

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT CENTRAL LONDON

Case No. M01CL046

Courtroom No. 84

Thomas More Building
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL

Wednesday, 19th November 2025

Before:
DISTRICT JUDGE RIPPON

B E T W E E N:

THE LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN

and

LESLIE MORGAN

Ms Sonia Rai (counsel) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
The Respondent did not attend and was not represented

JUDGMENT
(Approved)

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District Judge Rippon:

1. This is the sentence in the matter of *London Borough of Camden v Mr Leslie Morgan*, claim number M01CL046.
2. Mr Morgan fails to be sentenced for breaching an anti-social behaviour injunction which was made on 4 April 2025 by District Judge Mauger of this court, which I will refer to as “the injunction”.
3. Mr Morgan is not in attendance today, but he has been warned on numerous occasions that the Court would deal with his case in his absence if he did not attend, and more specifically, he was informed that he was at risk of this sentencing hearing going ahead in his absence.
4. I am satisfied that the order in which those warnings were given has been served personally on him by the claimant and as such I take his absence today at this sentencing hearing to be a conscious choice on his part.
5. I have found, based on the evidence adduced by the claimant, that I am satisfied to the criminal standard (that is, beyond reasonable doubt, under CPR 81.4(2)(o)), that Mr Morgan has breached the injunction: I made findings in respect of breaches committed in May 2025 at a hearing on 3 October 2025 which was also in the absence of Mr Morgan, despite him having been given warnings as to the consequences of failing to attend.
6. I made further findings at a hearing earlier today in respect of breaches committed on 25 June and 8 September 2025, which again was in his absence, despite having been given warnings as to the consequences of failing to attend.
7. The alleged breach on 30 August was dismissed because I was not satisfied that it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
8. The injunction was made on such terms as to forbid Mr Morgan from: (i) speaking to any occupier or visitor of Flat 205 Wendling Estate, Haverstock Road, London, NW5 4QY (“No 205”); or (ii) following any occupier or visitor to No. 205; or (iii) swearing at any occupier or visitor to No. 205; or (iv) passing through the front gate of No. 205.
9. The injunction was made to last until 4 April 2027 and was personally served on Mr Morgan on 17 April 2025.
10. The facts of the breaches as I have found them are as follows, that on 4 May 2025 at about 6.45pm Mr Morgan confronted Ms Yeasmin, one of the occupants of No. 205, as she was walking from the stairwell of Wendling Estate towards No. 205 and he walked behind her and shouted threats at her. The defendant continued to follow Ms Yeasmin as she walked around the estate and he continued to follow her as she walked to the front gate of her property and went inside. He continued to shout abuse at her and asked her, “Have you got something to say, say something to me?”
11. On 25 June at about 2.15pm Mr Morgan entered through the front gate of No. 205 and banged on the door, and having obtained no response, he banged again and then he began shouting at the occupants regarding a letter he had received which showed Ms Yeasmin’s name. He then walked off.
12. On 8 September at about 8.10pm, a family relative, that is an uncle of Ms Yeasmin attended the property and as he approached the front door and was waiting at it, he was shouted at by Mr Morgan.
13. I have two affidavits from Ms Yeasmin in respect of these proceedings which set out the effect of this antisocial behaviour on her and she says that in respect of the first breach she was fearful that she would be assaulted in her home because Mr Morgan was following

- her around the estate square and in respect of the second breaches she says that she was made to feel fearful and unsettled when entering the house.
14. The evidence of Mr Mumin and Ms Yeasmin in respect of the uncle who visited was that he was made to feel uncomfortable when attending the property.
15. The witness statements do not tell me as much as I would have liked in respect of the effect on the occupants and visitors to the house, and that is an important factor because it is a significant issue for me in assessing the harm of the breaches and the sentencing.
16. In formulating an overall sentence for these breaches I consider the objectives in sentencing for civil contempt which are: to ensure future compliance with the order; punishment; and rehabilitation, in that order.
17. I take into account also that in achieving these purposes there are only five possible choices in sentencing: an immediate order for committal to prison; a suspended order for committal to prison with conditions; adjourning consideration of a penalty; a fine; or no order at all.
18. I am guarded by the authority of *Lovett v Wigan Borough Council* [2022] EWCA Civ 1631 as to the correct approach in sentencing cases of this nature. That case authority refers to the Civil Justice Council Report on Antisocial Behaviour in the Civil Courts from July 2020. I have had regard to both in conducting this sentencing exercise. There are a number of steps set out in those documents to follow but not all of them apply in this case.
19. The first step is to identify the culpability for the breaches, and in my judgment, the breaches here all fall into Category B because they are deliberate breaches and they have a degree of persistence but they do not fall to be considered persistent “serious” breaches such as would fall into Category A.
20. The second step is to consider the level of harm caused by the breaches, and in my judgment the first breach, that is the May 2025 breach, falls into Category 2. It is clear from the evidence that I have read from Ms Yeasmin that the May 2025 breach caused more than just a little harm or distress, but they have not caused the level of harm that might be expected for very serious harm or distress in Category 1.
21. In respect of the June 2025 breach, this in my judgment falls into Category 3. I was given no evidence on the effect of this particular breach on the occupants of No. 205 and I was not given any evidence that the occupants who were actually in fact in occupation of the property at the time of the breach.
22. I accepted in my finding on the breach that the breach amounted to speaking to the occupants, but I have to bear in mind that if they were not actually in occupation, and as I say I have no evidence that they were, then the degree of harm is bound to be lower in watching the footage after the event than being present at the time of it.
23. In respect of the breach of 8 September, equally I place this into Category 3 because the evidence I am given is that this made the visitor uncomfortable. I cannot, on the basis of that evidence, conclude that it actually caused more than little harm or distress.
24. The starting point for a sentence for a B2 offence is one month’s custody with a range from adjourning consideration of sentence to three months in custody, and the starting point for a B3 offence is adjourning consideration with a range of that adjournment to a one-month custodial term.
25. I must consider any aggravating or mitigating features of the offence or of the offender.
26. I also bear in mind that I am sentencing for three breaches.
27. There are two approaches here; either I can pass a consecutive sentence on each breach reducing them as necessary to reflect totality; or I can pass a sentence on the most serious breach which reflects the totality of the offending and then pass concurrent sentences in respect of the less serious breaches. I will adopt the latter approach.

28. The fact that I am sentencing therefore for three breaches entitles me to move up from the starting point sentence but I take into account also the fact that there appears to be some targeting of Ms Yeesmin personally as opposed to any occupant or visitor of No. 205, and that the first breach was committed barely one month into the two-year order.
29. In mitigation, I bear in mind that this is Mr Morgan's first time before the Courts for a breach of this injunction and I am not told that he has any history of previous breaches or other failures to comply with court orders.
30. I bear in mind also that these breaches do not appear to be breaches which have any significant degree of planning on the part of Mr Morgan and two of them appear to be spontaneous which have been committed when the opportunity presented itself.
31. Taking into account those factors and balancing the aggravating and mitigating features, in my judgment they are of equal and opposite effect and the appropriate sentence here is one of 28 days in custody in respect of the breach in May 2025, with sentences of seven days in respect of the breach in June 2025, and seven days in respect of the breach in September 2025, all to run concurrently.
32. I must consider whether that should be an immediate sentence or whether it can be suspended and in making that decision I take into account the purposes of sentencing and as I have already set out, and the limited scope of sentencing options that I have.
33. While I recognise that the primary objective is to ensure continued compliance with the injunction, I have to consider whether, in the circumstances of the defendant who has no other history of breaches, ought not to be left without another chance to prove he is capable of complying.
34. I am not convinced in the circumstances that the appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody nor am I convinced that it would have a rehabilitative effect.
35. Balancing the many factors that I need to consider in the exercise of this judgment, I conclude that the appropriate course is to suspend the term of imprisonment and I do so for a period of 16 months which will have the effect of the risk of this term being activated being present for broadly the same period for which the injunction still has to run, that is until April 2027.
36. I am optimistic that the threat of immediate custody if there are further breaches will encourage Mr Morgan to comply with the order in the future, and I am convinced in light of the nature of the breaches that it would be appropriate to allow him a final chance to do so.
37. Accordingly, a suspended sentence should ensure that if Mr Morgan commits any further breaches during the course of this order he will be liable to have the 28 day term of custody I have passed today added to any term which may be imposed for a later breach,. This is of course subject to any attempt Mr Morgan may wish to make to purge either the contempt in respect of which I have already made findings or any later breach.
38. Mr Morgan has the right to appeal this decision without first seeking permission to do so. Any such appeal must be made to a circuit judge in the County Court at Central London and must be made within 21 days and I direct a transcript of these sentencing remarks be produced at public expense so it can be uploaded to the judiciary website in compliance with Rule 81.8(8).
39. The overall sentence, therefore, is 28 days committal to prison, suspended for a term of 16 months on condition that the defendant continues to comply with the existing order.

End of Judgment.

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This transcript has been approved by the judge.