case

87. The Other Transactions allegedly had, and were designed to have, the effect of enabling Autonomy to recognise or accelerate the recognition of revenue for the purpose of achieving revenue forecasts in a given quarter.
88. The Claimants did not, apparently "*due to time constraints*", cross-examine Dr Lynch in relation to any these four transactions. Therefore, the Claimants accepted that they could not pursue an allegation that Dr Lynch had knowledge of their false accounting.
89. However, they submitted that the Other Transactions remain relevant given that:
 - 89.1.** the Claimants maintained that there was false accounting in relation to each of the transactions and they continued to allege that Mr Hussain knew of that false accounting; and
 - 89.2.** if (as the Claimants alleged) there was false reporting in relation to the Other Transactions, it fell to be taken into account when assessing loss.
90. In my draft judgment I have considered each of these four Other Transactions in detail. I have concluded in respect of each of them, that the Claimants have failed to establish that the accounting treatment adopted with the approval of Deloitte was wrong rather than a matter of accountancy judgement on which views might properly differ. In those circumstances, the

question of Mr Hussain's guilty knowledge does not arise, and this head of claim makes no contribution to any loss calculation.

Findings: the breach of duty claim for transactional losses

91. In relation to the claim for transactional losses, Dr Lynch was the President of Autonomy Inc, and he owed legal duties to that company as a director. He was a de facto director of ASL and owed duties to it. I find that Mr Hussain was a de jure director of all three relevant subsidiaries, Autonomy Inc, Zantaz and ASL,- and owed duties to all three.
92. I find that the transfer pricing arrangements which gave rise to the losses from transactions being transferred to ASL do not allow ASL to sue for those losses, and nor is there any legal basis for impugning the conduct of the Defendants in entering into those arrangements. But nor do they cause the subsidiaries who suffered the original losses to be treated as though they had suffered no loss, nor deprive them of the right to claim in respect of the losses. How they deal with the losses subsequently for example by price shifting arrangements does not effect the claims.
93. In respect of each of the transactions impugned under the four heads identified in this claim, as being of no commercial benefit to Autonomy Inc, ASL and Zantaz I find that case made out. I find that both Defendants breached their duties in causing or allowing these transactions to take place in respect of ASL and Autonomy Inc.
94. I emphasise that the breach of duty in respect of ASL is not the transfer pricing arrangements, but the original involvement in the Schedule 12 identified MAF payments, and reciprocal transactions.
95. I find Mr Hussain liable in respect of each one of the Zantaz impugned transactions in Schedule 12, and their claim may validly be made as assignee by ASL. Dr Lynch was neither a de jure nor de facto director of Zantaz, and no direct claim succeeds against him in respect of any of Zantaz transactions.

96. The pleaded quantum of the loss for the direct claims is \$76.1 million. Whether that is the correct figure, I will determine in the quantum judgment.
97. That concludes a summary of my findings. I now deal with a number of other matters.

Quantum

98. I have not included in my embargoed draft judgment to be delivered to the parties today detailed findings or conclusions on quantum. The parties have called evidence and addressed full argument on quantum. I considered it inappropriate to delay my judgment on liability when it could have an effect on other proceedings, in particular the extradition proceedings, to allow completion of the quantum section. I have however provisionally determined that even if adjusted to take account of the fraud, HP would still have considered Autonomy, with its signature product, IDOL, a suitable acquisition whereby to effect transformational change. I would expect the quantum to be substantially less than is claimed.
99. The evidence on the quantum part of the case was dense and voluminous. There was extended cross-examination. I will now proceed to consider that aspect of the case. That section will take some time to complete and further submissions may be necessary.

Counterclaim

100. Dr Lynch also brought a Counterclaim. Dr Lynch contended that HP's public and much-publicised announcement of a claim against the Defendants of \$5 billion was precipitate and had no properly formulated basis. I need say nothing about this. My findings in the main claim undermine his counterclaim. I have not therefore addressed it in my draft judgment. If there remains anything of substance, I am sure I will be told of it.

Final matters

101. This has been an unusually complex trial, 93 days long. Dr Lynch was cross-examined for 20 days. There was a database of many millions of documents from which there was extracted a trial bundle containing more than 28,000 documents. These documents have been the most reliable source of evidence. But there were also hundreds of pages of hearsay evidence, largely

comprised of transcripts from previous proceedings in the United States, both civil and criminal. The determination of this matter in its plainly natural forum has been made the more difficult by the concerns I have had about the reliability of some of the Claimants' witness and hearsay evidence, which bore signs of having been fashioned, rehearsed and repeated in the course of multiple previous proceedings in the US and the preparatory stages for them, and in some cases, of the constraints (such as the terms of promised immunity) under which it had been given.

102. Nevertheless, I have reached clear conclusions in these proceedings on the civil liability of Dr Lynch and Mr Hussain for fraud under FSMA, common law, and the Misrepresentation Act 1967, applying, of course, the civil standard of proof of the balance of probabilities.

The Parties' representatives

103. Finally, the legal representation and assistance provided to me in this case have been of the very highest standard. The longer my labours have continued the more I have understood and appreciated theirs and quite how much work has been put into these proceedings. I have been shown patience and understanding throughout. I wish to express my profound and genuine appreciation to them all for the quality of their work, and in particular the enormous help they have provided to me in what has been for everyone involved an exceptionally onerous case.

End.