



EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS (ENGLAND AND WALES)

PRESIDENTIAL CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER

The President of Employment Tribunals may issue case management orders to further the [overriding objective](#) and he may do so, in particular, where claims and/or responses brought before the Employment Tribunals in England and Wales in multiple locations raise the same or similar issues. In doing so, the President will have regard to the interests of justice, the impact on the judicial and administrative resources of the Employment Tribunals, and any views expressed by the parties.

This case management order of the President concerns:

**Claims brought by Ms. Sandra Messi against multiple respondents
in various regions of the Employment Tribunals (England & Wales)**

Background

1. Ms. Sandra Messi has brought claims against multiple respondents in most regions of the Employment Tribunals (England and Wales).
2. By order dated 17 January 2025, His Honour Judge Tayler (sitting as a judge of the Employment Appeal Tribunal) directed that all current appeals lodged by Ms. Messi before the Employment Appeal Tribunal would be stayed pending the determination of an application by the Attorney General to the Employment Appeal Tribunal made under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.
3. That order did not extend to the Employment Tribunals, where Ms. Messi has a number of live claims. She also continues to make applications or send in correspondence about disposed claims. Those claims are set out in the attached schedule, details of which have been drawn from the case management system used by HM Courts and Tribunals Service. I am reliant upon the HMCTS case management system for the accuracy of the schedule.

Discussion

4. I have considered whether all claims brought by Ms. Messi to the different regions of the Employment Tribunals (England and Wales) should also be stayed, pending the determination of the Attorney General's application.
5. Before making such an order, my office supplied Ms. Messi with a draft of this order and sought her views. She objected on various grounds, which I consider below.

- 5.1 First, she contended that such an order would breach natural justice because it was made without hearing her views. That is factually wrong. She was supplied with a draft of the order and her views have been sought.
- 5.2 Second, she contended that the order would be in excess of my authority because her various claims do not “raise the same or similar issues”. That objection is misconceived. The use of this phrase in the general preamble to presidential case management orders that are published online operates to explain rather than constrain my approach to case management orders. Rule 2(1) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 defines a case management order as an order or decision of “any kind in relation to the conduct of proceedings”. Rule 30(1) confirms that such orders can be made on the tribunal’s own initiative. As a judge of this jurisdiction, it is plainly within my judicial power to make an order staying these proceedings.
- 5.3 Third, she contended that such an order would be in breach of my “recusal”. Ms. Messi says that she complained to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office on 13 November 2024 and that, as a result, I was “formally recused” from the case and have now “reinserted” myself into it. That is factually wrong. A complaint to the JCIO does not automatically lead to a judge’s recusal; were it otherwise, any party could make such a complaint in an effort to choose their own judge. Even if I were to treat Ms. Messi’s contention as an application for recusal now, I would refuse it. The test for apparent bias requiring recusal is, according to *Porter v Magill* [2002] 2 AC 357, whether the “fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the judge was biased”. I am satisfied that the fair-minded and informed observer would not consider it a realistic possibility that I am biased against Ms. Messi on the basis of her complaints against me and/or other judges of this jurisdiction. In my judgment, the fair-minded and informed observer would test her assertions of bias against her litigation history and conclude that they are without merit.
- 5.4 Fourth, she contended that such an order would constitute retaliation against her in respect of her complaints to the JCIO and is an attempt to “silence [her] permanently” in concert with the Attorney General and the various judges that she names. That objection is misconceived. There will be an opportunity in due course for Ms. Messi to address the Employment Appeal Tribunal in respect of the Attorney General’s application. My draft order did not propose the dismissal of her claims. Its effect would simply be to pause her live claims before the Employment Tribunals until the Attorney General’s application has been determined, and to pause any ongoing applications by her (such as for reconsideration) in respect of her disposed claims.
- 5.5 Fifth, she contended that such an order would be disproportionate. I reject that contention. Ms. Messi’s claims and ongoing applications and correspondence place a considerable burden on the limited resources

(both judicial and administrative) of the Employment Tribunals. Those claims and applications will, in many cases, require action to be taken by respondents, for which many will incur legal fees. The overriding objective of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, as confirmed by rule 3(1), is to deal with cases fairly and justly. That includes “saving expense”. The claims brought by Ms. Messi and the accompanying applications and correspondence adversely affect the ability of the Employment Tribunals to deal with other cases awaiting a hearing. An order pausing her proceedings, while the Attorney General’s application is considered, is plainly proportionate.

5.6 Sixth, she contended that such an order would contravene her rights under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights to a fair hearing and for access to justice. This is because, when combined with His Honour Judge Tayler’s order, it “creates a pattern of exclusion from the courts based on [her] JCIO complaints”. This contention is misconceived. As already noted, my draft order did not propose the dismissal of her claims and it does not anticipate the outcome of the Attorney General’s application. If that application fails, the stay will be lifted. The proposed order is a proportionate measure to manage the expenditure of this jurisdiction’s limited resources until that application has been considered judicially.

5.7 Seventh, she contended that the order contains procedural irregularities because it was undated. That contention is misconceived. The order was undated simply because it was a draft and she was being consulted about its proposed terms.

Decision

6. I reject each of Ms. Messi’s objections to my proposed order. In the light of my analysis above, I consider it proportionate and in accordance with the overriding objective to pause her live claims before the Employment Tribunals until the Attorney General’s application has been determined, and to pause any ongoing applications by her (such as for reconsideration) in respect of her disposed claims. I therefore order that all proceedings in which Ms. Messi is a claimant be **stayed until further order**.
7. As noted above, I am reliant upon the case management system used by HMCTS for the accuracy of the attached schedule. The inadvertent omission of a case from this schedule does not mean it is not covered by my order.
8. My order will be revisited when the Employment Appeal Tribunal has determined the Attorney General’s application. If the Attorney General’s application succeeds, the terms of the order made by the Employment Appeal Tribunal may supersede this order.
9. My order does not impact upon new claims that Ms. Messi may bring. Only the Employment Appeal Tribunal has power, under section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, to restrict a person from bringing new proceedings. However, it is a matter for an individual judge, having regard to this order, to determine whether future claims lodged by Ms. Messi should also be stayed

until the Attorney General's application has been determined.

Miscellaneous matters

10. Ms. Messi has made a number of other applications, which I will now address.
 - 10.1 First, for this order to be suspended. I refuse that application as being without merit. The order is made for the reasons I have given.
 - 10.2 Second, for an oral hearing. I refuse that application as being without merit. There is no evidence to be considered such as to make an oral hearing necessary. It would be impractical to hear from all respondents. Ms. Messi has been offered an opportunity to make submissions; she has done so and I have considered them.
 - 10.3 Third, to "reconsider" my involvement due to my "recusal". I refuse that application. I have never recused myself from dealing with her case and I have declined now to recuse myself for the reasons given at paragraph 5.3 above.
 - 10.4 Fourth, to consider assigning an "independent" judge to review my order. I refuse that application. It is misconceived. The way to challenge such an order is by way of appeal, subject to identifying an error of law.
 - 10.5 Fifth, to respond in writing to each of her objections. I have done so. If Ms. Messi is dissatisfied with my order, she may appeal, subject to identifying an error of law.
 - 10.6 Sixth, not to send this order to order to Acas. I refuse that application. It is misconceived. All decisions, whether in the form of judgments or orders, are routinely copied to Acas to enable them to pursue their conciliation powers. There is no reason to depart from that practice in this case.
 - 10.7 Seventh, not to send this order to any respondents. I refuse that application as being without merit. It is obvious that all respondents should be informed of my decision. It would be contrary to the important principle of open justice, as well as being wholly unfair, to deny them knowledge of it.
 - 10.8 Eighth, not to publish my order online. I refuse that application as being without merit. Presidential case management orders have always been [published online](#) because of the need for them to have a wider "reach", and one which extends beyond the parties to the case. It is appropriate not only for existing respondents to be aware of my order, but also for prospective respondents to be aware of it.
 - 10.9 Ninth, not to "allow any judgment to be published without any involvement or influence in regards to final claims in which was allowed to proceeded in which [she] was imposed to pay excessive deposit orders to access justice despite providing evidence that it will cause [her] extreme hardship". I refuse that application. It is misconceived. It would

not be appropriate for me, as President, to intervene in decisions reached by other judges. Such intervention would contravene the principle of judicial independence. The only circumstance in which one judge can overturn a decision of another judge is if they are considering that decision in their judicial capacity in an appeal hearing. It would also not be appropriate for me to intervene in the process by which judgments and written reasons are entered in the Register. That process is mandated by rule 65 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. There is, in any event, no discretion to decide that a judgment should not be entered in the Register at all; see paragraph 49 of *Ameyaw v PriceWaterhouseCoopers Services Ltd* (EAT/0244/18) and paragraph 26 of *L v Q Ltd* [2019] EWCA Civ 1417.

- 10.10 Tenth, to recuse myself. I refuse that application. See paragraphs 5.3 and 10.3 above.
- 10.11 Eleventh, to order the judges of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and/or the JCIO to lift all decisions made by HHJ Tayler. I refuse that application. It is misconceived. HHJ Tayler is independent of the JCIO and, in any event, as President, I have no power to overturn a decision taken by a judge of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Such decisions can only be made, in the context of a further appeal, by the Court of Appeal or (in Scotland) by the Inner House of the Court of Session.
- 10.12 Twelfth, to stay the Attorney General's application. I refuse that application. It is misconceived. I have no power to do as Ms. Messi requests.
- 10.13 Thirteenth, to provide all transcripts she has requested between June 2018 and October 2025 where Form EX107 has been provided. I refuse that application as being without merit. Such applications should be made to the judge that heard the case. Further, it is misconceived. It would not be appropriate for me, as President, to intervene in decisions reached by other judges to refuse a transcript at public expense; that would be a matter for an appeal, subject to identifying an error of law.
- 10.14 Fourteenth, to order the Attorney General to provide full disclosure of who applied for a restriction of proceedings order. I refuse that application. It is misconceived. I have no power to order the Attorney General to provide such disclosure. The Attorney General's application was made to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, not the Employment Tribunals.
- 10.15 Fifteenth, to tell her more about how the Attorney General came to make an application to the Employment Appeal Tribunal such as to make me, in turn, contemplate issuing such this order. I refuse that application. It is misconceived. I can say, however, that Ms. Messi's litigation history is a matter of public record and that I made this order of my own initiative. I reiterate that the effect of my order is simply to pause her proceedings until the Attorney General's application has been considered.

- 10.16 Sixteenth, to revoke all judgments published in the online Register on the basis that she has been “falsely labelled vexatious, unreasonable, dishonest, aggressive, threatening, intimidating” and that she has “harassed people”, which she says defame her. I refuse that application. It is misconceived. See what I said about the Register at paragraph 10.9 above.
11. If any party or representative in a particular case set out in the attached schedule wishes to make representations regarding the terms of this order, they should write to the President of the Employment Tribunals (England & Wales), supplying a copy to all other parties in that case, in accordance with [rule 90](#) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024.
12. A copy of this case management order shall be sent to ACAS, all known interested parties and published on the website of the Employment Tribunals at the link below:
<https://www.judiciary.uk/guidance-and-resources/directionsemployment-tribunals-england-wales>

SIGNED:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Barry Clarke', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Judge Barry Clarke
President

DATED: 06 November 2025

Schedule of claims currently before the Employment Tribunals

Claimant name	Respondent name	Claim Reference(s)
Sandra Messi	Canadian Solar UK Ltd	2200202/2017 & 2200868/2017
Sandra Messi	Bio-Rad Services UK Limited	3334267/2018
Sandra Messi	Susan Mann	2206758/2018
Sandra Messi	Croydon Logistics Ltd	2303102/2017, 2303470/2017 & 2300962/2018
Sandra Messi	Page Personnel	2203612/2019
Sandra Messi	Pret A Manger	2203613/2019
Sandra Messi	Tanvir Mazumder	2206501/2020
Sandra Messi	Alexander McQueen	2207426/2021
Sandra Messi	Amazon UK Services Ltd	2304911/2021
Sandra Messi	Anne Heaton	3321117/2021
Sandra Messi	Charles Novacraft Direct Limited	3321170/2021
Sandra Messi	Cordant People Limited	2204302/2021
Sandra Messi	Cordant People Limited	2204154/2021
Sandra Messi	Daria Pekala	3316467/2021
Sandra Messi	Manpower UK Ltd	3314273/2021
Sandra Messi	Manpower UK Ltd	3314225/2021
Sandra Messi	Nicholas Howard Limited	1404778/2021
Sandra Messi	Rameni Caussy	3314610/2021
Sandra Messi	Reiss	3207516/2021
Sandra Messi	Serco Group Plc	1401285/2021
Sandra Messi	Takeda UK Limited	3322788/2021
Sandra Messi	Deckers Europe Ltd	2201282/2022
Sandra Messi	LVMH Fashion Group UK	2202400/2022
Sandra Messi	Mars Chocolate UK	3305345/2022
Sandra Messi	Origin Multilingual	3204190/2022
Sandra Messi	Peter Downes	2302435/2022
Sandra Messi	Alvarez & Marsal Europe LLP	2214057/2023
Sandra Messi	Alvarez & Marsal Europe LLP	2214044/2023
Sandra Messi	Coremont Partership Services Ltd	2300226/2023
Sandra Messi	Hydrafacial UK Limited	1300098/2023
Sandra Messi	KAO (UK) Ltd	2212747/2023
Sandra Messi	Onclusive	2201228/2023
Sandra Messi	Onclusive	2200243/2023
Sandra Messi	Precise Media Ltd (T/A Onclusive)	2200391/2023
Sandra Messi	Shop Circle Ltd	2201793/2023
Sandra Messi	Stephanie Wright	2200827/2023
Sandra Messi	Stephen Skeete	2201789/2023
Sandra Messi	Epic Games UK Ltd	3311465/2023
Sandra Messi	Sonia Brosnan	2304116/2023
Sandra Messi	Beth Charles	4103947/2024
Sandra Messi	Casterbridge Tours Limited	2218535/2024

Sandra Messi	Casterbridge Tours Limited	2213167/2024
Sandra Messi	Casterbridge Tours ltd	2217721/2024
Sandra Messi	Change Grow Live	2303382/2024
Sandra Messi	Elle Louise Tucker	2303329/2024
Sandra Messi	Henry Clinton Davis	2218554/2024
Sandra Messi	Becca Pond	6019610/2024
Sandra Messi	Change Grow Life	6006412/2024
Sandra Messi	Change Grow Life	2304178/2024
Sandra Messi	Change Grow Live	2303961/2024
Sandra Messi	Change Grow Live	2303804/2024
Sandra Messi	Jack James Fagg	2304798/2024
Sandra Messi	Notting Hill Genesis	6014351/2024
Sandra Messi	Rachel Williams	2303853/2024
Sandra Messi	Revolut Ltd	6019186/2024
Sandra Messi	Gaynor Taylor	6005341/2024
Sandra Messi	The One Group	3303441/2025
Sandra Messi	Nomad Food Europe Limited	6001465/2025
Sandra Messi	Nomad Foods Ltd	6008658/2025
Sandra Messi	R2Vamp Ltd	6002655/2025
Sandra Messi	Royal College of Psychiatrists	6002653/2025
Sandra Messi	Royal School of Psychiatrists	6008724/2025
Sandra Messi	Electralink Limited	6032662/2025