Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 1525(KB) (KB)

Case No: KB-2022-003489

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 19/06/2026

Before :

MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER

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Between:

(1) IGNITE INTERNATIONAL BRANDS UK LIMITED **(2) IGNITE INTERNATIONAL BRANDS (LUXEMBOURG) SA**	**Claimants**
- and -	
(1) INPERO LIMITED **(2) MARK ANTHONY ROBERT COOPER**	**Defendants**

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Mr Joshua Hitchens (instructed by **Mackrell LLP**) for the **Claimant**
Mr Jonathan Green (instructed by **Karen Todner Ltd**) for the **Defendants**

Hearing dates: 15, 16, 18, 19 June 2026

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JUDGMENT

Mr Justice Martin Spencer :

1. By these proceedings, the claimants, Ignite International Brands UK Ltd and its parent company, apply to commit the second defendant, Mark Anthony Robert Cooper, to prison for contempt of court. Permission to bring these contempt proceedings was granted by Obi J on the 31 October 2025.

2. For the factual background, reference is made to the judgment of Sweeting J in earlier proceedings between these parties reported at [2024] EWHC 220 (KB). In short, the first claimant is the UK subsidiary of a global business, Ignite, which is engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of consumer products, product predominantly in the vapes industry. In December 2021, the second claimant entered into a sales and fulfilment agreement with the first defendant. The second defendant, Mr Cooper, was the sole director and shareholder of the first defendant. During the course of the agreement, Mr Cooper (hereafter described as "the defendant") perpetrated a fraud on the claimants. The commercial relationship between the parties broke down and was terminated in June 2022. The defendant wrongfully retained several million pounds worth of the claimants' stock.

3. On 18 October 2022 the claimants issued proceedings and on 25 October 2022, James Healey-Pratt KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, ordered up the delivery of the retained stock to the claimants and ordered the defendant to provide detailed information as to the whereabouts, disposition or sale of the Ignite products. The defendant returned approximately one third of the claimant's stock, but in breach of the order failed to account for the residue with a market value in excess of £2.8 million. The defendant but confirmed he had sold 244,493 units of Ignite's products without permission. The proceeds of sale were never paid to Ignite.

4. On 30 March 2023, the claimants made application for the defendant to be held in contempt of court for non-compliance with the order of 25 October 2022. On 26 April 2023, O'Farrell J granted a freezing order without notice, which provided that the defendant must not remove from England and Wales any of his assets or in any way dispose of, deal with or diminish the value of any of his assets which are in England and Wales up to the value of £3,182,742. The injunction covered the defendant's assets, whether or not in his own name, whether solely or jointly owned and including any assets upon which he had the power, whether directly or indirectly, to dispose of them or deal with them as if his own. The defendant failed to comply with the freezing order and on 12 May 2023 he appeared in front of Dexter, Dyas KC (as he then was), sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, who ordered the defendant to comply with the information provisions set out in the earlier orders. The defendant cross-applied for the discharge of the freezing order made by O'Farrell J on 26 April 2023 and in support of that application he handed up an un-sworn affidavit which exhibited an email which he claimed to have sent to the claimant's general counsel, Mr Hughes, on 4 May 2023. The email set out the assets of the defendant himself and also of Inpero Ltd, the first defendant. The claimants contended that the email was a forgery and had never been sent or received, but in the course of giving evidence before Mr Dyas, KC, the defendant confirmed that, in any event, the list of assets was true and accurate. Mr Dyas KC noted that the defendant had not complied with the information provisions of the freezing order and required him to comply by 19 May 2023.

5. On 2 June 2023, the claimants made a further application to commit the defendant to prison for failing to provide an affidavit setting out his assets, as required by the orders of O'Farrell J and Mr Dyas KC. Both contempt applications came before Sweeting J in July 2023, and his judgment finding the defendant to be in contempt of court is that to which I have already made reference, dated 7 February 2024. In the meantime, default judgment had been obtained by the claimant against the defendant on 2 November 2023 in the sum of £3.5 million. That judgment has not been met and, with interest, now exceeds £4 million.

6. Sweeting J proceeded to a sanctions hearing and on 13 May 2024 committed the defendant to prison for a term of nine months. On 15 July 2024 the Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal against sentence.

7. It is the claimant's case that in defending the contempt proceedings before Sweeting J, the defendant committed further serious contempts of court. Thus, he filed and served a witness statement upon which he relied at trial, which re-exhibited the schedule of assets which had purportedly been contained in the forged email of 4 May 2023. He contended that he was entirely impecunious and he filed and served an affidavit in purported purging of his contempt in which he set out a schedule of his assets which, the claimants contended, was deliberately misleading.

8. Pursuant to the judgment, the claimants obtained a charging order on 20 June 2024 in relation to the defendant's property at 66 Rydal Rd, Chester-le-Street DH2 3DT and on the same day, Master Armstrong ordered the defendant to attend for questioning at the Royal Courts of Justice on 23 October 2024. Master Armstrong also made a disclosure order against various financial institutions where the defendant held accounts. On 24 October 2024 Master Armstrong, dissatisfied with the disclosure that the defendant had made, adjourned the hearing for questioning and ordered further disclosure of banking records and statements from some 11 bank accounts either held by the defendant or by companies with which he was associated.

9. The adjourned hearing before Master Armstrong took place on 23 January 2025. The Master made a further disclosure order against various financial institutions. On 23rd of April 2025. Master Armstrong handed down his judgment arising out of the hearing on 23 January and arising out of further submissions made on behalf of the claimants on 5 March 2025. At paragraph 7, he said:

> "7. A number of orders requiring disclosure of banking information have been made, including those made by Master McCloud in 2023 and then by myself in June 2024 and again in October 2024. Ignite have sought to analyse the banking disclosure and it is clear Mr Cooper has dissipated significant funds from his account which at the start of 2022 was in credit for approximately £180,000. Inpero's account was, at times, in credit for almost £500,000, and yet all assets have been dissipated. The Claimants have been unbale to trace the proceeds from the £2.8 million worth of missing stock, but have identified that the Defendants have transferred significant funds to related parties, including £17,122.18 to Mr Cooper's mother,

> £21,229.71 to Mr Cooper's father, £17,539.17 to Mr Cooper's partner and fiancée, Mr Shauna Emberton, and £133,006.99 to Bon Bon Sweets Limited, a company Mr Cooper has close ties to."

The Master stated he was satisfied that the defendant had breached his order of 23 October 2024, requiring disclosure stating:

> "9. I am satisfied that Mr Cooper has breached my order of 23rd October 2024. This order required disclosure of, amongst other things:
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> i) "all documents from all bank accounts in his name or those under his control forthe period 20 October 2019 to date. This disclosure shall include, but is notlimited to, banking records and statements for the following accounts
>
> a) v. All Barclays accounts
>
> b) …
>
> c) x. All bank accounts held by any of his companies including
>
> a. Bon Bon Sweets Limited
>
> b. Mark Cooper Investments Limited
>
> c. Inpero Limited
>
> i) …
>
> ii) xi. All bank accounts held by Wellacy Limited, or Wellacy Labs Limited "
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> 10. The order also required Mr Cooper to disclose any and all communications and correspondence with Mr Connor Bentley.
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> 11. Very simply, Mr Cooper failed to provide all the required Barclays Bank statements for the period 20 October 2019 to date, and many of those he did provide were blatantly illegible. Mr Cooper claimed to have phoned the bank and to have visited a branch but that they would provide him with some of the statements but not all , as the account had been frozen following the allegations of fraud which had been made. Specifically, he answered questions about missing documents by saying that the bank would "only give him so much". This simply makes no sense on any view. The bank would either disclose everything or nothing, and there is no valid reason given why some could not be obtained.

12. Further, as to the illegible statements, Mr Cooper accepted his copies were legible but that it was the Claimant's problem because the ink in the Claimant's printers might be low. However, despite being asked to do so Mr Cooper failed to bring the original documents with him to court for inspection because "he did not have time". These answers lack any credibility or reliability.

13. In respect of the bank statements of Wellacy Labs Limited, Mr Cooper again failed to provide any disclosure. His reason given was that the bank would not give him access as he was not a Director. However, it is accepted that Mr Cooper was the CEO of Wellacy Labs Limited and his father was the sole director and shareholder. Mr Cooper said he had asked his father for copies of the statements but at different times explained he could not recall his father's response to the request, his father had already supplied them, or that his father would supply them if a court ordered hm to do so.

14. Mr Cooper was also asked about another business, Wellacy Limited, where he had been a sole Director. Mr Copper claimed to emailed Metro bank for these statements, but he only did so 2 days before the deadline for disclosure. When advised to call customer services Mr Cooper claimed to have been told that he would need to personally visit the branch where the account had been opened. Nonetheless, Mr Cooper accepts that he did not in fact visit the branch and claimed he could not provide the sort code or account number for the Metro Account held by Wellacy Limited, notwithstanding that he had been the sole shareholder of the company, and had received payments from that account into his own personal account as well as making payment from his personal account into the Metro account for Wellacy Limited.

15. In his oral evidence Mr Cooper accepted he had exchanged text messages emails with him, and WhatsApp messages with Mr Connor Bentley. However, none of these communications were disclosed before the oral examination nor was it set out in any statement that they were previously in his possession or when they ceased to be in his possession. . Further, Mr Cooper admitted receiving a phone call from Mr Bentley despite having also stated he had a new telephone number which he had not given to Mr Bentley.

16. In all of the circumstances I am satisfied that Mr Cooper has deliberately and wilfully failed to take all reasonable steps to comply with the order of 23rd October 2024. He has deliberately withheld information and failed to provide frank and honest answers to oral examination. He has been deliberately vague and

> his response to questioning was inconsistent and lacked any credibility."

10. The contempt application in relation to the present proceedings was issued on the 16 September 2025, supported by an affidavit from James Atton, the solicitor with the conduct of these proceedings on behalf of the claimants. The allegations of contempt were as follows:

> "1. Mr Cooper breached paragraphs 5 and 6 of the freezing order of O'Farrell J made on 26 April 2023 and continued by Mr Dexter Dias KC on 12 May 2023 and 12 July 2023 by dissipating funds as particularised in the second affidavit of Mr James Atton.
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> 2. To the extent Mr Cooper spent the dissipated funds by spending £1,000 per week or less on ordinary living expenses or reasonable legal costs, he breached paragraph 11(1) of the order of O'Farrell J by failing to inform the Claimants where the money spent is to come from before spending any money.
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> 3. Mr Cooper interfered with the due administration of justice in that he gave a dishonest account of his assets in an unsworn affidavit he handed up to Mr Dias KC on 12 May 2023, a signed witness statement dated 06 July 2023 filed in the course of previous contempt proceedings and an affidavit dated 10 May 2024 also filed in the course of previous contempt proceedings. All of these documents deliberately understated Mr Cooper's assets.
>
> 4. Mr Cooper failed to comply with paragraphs 1 and 3 of the order of Master Armstrong of 24 October 2024 because:
>
> (a) Mr Cooper did not provide any emails, Facebook chats or whatsapp messages with Conor Bentley. On 06 July 2023, Mr Cooper exhibited screenshots of Facebook messages, emails and Whatsapp chats with Connor Bentley. In breach of paragraph 3 of Master Armstrong's order, Mr Cooper did not list the correspondence with Mr Bentley he previously had in his control or where it is now.

> (b) Many of the Barclays Bank statements disclosed were illegible. Mr Cooper claims that he was unable to disclose "full accounts" as Barclays Bank refused to provide records due to the extant freezing order.
>
> (c) Mr Cooper failed to disclose bank accounts for Wellacy Limited. Mr Cooper he claims he was unable to obtain these accounts from Metrobank and Tide, However, Mr Cooper did not take reasonable steps to comply with the order in relation to the Wellacy Limited accounts."

11. Although the claimants served an amended contempt application in December 2025, the amendment seeking to allege a further contempt by the defendant in forging and purporting to rely on the email of 4 May 2023, the claimants did not pursue that additional allegation before me after I indicated that I considered that Sweeting J had taken the forgery of that email into account in the previous contempt proceedings, effectively as an aggravating factor.

12. Obi J granted the claimant permission to bring the contempt proceedings on 31 October 2025, and in her order, she set out directions for the hearing of the application. By paragraph 6 of her order, Obi J provided:

> "(6) By 4pm on 12 December 2025, the Defendant is to file and serve any evidence he wishes to rely upon in response to the contempt application. This evidence shall not taken to have been deployed unless and until the Defendant deploys the evidence at trial and may only be used by the Claimant for the purpose of gathering preparatory evidence in reply."

She also made provision for the defendant to file and serve any skeleton argument, not less than seven days before trial, if so advised.

13. The contempt application came before Moody J on 11 February 2026, when the defendant applied for an adjournment in order to obtain legal representation and also for transfer of the proceedings to a court closer to where he lived. Moody J refused the transfer application but granted the application to adjourn, determining that the defendant had not made adequate attempts to obtain legal representation but that, having regard to the gravity of the proceedings and their technical complexity and in the interests of justice, he ought to have one final opportunity to obtain representation. Moody J also made a passport order requiring the defendant to surrender all passports held by him to the claimants' solicitors. Moody J set out further directions for the hearing of the contempt application, including the filing by the defendant of any evidence upon which he wished to rely and skeleton argument, if so advised.

14. The contempt application was listed for hearing before me on Monday, 15 June 2026 with the defendant represented by Mr Jonathan Green of counsel and the claimants represented by Mr Joshua Hitchens of counsel who has represented the claimants throughout. Mr Green, whilst of course representing and protecting his client's interests to the best of his ability, has had a wholly benign influence on these proceedings. It was

indicated to me by Mr Hitchens that, of the four substantive breaches alleged in the contempt application, the defendant no longer contested the first breach. However, it was further indicated that on 28 March 2026 the defendant had sent to Mr Green's instructing solicitors a large bundle of further documents, numbering over a thousand, which included potentially disclosable material and about which Mr Green had only found out that morning. The matter was adjourned to the following day to allow Mr Green to assimilate the further disclosure material and also to advise his client further and consider the defendant's position in relation to the breach allegations. Mr Green further wished to consider whether the defendant would contest the evidence of the witnesses for the claimants whose evidence had been served, namely Mr Atton and Mr Ovenell and thus whether their presence would be required.

15. When the matter came before me on Tuesday 16th June, 2026, further progress had been made. First, the evidence of Mr Atton and Mr Ovenell was accepted so that those witnesses were no longer required to attend court. Furthermore, it was indicated that the Defendant accepted the first, second and fourth allegations of breach. That left only the third allegation as a contested matter. However, disclosure of the further documentation continued to cause a problem. I was informed that within the documentation were documents subject to legal professional privilege, and Mr Green needed time to go through the documents and consider which ones needed to be disclosed and which should not be disclosed for reasons of privilege. Mr Hitchens indicated that he would then need time to assimilate the disclosed documents and re-fashion his cross- examination of the defendant by reference to those documents. I accordingly adjourned the matter further, to Thursday, 18 June 2026.

16. The contempt application was able to proceed on 18 June 2026. During the previous day, Mr Green had informed Mr Hitchens that the defendant did not intend to give evidence, nor deploy the evidence that had been served in accordance with the order of Moody J. That meant that there was to be no oral evidence, simply leaving counsel to make submissions in relation to the third allegation of breach. Although an issue arose in respect of the extent of the admission made by the defendant to the fourth allegation, it was agreed that the extent of the admission would be a matter for a sanctions hearing, with the defendant setting out precisely the basis and extent of the admission, equivalent to a "basis of plea", and the claimants would decide whether such basis of plea was acceptable and if not, whether a "Newton" hearing would be required.

17. The contested allegation centres around the company called Bon Bons Sweets Ltd, owned by the defendant, in which the defendant accepted in the course of the hearing before Master Armstrong on 23 January 2025 he invested £133,000 and in which the claimants allege he continue to invest money until only nine days before the previous contempt trial before Sweeting J in July 2023. Thus, despite having paid £1,200 into Bon Bons Sweets on 8 July 2023, he asserted when giving evidence before Sweeting J on 18 July 2023 that he did not believe that Bon Bons Sweets had ever had assets of more than £1,000 and was therefore not caught by the Order of O'Farrell J. It is alleged that in the list of assets contained in the disputed email of 4 May 2023 but verified by the defendant in his witness statement of 6 July 2023, made for the purpose of the previous contempt proceedings, the defendant grossly understated his assets by failing to make any reference to Bon Bons Sweets Ltd, despite this being a company in which he had invested large sums of money.

18. For the claimants, Mr Hitchens submitted that the defendant's affidavit purporting to purge his contempt, dated 10 May 2024, was the time for the defendant to "come clean" about Bon Bons Sweets Ltd and his interest in that company. He submitted that the company clearly had assets worth more than £1,000 given the purchase price (exceeding £133,000), its stock, the premium on the lease it held, the value of the Smartcar it owned and the value of the goodwill in the business. Mr Hitchens referred to the defendant's evidence before Master Armstrong where he asked the defendant why he had not disclosed the existence of Bon Bons Sweets Ltd either before Dexter Dyas KC, or in his affidavit. He gave this answer:

> "Not mentioning it to Dexter Dyas is the freezing order stipulated any assets above £1000. That wasn't an asset. It was a liability, as when you guys have sent the paperwork you seen. It owed me £133,000. That's not an asset. That's a liability."

Mr Hitchens submitted this was an absurd answer: whilst the debt to the defendant was a liability of the company, it was undoubtedly an asset of the defendant. The defendant effectively had two assets: first, the director's loan of £133,000 and, secondly, his shareholding. He submitted that the defendant cannot rely upon naïveté, given that he is a chartered public accountant, he attended business school and he has run other businesses. In those circumstances, it is not credible that he believed that the fact he was owed £133,000 rendered it a liability and not an asset. He did not question the defendant further about this at that stage, before Master Armstrong, because such questioning would more properly be for the further allegation of contempt, an opportunity now denied him by the defendant's decision not to give evidence.

19. Mr Hitchens submitted that there are good reasons to treat the defendant's position in relation to Bon Bons Sweets with scepticism: first, he has repeatedly lied to the court, secondly, he has already been in serious breach of court orders; thirdly, in an a text message sent to him on 8 December 2022 by Mr Connor Bentley, who was Ignites's sole director in the UK during the subsistence of the contract, Mr Bentley referred to the defendant having a "pile of cash put away"; fourthly, in a text to Mr Bentley on 23 October 2020, the defendant referred to having £25,000 worth of shares: Mr Hitchens submitted that either he still owns the shares or they have been sold and the money has gone elsewhere; fifthly, there is a suspicion as to how Kirsty Wilkinson, whom the defendant employed to run the sweet shop at £160 a week, was able to acquire and run the business after Bon Bons Sweets went into liquidation, putting into perspective the defendant's assertion in his affidavit of 18 November 2024 that "there is no correspondence between Kirsty Wilkinson and myself in regards to Bon Bons Sweets Ltd, this is not my company and I have no involvement."

20. On behalf of the defendant, Mr Green submitted that the claimants had failed to satisfy the criminal standard in relation to the third alleged breach. He submitted that no adverse inference should be drawn against the defendant from his failure to give evidence, given that he had previously been questioned on the matter. He submitted that the bank statements that have been disclosed paint a clear picture of a company which was living hand-to-mouth on a daily basis. This puts into perspective, for example, the payment of £1,200 made by the defendant to Bon Bons Sweets nine days before the contempt hearing before Sweeting J: this was payment to cover the company’s liability for rent/wages and to keep the company afloat, so that the payment did not result in Bon Bons Sweets having assets exceeding £1,000. He submitted that it

is necessary for the claimant to point to some value in Bon Bons Sweets in order for it to be an asset of the defendant. In relation to the acquisition of the business by Ms Wilkinson, there is no evidence of any payment by her for goodwill, or for the lease. He submitted that the claimant's case is based on supposition or innuendo.

21. Mr Green submitted that, in order to make good its allegation of breach, the claimants were asking the court to draw two inferences: first, that Bon Bons Sweets was worth more than £1000; secondly, that the defendant dishonestly failed to disclose it. He submitted that unless the court could draw the first inference, there was no breach of the order of O'Farrell J because the defendant was only ordered to disclose assets exceeding £1,000. Mr Green then considered the evidence relied on by the claimants in support of the first proposition. At paragraph 13 of his affidavit, Mr Ovenell referred to the banking records showing that the defendant had made a large number of payments to Ms Wilkinson and Mr Green submitted that, upon examination, those payments could be seen to be in respect of her wages, she being an employee of Bon Bons Sweets Ltd. However, significantly, there is no evidence of any payments the other way. He submitted that if Bon Bons Sweets was an asset and the defendant transferred that asset to Ms Wilkinson, some consideration passing from her to him would have been expected. It was the defendant's evidence before Sweeting J and Master Armstrong that the company fell apart after he acquired it, and that the purchase price had not in fact reflected its value. He submitted that analysis of the company's bank statements shows a company on its last legs. The deathblow came when the landlord sent bailiffs round to occupy the premises and take possession of the stock. Bon Bons Sweets was finally dissolved on 23 August 2023. The new company, started by Miss Wilkinson, was incorporated a number of months later. It is plausible that she would restart the company with the same, or a similar, name, but there was no support for any assertion that she and the defendant had come to an arrangement based on their personal relationship. Finally, Mr Green submitted that the exchange of text messages between Mr Cooper and Connor Bentley, in 2023 supported the defendant's case that the company was in difficulty.

Discussion

22. In considering the disputed breach, it is first appropriate to remind myself of the legal background. The test for civil contempt was set out by Christopher Clarke J (as he then was) in *Masri v Consolidation Contractors International Company SAL* [2011] EWHC 1024 (Comm):

> "150. In order to establish that someone is in contempt it is necessary to show (i) that he knew of the terms of the order; (ii) that he acted (or failed to act) in a manner which involved a breach of the order; and (iii) that he knew of the facts which made his conduct a breach…

23. In order to establish their case, the Claimants must prove to the criminal standard of proof that when representing that his assets were what he asserted them to be on 12 May 2023, 06 July 2023 and 10 May 2024, the defendant: (a) knew that the statements were untrue; and (b) knew that what he was saying was likely to be relied upon by the Court. It is not necessary, in order to establish interference with the administration of justice, that conscious thought is given to the significance or consequences of the act for the administration of justice. It is enough to show that in providing an affidavit or

a witness statement with a statement of truth, a person has no honest belief in its truth and knows of its likelihood to interfere with justice. A witness who gives evidence on oath/affirmation to the court which he knows to be false commits a contempt of court. Such a witness also thereby interferes with the due administration of justice, it being obvious to such a person that giving dishonest evidence on oath/affirmation has at least the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice.

24. In my judgment, the evidence points inexorably towards the drawing of the inferences both that Bon Bons Sweets was an asset worth more than £1,000 and that the defendant deliberately and dishonestly failed to disclose it. I start with the letter (and spirit) of the orders made by O'Farrell J and subsequent judges. Clearly, they were intended, as Mr Hitchens put it, for the defendant to "come clean" about his financial position. Even if he believed that Bon Bons Sweets was a worthless asset (which I do not accept), having invested £133,000 in the company, which he was saying had "gone down the drain", he must have known that the court would require him not only to disclose this (and disclose where the £133,000 had come from) but also give details of how that company, of which he was the director, shareholder and creditor, could have gone from being worth £133,000 to being worth nothing. An explanation was required from him to resolve the inevitable suspicion of fraud otherwise arising. The inference becomes all the stronger when one considers the defendant's history in this litigation and these proceedings: not only was he found to have been in contempt of court by Sweeting J, for which he was sent to prison for nine months, but he has additionally admitted three of the four allegations of breach in the present application, and has thus admitted being in further contempt of court. Master Armstrong's assessment of him and the evidence given on 23 January 2025 is damning. Thus, the defendant's credibility and reliability is zero. That is compounded by the clear absurdity of his answer to Mr Hitchens when questioned before Master Armstrong (see paragraph 18 above). No doubt, the Bon Bons Sweets issue not being yet an allegation of contempt, Mr Hitchens desisted from asking further questions in order to "keep his powder dry" in anticipation of cross-examining the defendant further about the matter within the present application. However, despite the serious allegations made, the defendant has declined to give evidence and submit himself to such cross-examination. It is abundantly clear to me that this is because he knows he has no sensible or credible answer to the anticipated questions about this matter and that it is appropriate that I should draw an adverse inference against the defendant arising from his failure to give evidence. There was, in the course of counsel's submissions, an issue over whether the defendant had further lied to the court in relation to the progeny of the further disclosure which caused the hearing of this application to be delayed. It is unnecessary for me to resolve that issue and, in any event, I consider it encompasses technical issues in respect of which I lack the necessary evidence. However, for the abundant other reasons to which I have referred, I am satisfied so that I am sure that, in addition to the matters to which he has admitted, the defendant is also in breach of the order of the court and in contempt of court in his failure to disclose his interest in Bon Bons Sweets and explain fully his financial dealings with that company. Given the admissions made by the defendant, through his counsel, to the other allegations of breach, I find the defendant to be in contempt of court for all the reasons set out in the application. A sanctions hearing will follow in due course