

lan Potter HM Assistant Coroner for Inner North London HM Coroners Office

29 April 2024

Re: Regulation 28 Report – Vanessa Ford

Dear Sir,

I refer to your report dated 4 March 2024 made under paragraph 7, schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere condolences to the family of Ms Ford. Please be assured that we take all incidents of this nature on the railway incredibly seriously and have carefully considered the matters raised in your report.

Your report identifies a number of matters of concern on which you request Network Rail's response. I have taken each of these matters in turn.

(1) Access to the railway tracks in the vicinity of Hackney Central/Dalston Kingsland

In your report you refer to three (non-fatal) incidents in the vicinity of the Hackney Central/Dalston Kingsland areas of the rail network in the 12 months prior to this incident on 23 September 2023. You also refer to the British Transport Police Post Incident Site Report (DOCU Reference: DOCU 2023 1576) which refers to these incidents. Though Network Rail works closely with the BTP following fatal accidents on the railway and participates in a post-incident site visit the PISR is authored by the BTP.

I can confirm that the three incidents referred to each occurred at the Hackney Central and Dalston Kingsland railway stations. These are publicly accessible locations and in each instance access was taken from the public station areas directly onto the track. Management of the stations and relevant access mitigations is the responsibility of London Overground as Station Facility Owner. The three incidents referred to therefore do not suggest that access to the railway tracks by members of the public may be a frequent issue in this vicinity. We have no other records of unauthorised access at this location.

(2) Mitigation measures

The specification, inspection and maintenance of railway boundary measures, including the particular piece of wall which was used to access the railway network on 23 September 2023, is specified in Network Rail standard NR_L2_OTK_5100 Boundary Measure Management Manual. All boundaries to the rail network are assessed in accordance with Network Rail standards. This includes assessing the likelihood of trespass and the adequacy of boundary measures, which includes consideration of the risks associated with the adjoining land use including ancillary features of a location (such as the presence of street furniture) which may exacerbate a risk or require further mitigation.

I can confirm that all relevant inspection records were up to date and the boundary at this location was confirmed to meet Network Rail standards on its last inspection on 17 January 2023.

I note the evidence referred to in your report regarding the nature of the wall at this location, specifically the wall along Martel Place referred to in the Post Incident Site Report. The wall has reviewed again following receipt of your report as part of Network Rail's continuous boundary asset management approach.

Although the boundary is assessed as compliant to Network Rail standards, we are working with the Local Authority to explore if further measures can be implemented to address the specific concerns identified by this incident. Works have already been scheduled to be undertaken on during early May to the access gate at Martel Place so that it matches the height of the adjacent palisade fencing and the gap underneath the fence and the climbing foothold will be removed. We are working with the Local Authority to consider options to add additional measures to the wall which may include the installation of Vanguard anti-climb rollers, planting Hawthorne or similar and installation of signage to warn people of the risks of the drop to the railway at the other side of the wall. It is anticipated that the selected option will be installed by early May 2024.

(3) Street furniture

Street furniture such as the recycling bins or electrical boxes referred to in your report are managed by the Local Authority. In relation to specific issues on Dalston Lane Road Bridge and Martel Place, Network Rail is liaising with the Local Authority and understand that its Streetscene department is looking to re-locate some of the recycling bins. Though this is outside of Network Rail control we continue to support the exploration of any improvements that can be made at this location, alongside the physical mitigations being explored as detailed above. We consider that the mitigation works referred to above to add additional measures to the boundary will also address the concerns raised in your report regarding the electrical box.

I hope that this response answers your concerns but if I can be of any further assistance, or if you would like further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

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Route Director, Anglia Route