

IN THE COUNTY COURT AT CENTRAL LONDON

Case No. M04CL581

Courtroom No. 53

Thomas More Building
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL

Thursday, 16th July 2026

Before:
HIS HONOUR JUDGE ASHBY

B E T W E E N:

MARIAM MOLA

and

MYLES HARRIS AKA BOUNCER

THE CLAIMANT appeared In Person
NO APPEARANCE by, or on behalf of, the Defendant

JUDGMENT
(Approved)

This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part, other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.

HHJ ASHBY:

1. I am dealing today with the sentencing of Myles Harris, aka Bouncer, for contempt of court in claim number M04CL581.

Defendant's knowledge of the proceedings

2. Mr Harris has not engaged with the process at all, but I am satisfied he is aware of these proceedings which have been served in accordance with previous orders. Not only have great efforts been taken to serve him at various addresses which he has been linked with, but he has also been served by email to various email addresses that are clearly linked to him. Documents have also been sent to solicitors that were previously instructed by him (but not on the record) and he is, in any event, clearly aware of these proceedings because he has posted on his social media account about them.
3. He has, for example, posted on 24 January 2026:
"As you know I have made a new YouTube and I have been uploading these videos and thought I would start with this evil witch Mariam Mola. Obviously, they have been trying to take me down and get lawyers involved but you cannot serve me I have got no fixed abode".
4. That was shortly after my order in January. He said a few days earlier on 20 January:
"I have took [sic] down all my videos about them, but I have got a new YouTube ready to upload them all again, because these people think they can take me to court, [then again], I have got no fixed abode".
5. He says, "Comment 'active' and I will send you the full YouTube"; a clear violation of the order.
6. Then on 28 January, "I heard this Mariam..." - I cannot read the next bit - "...has tried to put out an injunction against me but I have received nothing because I have got no fixed abode".
7. I am more than satisfied even to the criminal standard of proof, that he is well aware of these proceedings (both the underlying proceedings and the contempt proceedings).
8. I was shown a further video today where he said he understands there is a warrant out for his arrest, that he has heard this on the grapevine. He has clearly not heard on the grapevine; he has been directly informed, and he knows that a warrant is out for his arrest which is what I did on the last occasion.
9. I am therefore, in any event, quite satisfied that not only has he been appropriately served in accordance with my order of 10 June 2026 about this hearing, but he has actual direct knowledge of it too (as he has the previous hearings and proceedings) and he has chosen not to engage. He says because he spends a large amount of time outside the UK, although I am satisfied that this Court does have jurisdiction and that he has addresses within the UK as well.

Background

10. The background to this is that the defendant has posted a number of videos about the claimant. On 12 December 2025 His Honour Judge Monty KC made a without notice injunction by reference to harassment, requiring the defendant not to publish, repost, upload, share, circulate, broadcast, disseminate any video, post, comment, story, reel, or other content referring to the claimant. It also required him not to harass or approach her and to remove the relevant content from all platforms. He listed a return hearing and that was in front of me on 6 January 2026.

11. At the return hearing on 6 January 2026, I made that order final. I extended the obligations in those orders until January 2028. I made various orders in relation to service of that order which have been complied with.
12. There was at that point a contempt application, but it had not been properly made. I gave time for an amended contempt application; ultimately that has been accepted by the Court, and it was listed, after a number of hearings, for hearing in front of me on 10 June 2026.
13. On 10 June 2026, I recorded that I was dealing with a contempt application of 15 February 2026 and that the defendant was aware and had chosen not to engage. I recorded that he made reference to the proceedings in his social media posts and to the requirement to remove content and as such he was uploading them on another social media handle, in direct breach of the order. I found the defendant in contempt of court for failing to comply with the orders of 12 December 2025 and 5 January 2026 by continuing to post content about the claimant and by not removing all content about the claimant as required by those orders.
14. However, because of the seriousness of a contempt finding and the possibility of a custodial sentence, I adjourned the sentencing to a separate occasion to give him a further opportunity to attend; again telling him of his right to legal advice. That sentencing hearing is today.
15. He still has not engaged, although, as I say, he is clearly aware of these proceedings and this hearing. I issued a bench warrant for his arrest which has not proved to be effective in getting him here today.
16. I am satisfied in those circumstances that he has had every opportunity to engage and has chosen not to and it is therefore fair for me to proceed to sentence him in his absence.

Sentencing

17. Under Section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there is a power to commit to prison for up to two years for contempt of court. The objectives in sentencing are to ensure compliance with the order, punish and rehabilitate.
18. My options are effectively to impose an immediate custodial sentence, to suspend a custodial sentence. Custody is only reserved for the most serious breaches. Alternatively I could adjourn the sentence; in my mind, there is no merit in doing that in this case because I have already adjourned to allow further consideration of sentence and there has been no engagement so that will achieve nothing. I can fine. Or I can make no order, if the breach is minor, for example.
19. There are no specific Sentencing Guidelines, in relation to contempt of court that are strictly applicable here (to civil proceedings).
20. I have in mind the principles in *AG v Crosland* [2021] UKSC 15 (albeit this was the approach for sentencing in criminal contempt). I have to consider the culpability and the harm that has been caused, is intended or likely to be caused.
21. I consider first whether a fine is sufficient. I do not consider in this case that a fine would be a sufficient penalty. The conduct is deliberate, contemptuous and repeated. There have been numerous occasions where the defendant has acted in breach of the orders, even though clearly aware of them. He has recorded, for example, on 24 January 2026, “Head over to my new YouTube channel and let us keep getting these scumbags out of here”. On 20 January 2026, there is the reference to taking down videos, but setting up a new YouTube channel and that he is ready to upload, there was an invitation to people to comment on his feed in order to be sent full videos and reference to the injunction proceedings. He has effectively decided to completely disregard the Court's orders, knowing that they are there. Hence, I do not think a fine would be sufficient in those circumstances.

22. I bear in mind that in terms of custodial sentences, they should only be imposed if the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will do. Also, that I should impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt.
23. I need to take account of any mitigation. Well, none has been put forward.
24. I would ordinarily take account of the impact of the committal on other persons, but none has been put forward.
25. I would ordinarily make a reduction for an early admission. There is none, because he has not engaged.
26. I have considered, if there is to be a term of imprisonment, whether it should be suspended or not. In order to, for example, secure compliance. There is always an option of suspending any prison sentence on the basis of compliance with the order.
27. Although there are no specific guidelines, in cases of committal for breach of antisocial behaviour injunctions (which are not quite the same), the Court of Appeal, in a case called *Lovett v Wigan Borough Council* [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, set out some guidelines for the approach to civil contempt. Whilst they relate to antisocial behaviour proceedings, they are, by analogy, helpful and applicable in these types of scenarios. They tell me that again, I should look at culpability and harm.
28. There are three levels of culpability. High culpability (A) for very serious breach or persistent serious breaches. Culpability B for deliberate breach falling between Culpability A and Culpability C. Lastly, Culpability C is lower culpability for minor breach or breaches.
29. There are also three levels of harm: Category 1, Category 2 and Category 3. Category 1 is for where the breach causes very serious harm or distress. Category 2 is for cases falling between Categories 1 and Category 3. Category 3 is for breaches causing little or no harm or distress.
30. There is a grid set out in paragraph 54 of *Lovett* with the various starting points and ranges for contempt taking account of the culpability and harm.
31. In terms of harm and culpability, this is a Culpability A situation, the highest level. It is a persistent serious breach of court orders. Not only are the breaches repeated, but they are done in clear defiance of the Court's orders, as I have set out. He has decided, to use the proverbial, to stick-two-fingers-up to the Court. I am of the view that these are persistent serious breaches.
32. In terms of harm, I bear in mind the harm in the context of all the types of contempt cases that the Court sees. This is Category 2; it is not the lowest level, it is not the highest level. I appreciate that lots of people have been commenting on the content the defendant has posted with very, very serious and unpleasant threats against the claimant. However, they are the comments of other people rather than the defendant himself. I do not think it falls at the very serious harm or distress end in terms of the contempt proceedings. It is certainly not the lowest; it falls in the middle.
33. Therefore, this an A2 case using the category and culpability assessment. For A2, the starting point is three months' custody. The range is from adjourning consideration to six months custody; that is the recommended range. The starting point of three months is normally applied to somebody who has pleaded not guilty, as it were, or not admitted anything. So someone who has not made any admissions and where it is their first relevant offence, as it were.
34. I have to consider whether to increase or decrease the starting point in light of the various factors. For example, a history of disobedience, the particular vulnerability of any victim, persistent breaches of injunctions are likely to amount to important aggravating factors, mitigating factors and apologies. If I were to go outside the indicative range, then I should give cogent reasons for doing so because the Court has to make sure there is a level of proportionality and consistency applied in relation to contempt.

35. Where there is more than one breach, as there is here, I have to look at the totality of the sentence. Whilst there are numerous breaches in this case, it is effectively all the same thing.
36. There is no time already served, so I do not need to concern myself with what needs to be counted to his credit in that respect.
37. It seems to me that this is an A2 category and culpability contempt. The starting point is three months and there are a number of reasons why that should be increased. They are repeated and deliberate breaches; it is done with a very clear and obvious attitude of ignoring what the Court says and refusing to submit to the authority of the Court. Therefore, I am going to increase it from the starting point.
38. I am going to impose a custodial sentence of four months in prison, taking account of the guidelines and the range. In this case I do not see any point in suspending that. It is going to be an immediate custodial sentence of four months. I have carefully considered whether to suspend the custodial sentence because a custodial sentence is obviously very serious. However, there has been no attempt to engage with the Court and no attempt to comply with the orders. In fact, there has just been flagrant disregard of the Court's orders and process. There has been no mitigation put forward, no personal circumstances put forward. I have already given a chance, in terms of adjourning the sentencing from the previous hearing, to try and engage with the process and he has not taken that.
39. Therefore, for all of those reasons, I am going to impose an immediate custodial sentence. I do not consider it is an appropriate case for suspending the sentence. The defendant always has the opportunity to apply to purge his contempt and comply with the order in any event. For all of those reasons, I am going to impose an immediate custodial sentence of four months.
40. Due to the fact that I have imposed a custodial sentence, I will include in my order, and state plainly now, that the defendant has the right to appeal my order and he does not need permission to do so. He must do so within 21 days of today. That appeal is to be made to the Court of Appeal, if he wishes to do so.
41. Further, as I have imposed a custodial sentence, I will also order that my judgment is transcribed at public expense on an expedited basis and uploaded to the website of the Judiciary of England and Wales, so that it is publicly available.
42. That concludes my judgment in relation to the sentencing on contempt.

End of Judgment.

Transcript of a recording by Acolad UK Ltd
291-299 Borough High Street, London SE1 1JG
Tel: 020 7269 0370
legal@ubiquis.com

Acolad UK Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the
proceedings or part thereof.

This transcript has been approved by the judge.