



20 February 2026

Titan Wealth v. Okunola
Appeal No: CA-2024-002483
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 138

JUDGMENT SUMMARY

Important note for media and public: this summary forms no part of the court’s decision. It is provided so as to assist the media and the public to understand what the court decided. The full judgment of the Court of Appeal is the only authoritative document. Judgments are public documents and are available at: www.judiciary.uk, <https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk>

Introduction and prior proceedings

This appeal concerned the power to grant an injunction to restrain a party to legal proceedings from sending abusive communications to the lawyers for the other party. The appeal has been dismissed (see [26]-[32] and [89]).

The claimants were either part of the Titan Wealth Group which provides global fund, wealth and asset management services, or employees of Titan (together “Titan”). Titan was represented by the UK office of one of the largest law firms in the world, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan (Quinn Emanuel). Titan brought successful proceedings against the defendant for claims

including harassment of the third and fourth claimants under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PfHA).

The defendant is an expert in the Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS). CASS is part of the framework of regulatory rules established by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to protect the money and assets of the clients of regulated firms. The defendant was first engaged by Titan on 2 August 2022, through her private company, as a consultant. The defendant was then employed by the first claimant from 14-25 November 2022 as Senior Risk Manager.

After the defendant's employment, she brought 6 unsuccessful claims in the Employment Tribunal against Titan, the last of which was struck out on 20 December 2023. These employment claims were followed in January 2024 by what the defendant herself called a "plan for vengeance" against the claimants, which involved sending hundreds of abusive messages to many recipients

On 5 April 2024, Freedman J granted an interim pre-action injunction against the defendant restraining her from harassing the third and fourth claimants (the injunction). Titan started their proceedings against Ms Okunola on 11 April 2024. On 21 June 2024, Chamberlain J imposed a 6-month prison sentence on the defendant for breaches of the injunction, suspended on condition of future compliance. Unfortunately, despite the suspended sentence, Ms Okunola continued sending abusive messages to Titan and to Quinn Emanuel.

On 18 September 2024, Titan made an application for a further order against the defendant prohibiting her from: (a) publishing any message to or about the claimants' lawyers (or persons acting for them), which abused, belittled, demeaned, or insulted them, and (b) using profane or otherwise grossly offensive language or imagery in communications addressed or copied to the claimants' lawyers (the further injunction application). The further injunction application came

on for hearing before the judge at the same time as the trial of Titan's substantive claims, which took place on 9, 10 and 11 October 2024.

The communications sent by the defendant were not wholly unrelated to the proceedings in which the defendant was engaged. Two relatively mild examples were: (i) the defendant's email of 27 June 2024 at 8.05am saying: "... Unless it is mandated by the court you won't get a witness statement from me. That is a lot of work and I would like to be paid for it. You know you and your clients are bastards! ..." and (ii) the defendant's email of 3 July 2024 at 7.38pm about the trial date saying "I do not accept the Claimants offer of October!! Chamberlain J ordered Expedited Trial in July on 23 May 2024!! The Claimants are lying that they have no availability for the WHOLE OF JULY!!!". There were also several emails relied upon that were gratuitously abusive, obscene and insulting without any clear connection to an issue in the proceedings.

The judge found that the Defendant's conduct was (i) impinging upon the Claimants' legal team's ability to fulfil its duties to the Claimants as their clients; (ii) adversely affecting the Claimants' ability to conduct these proceedings properly and in accordance with the overriding objective; and (iii) having the indirect effect of preventing Mr Gailani, a witness, from giving his best evidence.

The judge held that the existence of a cause of action entitling the applicant to substantive relief was an overriding requirement for an injunction. Since no such cause of action was relied upon, the judge dismissed the further injunction application. Titan appealed to the Court of Appeal.

On 12 February 2025, Kerr J activated the defendant's prison sentence with immediate effect because she had breached the original injunction. The defendant was released from prison in or

about May 2025. It was not suggested to us that the defendant's conduct had continued since her release from prison.

The single ground of Titan's appeal was that the judge was wrong to conclude that she lacked jurisdiction to make the order sought and that she ought to have made the order sought. On the appeal, Titan sought a more limited form of order than it had sought from the judge.

The judgment

The Court of Appeal (Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Warby and Lady Justice Whipple in a single judgment of the Court) decided that the judge was wrong in law to conclude that she lacked any jurisdictional basis to grant the injunction. The judge had the power to grant an injunction of the kind sought under the inherent common law jurisdiction of the court to protect the integrity of its proceedings in the interests of justice. ([37]-[40] and [90]).

The power to grant an injunction of the kind sought was not limited to cases where the conduct restrained would, absent the injunction, be a criminal contempt of court. The court could, in theory, act in the interests of justice to restrain any conduct that was serious enough to threaten the integrity of its own process. In many cases, however, conduct of the kind that would be serious enough to threaten the integrity of its process and its proceedings would also be regarded as conduct of sufficient seriousness to found an allegation of contempt. ([41]-[45] and [91]).

Titan did not allege that the defendant's conduct in this case crossed the threshold of sufficient seriousness to found an allegation of contempt. But if contempt had been alleged and proved, neither article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (article 10) nor the immunity

from proceedings that attached to statements made in the course of litigation (the immunity) would have prevented the court exercising the power to grant an injunction to protect the integrity of its process. In cases where contempt was not established, the court would have to consider carefully (i) whether an injunction to restrain similar future conduct will impinge on article 10 rights (and if so, whether that interference can be justified under article 10(2)), and (ii) whether the order proposed respects the immunity from proceedings that attaches to statements made in the course of litigation. ([28]).

Accordingly, article 10, the immunity, and the fact that the affected lawyers at Quinn Emanuel could have brought their own claims against the defendant under the PfHA were all **relevant** to the court's consideration of the grant of an injunction of the type sought. ([29]).

The Court of Appeal considered how it could best give guidance to hard-pressed first instance judges faced with this kind of application. Unfortunately, though, one size never really fitted all. In a case where an injunction was sought to restrain specific misconduct within the proceedings, the applicant needed to show a threat or at least a real prospect that the defendant would engage in serious misconduct that would create a material risk of interference with the integrity of the court's process or proceedings. If the misconduct would not amount to a contempt of court, the court needed to consider article 10 and section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the one hand and the immunity on the other hand. ([30]).

The court had to exercise its discretion as to whether an injunction should be granted in all the circumstances. If it were to be granted, the relief had to be tailored so as to restrain such threatened misconduct as created a material risk of interference with the integrity of the proceedings, but not in wider terms than were necessary to do justice nor to interfere with the defendant's right freely to conduct the litigation as they saw fit. ([31]).

The Court of Appeal decided that the judge was right not to have granted the injunction sought by Titan at the trial. There were essentially four reasons: (i) the injunction sought was far too broad and went beyond the protection of Titan's existing proceedings, (ii) without a detailed examination of the correspondence complained of, it was not easy to say either whether there had been a contempt or whether article 10 and/or the immunity were engaged or excluded, and no such detailed examination was requested or undertaken, (iii) a far more straightforward remedy was probably available to Quinn Emanuel under the PfHA, and (iv) as a matter of discretion, no such injunction was appropriate when the proceedings were nearing their conclusion and other mechanisms to curtail the abuse might have been equally effective. ([77]-[86]). The more limited injunction still sought was refused for much the same reasons. ([87]-[88]).