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Chief Constable

Mr Adrian Farrow
HM Coroners Office
1 Mount Tabor Street
Stockport
SK1 3AG

30 September 2022

Dear Mr Farrow

Re Regulation 28 report following the inquest into the deaths of Brandon James Pryde (Brandon Geasley) and David Ernest Faulkner

Thank you for your report dated 12 August 2022 in respect of the tragic deaths of Brandon James Pryde (Brandon Geasley) and David Ernest Faulkner and pursuant to Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 and Paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

Having carefully considered your report and the evidence submitted at the inquest I make the following observations and recommendations to hopefully address the areas of concern.

Greater Manchester Police (GMP) use the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) as the relevant guidance for the management of police pursuits.

GMP is part of a collaboration with other Northwest forces in respect of policing the motorway network. The collaboration is known as the Northwest Motorway Patrol Group (NWMPG) and is managed by Cheshire Police. The NWMPG is a communications and command and control collaboration rather than a fully integrated operational collaboration.

It is the position of GMP that pursuits should be authorised and commanded by the most appropriate authority in the specific circumstances as they are presented. This is an agreed position with the NWMPG.

GMP accepts that during this pursuit, no authority accepted formal responsibility to authorise or command the pursuit prior to the collision, other than the pursuit commander, under appropriate self-authorisation, in line with APP.

GMP agree with the coroners findings that this omission did not contribute to the outcome and observe that, having reviewed similar pursuits, that failure to take command and control is not a common issue.

GMP submits that, had the pursuit continued, there would have been further communication between control rooms resulting in confirmation of which authority had command and control responsibility. It was the relatively short nature of the pursuit that contributed to the omission. Were this set of circumstances to arise in future pursuit situations the updated managing pursuit protocol supported by the training being implemented would result in GMP taking command and control responsibility.

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Notwithstanding those observations, it is clear from the evidence that individuals within the control room were not clear on the guidance set out in the managing pursuits protocol. It is also acknowledged that the guidance itself could be clearer on the general principles of command and control.

It is the case that guidance documents cannot cater for every specific situation and, to some degree, must rely on subjective decision making of those in the control rooms as to who is the most appropriate authority to accept and retain command and control in spontaneous pursuits.

It is the agreed position of GMP and the NWMPG that when a spontaneous pursuit is initiated then the 'Pursuit Commander' will self-authorise until a control room supervisor is in a position to take command and control of the pursuit.

Where a pursuit commences, the authorising authority shall be that upon which the Pursuit Commander is communicating unless specifically instructed otherwise.

If a pursuit moves from one authority area to another, or the pursuit commences on a different authority area to which the communication platform is aligned, then communications links will be established between the respective control rooms, but the command and control will remain with the originating authority until such a time is deemed appropriate by the respective control room supervisors to hand over command and control.

In response to the below three areas of concern raised in the regulation 28 notice I make the following observations;

The GMP Force Duty Supervisor assumed that the NWMPG Supervisor had taken Command and Control when they had not done so.

The NWPGM Supervisor did not communicate whether they had taken Command and Control clearly.

The GMP Force Duty Supervisor did not consider that they had any authority to perform Command and Control of the pursuit once it had entered the motorway network.

GMP have committed to further training for all those who may be involved in the command and control of police pursuits. It was identified that whilst drivers had received significant investment over recent years this had not been the case for officers and staff engaged on the command-and-control element of pursuit management.

GMP now has a Pursuit Management Working Group which is leading on a review and re-development of training for dispatch operators and commanders. The below is a summary of the current position:

- A 1-day initial pursuit course has been devised by the Driver Training Unit. This will be delivered to Supervisors and operators involved in the management of initial phase pursuit and will align with training provided to Police drivers who have completed the Initial Pursuit course (IPP). A training schedule is being drawn up now for delivery anticipated to be completed within the next 6-9 months due to high numbers requiring training.

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
- *A 4-day tactical phase commanders' course is in the final stages of design by the Driver Training Unit and Command Training (Specialist Operations). This will be delivered to the 8 Force Duty Officers (FDO) and 7 Assistant Force Duty Officers (AFDO) within GMP. This will enable a policy change with the authorisation of pursuits moving from the Force Duty Supervisor to the FDO/AFDO role. A training schedule is being drawn up and delivery anticipated within the next 6 months.*
- *Training for Team 3 dispatch operators – those managing specialist resources – is being designed. Delivery of this is planned to take place within the next 6-9 months.*
- *Accreditation, re-training and Continuous Professional Development (CPD) are in design and final details will be confirmed through the working group.*

This training will include revised guidance in relation to the command protocols for cross border pursuits, and specifically the nuance of the NWMPG collaboration. Training will be given to new staff and refreshed with those who remain in their role.

The Protocol did not operate in practice so that there was no effective Command and Control at any point during the pursuit.

As a result of this tragic incident GMP and Cheshire Police (on behalf of the NWMPG) have revised the managing pursuits protocol and produced a clearer document which removes the previous ambiguity on the issue of Command and Control. This document will be circulated to all GMP control room staff involved in the management of police pursuits.

Yours sincerely, /

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of the Chief Constable.


Chief Constable