## **REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS**

|   | REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS   |
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|   | THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:   |
|   | <ol> <li>Care</li> <li>NHS ENGLAND</li> </ol>   |
| 1 | CORONER   |
|   | I am Hannah Godfrey Area Coroner for the coroner area of Berkshire  |
| 2 | CORONER'S LEGAL POWERS  |
|   | I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.   |
|   | A prevention of future deaths report raises issues and is a recommendation that action should be taken but does not recommend what that action should be. That is a matter for the recipient.   |
|   | It is important to note the case of $R$ ( <i>Dr Siddiqui and Dr Paeprer-Rohricht</i> ) v Assistant<br>Coroner for East London. This case clarifies that the issuing and receipt of a Regulation<br>28 report entails no more than the coroner bringing some information regarding a public<br>safety concern to the attention of the recipient. The report is not punitive in nature and<br>engages no civil or criminal right or obligation on the part of the recipient, other than the<br>obligation to respond to the report in writing within 56 days. |
| 3 | INVESTIGATION and INQUEST   |
|   | On 23 May 2024 I opened an inquest into the death of Mrs Susan Dear on 4 January 2023 aged 72. The inquest concluded on 9 September 2024.   |
|   | The family requested that I refer to Mrs Dear as Susan, which this report will reflect.   |
|   | The conclusion of the inquest was that Susan had died of natural causes (Pulmonary Embolism due to underlying Deep Vein Thrombosis).  |
| 4 | CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH  |
|   | Susan was suffering abdominal pain, and her family called 999 at 10.20 pm on 3 January and that call was triaged at category 3 (meaning that an ambulance was expected to be on scene within 120 minutes).  |
|   | At that time the inquest heard that there were 48 patients awaiting ambulances, 7 were waiting for category 2 ambulances with the longest wait time being 1 hour 12 minutes, 19 patients were waiting for category 3 ambulances with the longest wait time being 7 hour 55 minutes.   |
|   | Susan's symptoms deteriorated and a second 999 call made at 2.32 on 4 January was triaged at category 2 (meaning that an ambulance was expected to be on scene within   |

|   | 40 minutes).  |
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|   | At that time the area was in OPEL 4, the highest OPEL level, indicating Extreme Pressure on resources. There were 37 patients waiting for ambulances. 9 patients were awaiting category 2 ambulances with the longest wait being 5 hours 53 minutes, and 26 patients were awaiting Category 3 ambulances, with the longest waiting time being 14 hours 39 minutes.  |
|   | There was no ambulance resource available to respond at any time to Susan.  |
|   | At around 5 am Susan's family decided they could wait no longer and drove her to hospital, where she was recognised as deceased shortly after arrival at 6.02 am.   |
|   | On the evidence at inquest I did not find that the ambulance delay contributed to Susan's death.  |
| 5 | CORONER'S CONCERNS  |
|   | During the course of the investigation and inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.  |
|   | The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:  |
|   | (1) South Central Ambulance Service ('SCAS')'s internal investigation established<br>that there had been no missed opportunity to send an ambulance during the<br>time that Susan was waiting overnight on 3 to 4 January 2023 as none was<br>available; and  |
|   | (2) overnight between 3-4 January 2023 patient's lives were put at risk because<br>SCAS did not have ambulances available to meet the level of demand resulting<br>in severe delay and ambulance response times far outside the national<br>expected standards; and   |
|   | (3) this was not unprecedented but was reflective of a picture of a chronic situation<br>whereby there was a continuing risk that demand for emergency ambulances<br>would outstrip resources and SCAS were unable to reassure me this was a<br>situation that had been resolved; and   |
|   | (4) SCAS have an SCAS wide improvement programme which is aimed at<br>increasing capacity, which is monitored by NHS England and the Trust's own<br>commissioners. There was no evidence indicating anything that it was within<br>SCAS's power to change on this occasion; and   |
|   | (5) SCAS's service was operating at under the number of planned staff for that<br>night, (despite the service taking all reasonable steps to meet requirements) due<br>to chronic understaffing of the service with recruitment and retention issues with<br>paramedic and other emergency response staff that the inquest heard are<br>problems nationally; and  |
|   | (6) handover delays at the Royal Berkshire Hospital and the Wexham Park Hospital<br>were found to be a substantial root cause of the problem (due to ambulance<br>staff being delayed at hospital with patients who could not be admitted to<br>Accident & Emergency as other patients were unable to be admitted to the<br>wards until beds were available) and that this was a problem that required<br>improvement at a national level with changes to the social care system to ease<br>the discharge of patients who required care in the community from the wards<br>back into the community; and |
|   | (7) resources were being wasted due to ignorance of some of members of the  |

|   | public engaging with the service, and the inquest heard that it was unlikely this would improve substantially without a programme of public education regarding when it is appropriate to call 999, and when it is not.  |
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| 6 | ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN   |
|   | In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you AND/OR your organisation have the power to take such action.   |
| 7 | YOUR RESPONSE  |
|   | You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 14 November 2024. I, the coroner, may extend the period.   |
|   | Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.  |
| 8 | COPIES and PUBLICATION   |
|   | I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons   |
|   | <ol> <li>South Central Ambulance Service and</li> <li>The Finchampstead Surgery.</li> </ol>  |
|   | I have also sent it to The CQC and The Association of Ambulance Chief Executives who may find it useful or of interest.  |
|   | I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  |
|   | The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary<br>form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful<br>or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your<br>response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. |
| 9 | 20 September 2024  |
|   | A. God   |
|   | Hannah GODFREY<br>Area Coroner for Berkshire   |