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Sale M33 0BWProfessor Andrew Harris
HM Coroner South London[REDACTED]
14 November 2025

Dear Sir,

Inquest touching on the death of Rebekah Arter**Prevention of future death report**

I write on behalf of the Director General of the IOPC [REDACTED] with regards to the matters of concern raised in your Prevention of Future Death report arising from the inquest into the death of Ms Arter, which concluded on 29 August 2025. This letter is the IOPC's formal response to your report in accordance with Regulation 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

Matter of concern: missed opportunities for the IOPC and Metropolitan Police Service from their investigations to identify that Rebekah was a victim of domestic abuse and coercive control, which would have enabled her to be protected

Your report identified the following matters as illustrative of the potential missed opportunities:

- That Rebekah had met her husband initially as a victim of a crime.
- That police investigations uncovered a large number of women with whom he had inappropriate relationships and that he misused his police powers.
- That he was dismissed from the police for drug offences in May 2023, but the risk to Rebekah was not apparently considered at that time.
- A witness has alleged that a video was sent by him of Rebekah [REDACTED], which the family allege was used to shame and enforce control over her, allegedly in 2023.
- A history of her having unexplained repeated bruises and injuries was available in 2024 to anyone who enquired about the risk of domestic abuse.

- [REDACTED]
- That in retrospect it is recognised by a Detective Chief Inspector that he was an exceptionally persistent and damaging offender against women, but no charges in relation to that had ever been brought.

Background context:

Before responding to the matter of concern, it may assist to set out the relevant duties and responsibilities of the IOPC, and to summarise the investigations into DI [REDACTED] the full history of which was outside the scope of the inquest.

Relevant IOPC duties and responsibilities: Police Reform Act 2002 (as in force at the time of Op Venta)

(1) Duties to provide information:

- (a) The IOPC must provide information about its investigations and outcomes to complainants and interested persons (sections 20 and 21 Police Reform Act 2002). For matters which do not concern a death or serious injury caused as a result of police action, the IOPC has a discretion to recognise someone as having interested person status where they have sufficient interest to make it appropriate to receive information about the investigation, provided the person consents to receive it.
- (b) At the time of Op Venta, the requirements in the legislation were to provide information on the progress of the investigation and any provisional findings, the outcome of the investigation and the outcome of any related disciplinary proceedings.¹
- (c) These entitlements are subject to exceptions set out in Regulation 13 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. Among other matters these exceptions provide for information to be withheld where there is a real risk of a significant adverse effect, including in relation to criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
- (d) For witnesses who do not have interested person status there is no statutory requirement to provide information about the investigation or regular updates.

¹ Paragraph 23(9) Schedule 3 Police Reform Act 2002 (prior to amendments made by the Policing and Crime Act 2017), and Regulation 12 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012

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(2) Decision making process:

(a) At the time of Op Venta, the process at the end of an investigation was as follows:

- (i) The IOPC makes a decision whether to refer the report to the CPS to consider any criminal charges;
- (ii) The Appropriate Authority [AA] (the chief officer under whose direction and control the officer was at the time of the conduct in issue – here, the MPS) makes a determination whether the officer has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct and whether to bring disciplinary proceedings;
- (iii) The IOPC decides whether the AA's determination on these matters is appropriate. If it disagrees, the IOPC can recommend and ultimately direct the AA to give effect to its recommendation.
- (iv) Proceedings are then brought by the AA, following the process in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012. The disciplinary case is presented by the AA and the IOPC will not necessarily have any formal role in proceedings. However, the IOPC will assist by providing disclosure and will often continue engagement with witnesses, particularly if witnesses are vulnerable, to provide continuity of contact as far as possible.

(3) IOPC jurisdiction:

- (a) Under section 12 Police Reform Act 2002 the IOPC has jurisdiction to investigate persons serving with police.
- (b) The IOPC can investigate persons who have ceased serving with the police since the time of the conduct in question, the conduct of concern must have taken place while the person was serving with police.
- (c) Once a police officer has ceased serving, they are no longer subject to the Standards of Professional Behaviour so their actions subsequent to leaving the force cannot amount to a disciplinary matter.
- (d) Any criminal conduct committed after the person ceased serving would fall to be investigated by a police force as would be the case for any other member of the public.

Investigations into DI [REDACTED]

The MPS commenced an investigation into alleged misconduct by DI [REDACTED] in 2016. This became an IOPC independent investigation in 2017 and developed in scale and complexity, eventually being split into 3 separate matters named Operation Venta 1, 2 and 3. Operation Venta 1 concerned allegations of potential abuse of position for sexual

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purposes (“APSP”), Operation Venta 2 concerned misuse of police systems and inappropriate involvement by DI [REDACTED] in a criminal investigation for which he was the victim, and Operation Venta 3 concerned allegations of illegal drug use by DI [REDACTED]. To assist with understanding the key dates and developments in the investigation, we have compiled a timeline which we enclose as Annex A.

Operation Venta 1 identified 7 potential victims of APSP behaviour, one of whom was Rebekah Arter. Mrs Arter was pseudonymised in the investigation as ‘Ms G’. The allegations concerning Ms G related to the circumstances in which the consensual relationship between DI [REDACTED] and Ms G commenced. These allegations had been made via an anonymous report to Crimestoppers in January 2016. At no point did Rebekah Arter come forward to either the MPS or the IOPC to make any kind of allegation about DI [REDACTED] either in relation to the commencement of their relationship or anything occurring subsequently.

It was not disputed by DI [REDACTED] that he first met Rebekah Arter in February 2006, when acting as a police officer to investigate criminal matters which she had reported as a victim of crime. DI [REDACTED] maintained that their relationship only started in late April or early May 2006, when he met her again on a night out when not on duty, after any professional involvement on her case had ceased.

In 2017 when the investigation become independent, the IOPC investigator made a policy decision that Rebekah Arter would not be made an interested person in the investigation. As outlined above, interested persons are entitled to specific information about the investigation, subject to a harm test, and must receive regular updates. It was considered that as Rebekah Arter was now married to DI [REDACTED] and had not come forward with any allegation herself, that it would not be appropriate to share information with her about the investigation especially as it was considered she was likely to be loyal to her husband.

Rebekah Arter was spoken to by the IOPC in 2018 when a search warrant was carried out at DI [REDACTED] home address. Mrs Arter declined to provide a statement but her remarks were recorded in a statement by an IOPC staff member. She corroborated her husband’s account that their relationship only started two months after DI [REDACTED] had dealt with her crime report. No other allegation was raised by Mrs Arter at the time. A statement was also provided by her son [REDACTED]. This did not make any allegations in relation to DI [REDACTED]. Rebekah Arter’s phone, as well as DI [REDACTED], was seized under the warrant, and analysed. While the IOPC phone analysis used parameters pertinent to the terms of reference of Operation Venta, and was not looking for any evidence of any domestic abuse behaviour as no such allegation had been made by or about DI [REDACTED] and Rebekah Arter at that time, the material reviewed by the IOPC did not disclose any cause for concern in respect of domestic abuse.

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The investigations concluded in 2020 and resulted in referrals to the CPS to consider criminal charges and referral to gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings. The CPS confirmed no charges would be brought in relation to either referral in 2020.

After delay while DI [REDACTED] received cancer treatment, Operation Venta 3, which concerned allegations of illegal drug use, resulted in DI [REDACTED] dismissal in May 2023. Notwithstanding that DI [REDACTED] was placed on the barred list (preventing him from working in law enforcement for at least 5 years) as a result, the MPS (with whom the IOPC agreed) considered there remained a public interest in holding a further gross misconduct hearing in relation to the outstanding allegations concerning APSP behaviour. This was to include allegations concerning how DI [REDACTED] relationship with Rebekah commenced, which was to proceed on the basis of documentary evidence alone.

Following confirmation of this decision in November 2023, the IOPC's Proceedings Support Unit planned engagement with the potential witnesses for the APSP allegations. In respect of Rebekah Arter, the PSU noted that she had not provided a statement to the investigation, and decided she would not be contacted until there was confirmation that DI [REDACTED] had been informed the hearing would go ahead.

In December 2023, the PSU made contact with Ms B in respect of the proposed hearing. In an email exchange a family member of Ms B's made reference to the fact that Mr [REDACTED] was still contacting Ms B, but no detail of the content of the messages was provided (it is not known whether the family member was aware of the nature of the messages). It was agreed that Ms B should be advised not to contact Mr [REDACTED] and to save any messages received from him. Arrangements were made for a meeting on 15 March 2024 to discuss potential special measures should Ms B be prepared to give evidence at the gross misconduct hearing.

It was during this meeting, attended by [REDACTED] (IOPC Proceedings Support Unit) and [REDACTED] (IOPC Survivor Engagement Manager) that Ms B described the content of the messages that she had received. Ms B stated she had deleted the messages so the IOPC were unable to view these. The IOPC's [REDACTED] then prepared a report detailing the description of the messages Ms B had provided, which the IOPC then reported to MPS by 25 March 2024.

At the time the messages were sent to Ms B, December 2023, Mr [REDACTED] had already been dismissed from the MPS. Therefore at the time these potential offences appear to have been committed, he was an ordinary civilian and not a person serving with police. As a result, the IOPC had no jurisdiction to investigate Ms B's disclosures itself. The only proper

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action open to the IOPC in the circumstance was to report the potential offences to the MPS, which it duly did – at the latest by 25 March 2024.

As you will be aware from the evidence provided at the inquest, the IOPC reported the potential offences to the MPS's Directorate of Professional Standards, with whom the IOPC had been liaising in respect of the outstanding gross misconduct matters. The DPS endeavoured to transfer the report to the appropriate team within the MPS to investigate the matter and this was when the delays with the MPS's internal Connect system occurred. For clarity, the IOPC has no direct access to the Connect system and all issues with this system were internal to the MPS. Once the IOPC had reported the matter to the MPS to take action, there was nothing further the IOPC could properly do in relation to it, given that it did not concern an alleged crime committed by a person while they were serving with police.

In the course of the MPS investigation, Ms B made further allegations in relation to Mr [REDACTED]. These allegations had not previously been made to either the IOPC or the MPS. The IOPC maintained regular contact with Ms B throughout its investigation to ascertain whether she wished to provide a statement or attend an ABE interview, however Ms B never provided a formal account during the IOPC investigation.

Matter of concern

Your report has raised a concern whether there were opportunities missed to recognise the risk to Rebekah posed by Mr [REDACTED].

Our purpose in setting out the IOPC's investigations in detail as above is to set out exactly what was known by the IOPC and when, and the rationale for our decisions in respect of our contact with Rebekah Arter.

In relation to the risk posed by Mr [REDACTED], a number of potential victims / witnesses of APSP behaviour were identified in the investigation. Mr [REDACTED] conduct in this regard was considered sufficiently serious to warrant a referral to the CPS to consider a potential offence of Misconduct in a Public Office, and the intention had been to bring gross misconduct disciplinary proceedings against Mr [REDACTED] for these allegations notwithstanding that he had already been placed on the barred list. This was on the basis that there was a public interest in a police misconduct panel making findings of fact on these allegations, so that this could be taken into account when deciding whether he should ever be permitted to work in law enforcement again. However, prior to July 2024, no allegation had been made of sexual assault.

Prior to Rebekah's death, the IOPC was not on notice of any allegations of controlling or coercive behaviour or any other domestic abuse allegation in respect of Mr [REDACTED]. When in

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2018 the IOPC had direct contact with Rebekah, and her son, no concerns of this kind were raised and downloads of devices seized at that time similarly did not disclose indications of this behaviour (from the material examined which fell within the parameters for the IOPC investigation). The IOPC had no cause to seek further evidence after 2018.

During the visit with Ms B in 2024, it was not possible for the IOPC to have identified the victim of the [REDACTED] as Rebekah, as Ms B had deleted the images. The IOPC assumes that these were subsequently recovered on forensic examination of the device.


While we do not think a specific risk to Rebekah was apparent from the information available to the IOPC, we wish to reassure you that the IOPC has robust safeguarding procedures in place, which were updated and strengthened in 2024. We will take this opportunity to review whether any additional content to this guidance would be appropriate in respect of risk assessments for spouses and intimate partners.

Conclusion

I express my sincere condolences to the family of Rebekah Arter.

I am grateful to you for raising this issue with the IOPC and trust this response provides reassurance that I have considered the matter of concern raised in your report. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any queries arising from this letter.

Yours sincerely,



Deputy Director of Investigations
For the Director General

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ANNEX A

Date	Event
27 January 2016	Crimestoppers anonymous report alleging DI Arter has had inappropriate sexual relations with a number of women encountered as victims of crime in his professional role
April 2016	MPS commences local investigation into conduct of DI Arter
6 December 2016	MPS arrest of DI Arter, phones/computers seized
13 December 2016	Conduct referral from MPS. Allegation re inappropriate contact and relationship with victim in investigation he was supervising (not Ms Arter) MPS arrested DI Arter
16 December 2016	IOPC decide conduct matter should be investigated by MPS (local investigation)
04 April 2017	MPS re-refer conduct matter to IOPC due to developments in the case
7 April 2017	IOPC redetermine MOI to independent
29 June 2017	Policy decision that Rebekah Arter (pseudonymised as 'Ms G') is a potential witness only at this stage. Notes "appears Ms G may have experienced inappropriate behaviour by DI Arter and that they are now married. We are not making contact with her at this time due to her marriage to the subject and I do not consider it appropriate to keep her updated on the investigation especially considering her probably[sic] loyalty to her husband". Countersigned by case supervisor 17 July 2017
4 January 2018	Further referral following evidence obtained in IOPC investigation suggesting drug use and supply by DI Arter (Op Venta 3)
1 June 2018	Further referral to MPS re misuse of police systems (Op Venta 2)
26 October 2018	IOPC execute warrant at DI Arter's address. Rebekah Arter is spoken to and statement obtained from her son
29 January 2019	Analysis of downloads from Rebekah Arter's phone completed
7 June 2019	Op Venta 2 report and provisional opinions sent to MPS
22 August 2019	Op Venta 1 Final report completed
18 February 2020	IOPC decision to refer Op Venta 1 to CPS for charging decision
17 January 2020	Reviewable copy of downloads from DI Arter's devices seized 26 October 2018 available and collected from forensic supplier, review commenced 17 Jan 2020 and completed 18 Mar 2020
5 March 2020	IOPC decision maker's provisional opinions on case to answer for Op Venta 1
1 May 2020	MPS provides statutory determinations on Op Venta 1 & 2, finding case to answer for gross misconduct for allegations concerning Rebekah Arter

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7 May 2020	IOPC letter to MPS agreeing with determinations including that allegations concerning Rebekah Arter should be taken forward to gross misconduct hearing
17 June 2020	Final report in Op Venta 3 approved
June 2020	IOPC refer Op Venta 3 allegations to CPS
7 July 2020	MPS provides case to answer determinations on Op Venta 3
16 July 2020	IOPC response to AA on Op Venta 3. Agreement that allegations, including of supply of drugs to Ms G, should be taken to GM hearing
July 2020	CPS decision to take no further action in relation Op Venta 1 referral
8 September 2020	CPS decision to to take no further action in relation Op Venta 3 referral
Jan 2021	MPS propose splitting conduct hearing into two parts and dealing with Op Venta 3 allegations first. Hearing delayed due to ill health of DI Arter.
23 May 2023	DI Arter dismissed in absentia at gross misconduct hearing re Op Venta 3 allegations & placed on barred list
6 Nov 2023	MPS confirm public interest in Op Venta 1 allegations proceeding to gross misconduct hearing. IOPC tasked with re-establishing contact with witnesses to assess if willing to engage with hearing
18 Dec 2023	IOPC proceedings support unit note in relation to contacting Rebekah Arter: "Miss G is Arter's wife. She did not provide a statement to the investigation. She has not been contacted to date, pending the MPS confirming that a hearing will go ahead. This is to avoid alerting Arter of a hearing in the event that it doesn't take place. My understanding is that he is suffering with ill-health. The MPS know more about his health from Op Venta 3 hearing."
28 Dec 23	Email from to IOPC from a family member of a potential victim of abuse of position for sexual purposes in Op Venta 1, known as 'Ms B'. The context is a discussion in relation to arranging a meeting with IOPC/Ms B in the new year to discuss special measures for the misconduct hearing. The message includes the following: "I would also like to make you aware that Warren is still contacting [Ms B] via whatsapp. I have told [Ms B] to ignore all contact but screenshot and save anything he sends"
4 Jan 24	Email from IOPC to Ms B's family member explaining who will be point of contact going forward who will meet with Ms B re special measures. Acknowledges information given in 28 Dec message: "Thank you for bringing to my attention that Warren is messaging [Ms B] on WhatsApp – something I would have been unaware about. I think the right approach is your own suggestion, that she saves any messages she receives from

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	<i>him.”</i>
15 Mar 24	Meeting IOPC and Ms B. Disclosures made re nature of messages received from former DI Arter, including upskirt photo of sleeping female.
25 Mar 24	IOPC makes report to MPS DPS (PC Shane O’Neill and t/CI Jamie Newman) of disclosures made by Ms B