Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2042 (Fam)

Case No: LV26C50313

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 31/07/26

Before :

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HAYDEN

- -

Between :

Cheshire East Borough Council

Applicant

- and -

(1) M

(2) F

(3) T

(4) A

(Through their Children's Guardian)

Respondents

- -

Cheshire East Borough Council v M and Others (Transparency)

- -

Catherine Heyworth KC (instructed by **Cheshire East**) for the **Applicant**
Darren Howe KC and Mr. Birch (instructed by **Bindmans LLP**) for the **First Respondent**
Adam Vaitilingam KC and Alison Brooks (instructed by **Freemans Solicitors LLP**) for the **Second Respondent**
Lorraine Cavanagh KC and Emma Greenhalgh (instructed by **Lord, Cox & Salt LLP**) for the **Third and Fourth Respondents**
Michael Armstrong (instructed by **Cheshire Police**) for **Cheshire Constabulary**

Hearing date: 6th July 2026

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Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 31st July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HAYDEN

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Mr. Justice Hayden :

1. On 26th June 2026, I handed down a judgment in one of the linked cases arising from the raid on Webb House and two further properties in and around the Crewe area. All three properties are linked to the Ahmadi Religion of Peace and Light (AROPL). The application made before me was to discharge Interim Care Orders (ICO) made by HHJ Parker, dated 12th May 2026. It was one of a cluster of applications made by various parties involved in the linked proceedings. For the reasons set out in the judgment, I considered that the application was unarguable and predicated on an interpretation of the Local Authority's intervention which I described as misconceived.

2. The High Court is rarely involved in applications for ICOs, or their discharge at early stages in the proceedings. I took the opportunity to review the case law and the legal framework to indicate how these applications would be approached in this case. The analysis of the legal framework also has wider resonance for other cases generally. I restated key principles: an interim order is inevitably made when the evidence is incomplete; it is designed to *"hold the ring"*; it does not involve advanced judgment of the final issue; it is a safeguarding measure to protect a child's welfare until the Court can consider the evidence as a whole. The applications require the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the children are at risk of significant harm. Given the gravity of the allegations here and the scope and breadth of the investigation, the interim criteria pursuant to Section 38(2) of the Children Act 1989 were manifestly met. I also noted that the overwhelming majority of the children remain living with a family member.

3. The judgment (*Cheshire East Borough Council v M and Others (Discharge of Interim Care Orders* [2026] EWHC 1606 (Fam)) requires to be read alongside this judgment. The above is only a very brief summary. In short, I indicated that I would not set these applications down for hearing, I would consider them on paper, and I indicated, unambiguously, that that they were likely to be dismissed at this stage. There are 41 linked cases in these proceedings. The intention of the judgment was to communicate with each of the legal teams so that they would learn of and understand the approach of the Court. It was my intention to place an anonymised judgment on the National Archives (official court judgments and tribunal decisions) in order to assist this process. I regarded that as entirely uncontroversial.

4. However, I received an application on behalf of the Mother (M) seeking: *"the continuation of the Transparency Order dated 29th May 2026 until a joint Case Management Hearing of all linked cases and the withholding of the judgment, dated 26th June 2026, from publication until all parties to the linked cases have been heard at a joint Case Management Hearing"*. A joint Case Management Hearing had not been listed at that time, although it has now taken place and been effective in obtaining the police disclosure requested.

5. It is necessary to set out the applicable legal framework here as there has been some confusion as to the scope and ambit of the Transparency Order. On 29th May 2026, HHJ Parker made a Transparency Order in each linked case having heard arguments in four cases when the Press applied to report what was taking place in the hearings. The Transparency Order supports the terms of Section 97(1) Children Act 1989 and Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1980 save insofar as it varies them. In this case the following must not be published:

> *"[19] The reporter(s) may not publish any information relating to the proceedings pending the matter being further considered by the court at the next hearing listed at paragraph 12 above.*
>
> *[20] For the avoidance of doubt, no person may publish any information relating to the proceedings to the public or a section of it, which includes:*
>
> *a. The name or date of birth of any subject child[ren] in the case;*
>
> *b. The name of any parent or family member who is a party or who is mentioned in the case, or whose name may lead to the child[ren] being identified;*
>
> *c. The name of any person who is a party to, or intervening in, the proceedings;*
>
> *d. The address of any child or family member;*
>
> *e. The name or address of any foster carer;*
>
> *f. The school/hospital/placement name or address, or any identifying features of a school of the child[ren];*

> *g. Photographs or images of the child, their parents, carer or any other identifying person, or any of the locations specified above in conjunction with other information relating to the proceedings;*
>
> *h. The names of any medical professional who is or has been treating any of the children or family members;*
>
> *i. For the purposes of s.97(2) Children Act 1989, any other information likely to identify the child as a subject child or former subject child.*
>
> *[21] This order does not disapply s.97(2) Children Act 1989 unless expressly stated."*

6. I agree with the analysis of the legal framework advanced by Ms. Cavanagh KC, Counsel on behalf of the Guardian. Mr. Howe KC, Counsel of behalf of M, also endorses her approach. In relation to the above provisions, Ms. Cavanagh submits:

> *"This is in the usual terms; it adds nothing that prevents the court publishing the judgment in the drafted format with the rubric. We cannot see that any amendments are necessary if the court publishes this judgment as the fact of care proceedings would then be in the public domain and capable of be published further as it would be an exception to section 97 and s12 by the court publishing in the first place."*

Section 12 Administration of Justice Act 1960

7. The phrase *"Information relating to the proceedings"* is derived from the Family Procedure Rules 2010 and Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. Section 12 is concerned with the business of the Court, in the courtroom, during hearings before a judge. Specifically, it is directed to the evidence and any other material placed before a judge. It affords procedural protection; it does not extend to protecting information about the children. The parameters of the protection afforded to material before the Court (pursuant to Section 12) was reviewed in *A v Ward* [2010] EWHC 16 (Fam), [2010] 1 FLR 1497, at paragraphs 112-114, per Munby J (as he then was):

> *"12 Publication of information relating to proceedings in private.*
>
> *(1) The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in the following cases, that is to say—*
>
> *...*
>
> *(b)where the proceedings are brought under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, or under any provision of the Mental Health Act 1983 authorising an application or reference to be made to the First-tier Tribunal, the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales or the county court;*
>
> *...*
>
> *(2)Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of an order made by a court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except where the court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication.*
>
> *(3)In this section references to a court include references to a judge and to a tribunal and to any person exercising the functions of a court, a judge or a tribunal; and references to a court sitting in private include references to a court sitting in camera or in chambers"."*

8. In *Re B (a child) (disclosure)* [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam), Munby J helpfully identified what Section 12 of the AGA does not restrict publication of:

(i) The fact that the children are subject to any order / declaration under the inherent jurisdiction or were subject to an order under the Children Act 1989;

(ii) The name, address or photograph of the children;

(iii) The name, address or photograph of the parties (or other parties than the children) to such proceedings;

(iv) The date, time or place of past or future hearings of such proceedings;

(v) The nature of the dispute in such proceedings;

(vi) *"anything which has been seen or heard by a person conducting himself lawfully in the public corridor or other public precincts outside the court in which the hearing in private is taking place"*;

(vii) the name, address or photograph of the witnesses who have given evidence in such proceedings;

(viii) the party on whose behalf such a witness has given evidence; and

(ix) the text or summary of the whole or part of any order made in such proceedings.

9. The above was expressly cited and approved by Sir Mark Potter (P), sitting in the Court of Appeal in *Clayton v Clayton* [2006] EWCA Civ 87.

10. In *Re B* (supra):

> *"82. For present purposes the relevant principles can, I think, be summarised as follows*
>
> *...*
>
> *(vi) Section 12 prohibits the publication of:*
>
> *(i) accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge sitting in private;*
>
> *(ii) documents such as affidavits, witness statements, reports, position statements, skeleton arguments or other documents filed in the proceedings, transcripts or notes of the evidence or submissions, and transcripts or notes of the judgment (this list is not necessarily exhaustive);*
>
> *(iii) extracts or quotations from such documents;*
>
> *(iv) summaries of such documents.*
>
> *These prohibitions apply whether or not the information or the document being published has been anonymised."*

11. Section 97(2) of the Children Act 1989 provides:

> *"(2) No person shall publish to the public at large or any section of the public any material which is intended, or likely, to identify—*
>
> *(a) any child as being involved in any proceedings before the High Court or the family court in which any power under this Act or the Adoption and Children Act 2002 may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any other child; or*
>
> *(b) an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings."*

12. Self-evidently, Section 97(2) protects the identity of the children; their images and home address from publication at large but only insofar as it serves to identify the child as being involved in proceedings before the Family Court. As has been made clear in *Clayton* (supra), the protection is limited to the duration of proceedings. It is designed to prevent the harassment of children and families subject to Children Act proceedings only whilst the proceedings are ongoing. Section 12 of the AJA does not prohibit publication of the fact of there being care proceedings and the general nature of the dispute. As discussed above, Section 97 prevents the names and identities of the particular children and families being linked to proceedings. Accordingly, the Transparency Order made by HHJ Parker does not in fact prevent the publication of my judgment with its accompanying rubric.

13. To the extent that M's team has assumed that the Transparency Order prohibited the publication of the fact of the care proceedings, they are, albeit for entirely understandable reasons, incorrect. Thus, my judgment, as drafted anonymously, is compliant with the relevant provisions. The appropriate application ought to have been for a Reporting Restriction Order, as I indicated to Mr. Howe at the commencement of his submissions. The substance of M's complaint is that there is *"significant additional evidence that publication of the judgment will expose the children, and the parents, to a likelihood to suffering harm, both emotional and physical"*. I propose to circumvent the procedural misunderstanding and address the substance of the concerns. I also record that this hearing took place on notice to the Press; three journalists attended; the

BBC and The Guardian (newspaper) made written submissions; and I received oral submissions on behalf of the Press Association (PA Media).

14. In the course of exchanges, Mr. Howe accepted the necessity for the other parties' lawyers to receive the judgment, i.e. in each of the linked cases. He also recognised the need for judges, involved in the interlinked cases, receiving the judgment too. I am bound to say that though those concessions were correctly made, they led inevitably to the crumbling of the foundations of his application. The genie is either in or out of the bottle. Ultimately, Mr. Howe rightly focused his energy on those parts of the judgment, which he submitted risked elevating the temperature of hostility surrounding Webb House for those who live or have lived there.

15. I approach that exercise on the well-established principles in *Re S* [2005] 1 AC 593, per Lord Steyn:

> "*The interplay between articles 8 and 10 has been illuminated by the opinions of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2AC 457. For present purposes the decision of the House on the facts of Campbell and the differences between the majority and the minority are not material. What does, however, emerge clearly from the opinions are four propositions. First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test."*

16. It is a parallel analysis between the competing Article 8 and Article 10 interests, in which neither has precedence. Sir James Munby (P) in *Re X (A Child) (No. 2)* [2016] 4 WLR 116 identified the following as being of considerable importance:

> *"i) First, it is the responsibility of the judge, and of the judge alone, to decide whether to send a judgment to BAILII and to ensure (if a judgment is sent) that (a) the correct version is sent and (b) the version sent has been appropriately anonymised.*

> *ii) Secondly, and following on from (i), it is for the judge, and the judge alone, to decide whether BAILII should be invited to take down a judgment which the judge has previously sent to BAILII. So any request or suggestion that such a judgment be taken down should be made to the judge (either directly or through the judge's clerk or through the Judicial Office) and not to either HMCTS or BAILII."*

That second point is not engaged here. Neither do I read the first point as conveying potentate powers on the judge. The judge will conduct an analysis of the competing rights and interests engaged in the way that I have discussed above, before deciding whether a judgment is placed on the National Archives. Only the judge can place a judgment on the National Archives and, it follows, only a judge can require the judgment to be taken down.

17. It is also necessary to consider *Abbasi & another v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; Haastrup v King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust* [2025] UKSC 15:

> *"128. The proper application of the Convention requires a more structured approach than the concept of "balancing" rights might suggest. In assessing whether there has been a breach of article 10 (or, mutatis mutandis, a breach of article 8), the court begins by asking whether there was an interference prescribed by the law. The next question is whether it pursued a legitimate aim, i.e. an aim which can be justified with reference to one or more of the matters mentioned in article 10(2) (or article 8(2), as the case may be). The remaining question is whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society. It is at that stage that the court may be required to strike a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other: Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6, para 84."*

18. As Sir Mark Potter (P) emphasised in *Clayton* (supra), the exercise is not conducted on the basis of *"rival generalities"* but on an intense focus of the specific rights and interests engaged.

19. As I have already mentioned, the central thrust of Mr. Howe's argument is an assertion that the privacy and safety of the children and adults are placed in heightened jeopardy by information in the judgment, some of which, though not a great deal, is not yet in the public domain. The fact that the children are subject to care proceedings has not entered the public domain, though for reasons that I have discussed above, there is nothing, at present, legally preventing it from being so. There can be little doubt, to my mind, that it is in the public interest to be informed that protective and safeguarding measures have been taken to protect potentially vulnerable children. The countervailing argument is that public knowledge of this fact *"will expose the children and parents to a* [renewed] *likelihood of suffering harm, both emotional and physical"*. It is said, as I understand the argument, that putting the judgment in the public domain, even if it simply repeats (factually) that which is already largely known, essentially reheats tensions within the local community. To this end, Mr. Howe's solicitors have harvested a raft of messages, posted on social media, which make reference to *"stalking"* members of the community and putting their addresses online, a practice known as *"doxxing"*. There are also references to *"Child Protection Plans"*, *"visits by social services"*, and I note, a TikTok message expressly referring to *"one family under proceedings"*. There is also a message which mentions *"the families [as] part of a section 47 investigation"*. This is plainly a reference to section 47 of the Children Act 1989, which is the provision which places on Local Authorities a statutory responsibility to investigate when they have reasons to believe that a child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm. Whilst all these messages point to some members of the public having a sententious interest in the activities of this community, they also illustrate, compellingly, how reference to an Interim Care Order is unlikely to add anything of real significance to public awareness of the case. I appreciate and take Mr. Howe's point that the reactions of some members of the public are not always rational in this sphere.

20. As Ms. Heyworth KC, on behalf of the Local Authority, and Ms. Cavanagh point out, the entirety of the substantial information in the public domain thus far has been placed there by formal police briefings. I was surprised, therefore, to find that Mr. Howe's application is supported by the police. Mr. Armstrong, now acting on behalf of the Cheshire Constabulary had been instructed very late in the day. I record this simply as fact, not as criticism. He had not had the opportunity to put a skeleton argument

together. I strongly suspect and understand that the police wish to retain sole control of the release of information into the public domain. That is sound operational policy, and I am committed to reinforcing it. However, reporting of judgments is a matter for me. Mr. Armstrong was not in a position to engage in this exercise with the subtlety it requires, and as recently restated by the Supreme Court in *Abbasi* (supra), namely the need to assess whether an interference with Article 10 (or 8) was one prescribed by law; pursued a legitimate aim; and is necessary in a democratic society. Recognising that only at that stage does the Court conduct the balancing exercise between competing Convention Rights (see Article 10(2)):

> *"The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."*

21. Judgments handed down in the High Court in Family cases and in the Court of Protection are now usually placed on the National Archives. They are, in most cases, anonymised to protect the interests of the children or adults who lack capacity. Their purpose is to enable lawyers, other interested professionals and members of the public to inform themselves about any developments in the law. They are essentially our forensic blood supply, distributing legal information to where and to whom it is required. Without the systematic reporting of judgments, the common law's doctrine of precedent could not operate effectively, and the coherence of our legal system would be very seriously compromised.

22. In the judgment, as I have set out at paragraph 2 above, I took the opportunity to revisit well-established principles in respect of ICOs and to explain why I would not be permitting oral applications, where an application to discharge an ICO was manifestly unarguable. That robust case management is not only required in this case, but it has wider resonance generally in our progression towards Child Focused Courts and our

renewed determination to circumvent or at least minimise avoidable conflict, both inside and outside the courtroom. Without exception, the applications in writing were raising the forensic temperature and generating conflict for no realisable objective. The families' lawyers have now had the opportunity to consider the judgment, and I note that most of the applications have been withdrawn. Those few that remain raise small but important points which may have to be litigated if they are not agreed (as I anticipate they can be).

23. It is also necessary to point out that the pool of litigants has not been static. Thus, new lawyers may come into the case. Practical problems arise; they would only be able to achieve a copy of the judgment if they learned of its existence through conversations with other lawyers in the case (who at least arguably would not be permitted to talk about it, without the leave of the Court). It would also be necessary for a separate application to be made for release of the judgment. This is both burdensome and potentially ineffective. It reinforces the unworkability of this partially transparent arrangement.

24. The work of the Family Court is frequently in the vanguard of change in life and society, as the case law demonstrates in abundance. The right, perhaps even the need, for the public to know what is being done in its name is now properly recognised. The Family Court has finally emerged from the protectionist and sometimes paternalistic shadow cast by the wardship jurisdiction and into the sunlight of transparency, the *"disinfectant powers"* of which were famously recognised by the US Supreme Court Judge, Justice Brandeis in 1913. The damage to the public confidence in the work of the Family Justice System when it was bedevilled by the canard of secrecy is still a fresh memory. The issues in this case have not been heard in the Family Courts before. Modern slavery and people trafficking are new challenges for this jurisdiction. The right of the public to know that there has been an application to a Family Court for determination of these serious and pervasive allegations, emanating from the raid at Webb House is, in my judgement, both pressing and necessary. Again, I emphasise that at this stage, these are allegations, not proven facts. Openness is intrinsic to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice within the Family Court.

25. I recognise that much of the tenor of our public debate, particularly that which is conducted on social media, has become crude and polarised. Truth and factual accuracy have become dispensable in the formation of opinions. It is, however, no part of the function of the Family Court to encourage the expression of views which accord with its own or restrict the publication of views which are misinformed and / or biased. Freedom of expression embraces both.

26. The Court cannot simply close its doors in response to unspecified concerns about potential civil disorder. It is perhaps convenient at this point to note that the judgment signals in clear terms that given the nature of the allegations, it follows that some of the adults in Webb House are suspected of being perpetrators of serious offending, but that other adults may not be. Neither I nor the public know where that line will ultimately fall, if the allegations are established. Those who are involved in stalking and *"doxxing"* members of the community should realise that they may be harassing people who have already been subject to harm and who may be blameless. *"Doxxing"* is a legally complex matter in which different jurisdictions have differing approaches. Stalking, however, is an established criminal offence. Where fear of violence or serious alarm or distress is concerned, it also carries significant penal sanction.

27. As foreshadowed, Mr. Howe submits that, in what he contends is a febrile local atmosphere, even the revisiting of known and publicised information could reheat the temperature and generate further hostility to the community. That is a proper submission, and it is well rooted in law. In *Newman v Southampton City Council & Ors* [2021] EWCA Civ 437, King LJ endorsed the approach of Tugendhat J in *JIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd* [2011] EMLR 9, namely *"the repetition of known facts about an individual may amount to unjustified interference with the private lives not only of that person, but also of those who are involved with him"*.

28. King LJ continued:

> *"(v) Repetition of disclosure or publication on further occasions is capable of constituting a further invasion of privacy, even in relation to persons to whom disclosure or publication was previously made—especially if it occurs in a different medium. It follows that the court must give due weight to the qualitative*

difference in intrusiveness and distress likely to be involved in what is now proposed: PJS: para. [32.(iii)] and para.[35]."

29. Thus, whilst a very great deal of information is already in the public domain, the repetition of, and addition to it, clearly risks a potential 'flare up' (my phrase). The Article 8 rights of both adults and children in this family are clearly engaged. Both M's team and the Guardian's team have undertaken impressive searches of the publicly available material. Ms. Emma Greenhalgh has identified *"tens of thousands of videos on TikTok"*. Manifestly, these searches cannot cover everything. Ms. Greenhalgh helpfully identifies the following general points:

(i) The police released a lot of information at the outset, and the public is aware that there are allegations of: forced marriage, modern slavery and sexual abuse. Details (gender, nationality and age) of all those arrested have been published;

(ii) The details of Slavery and Trafficking Risk Orders (STROs) are in the public domain, including the names of the members of the group who are the subject of the orders;

(iii) The names of each of the members of AROPL who, allegedly, committed public law order offences on 30th April 2026 are also in the public domain;

(iv) There is a significant amount of press coverage in relation to the raid on 29th April 2026. There is also coverage relating to the aftermath i.e. public order matters. I am confident that Ms. Greenhalgh's searches are predominantly online;

(v) There is much expressed public concern surrounding the activity in Webb House and the AROPL movement;

(vi) There are also examples of members of AROPL engaging with members of the public as detailed below on live stream videos;

(vii) Some members of AROPL are very active on social media. They have a podcast which at times runs on a frequent, sometimes daily basis;

(viii) J, a TikTok user who posted some information concerning social services involvement was invited to and joined the livestream with the group on at least one occasion (2nd June 2026). E, another TikTok user, was also invited onto the podcast; and

(ix) On the same day N (a member of the public) also mocked R (a member of the community) for a recent conviction and called him a *"naughty boy"*.

30. I have anonymised the usernames above notwithstanding that all these exchanges are in the public domain. It is the fact of the exchanges here that is important and not the identity of the individuals. The usernames themselves are mostly glib and fictitious, though some are real names, including people in the community.

31. Again, I am left with a very strong feeling that the genie is well and truly out of the bottle. As I discussed above, Article 10 is not a right available only to the righteous, it is a fundamental freedom available to all, within the constraints of the law. There are already infringements here, in consequence of the necessary anonymisations. The full rigour of Article 10 has yielded to the need to protect the privacy of the children. It is an illustration of the fact that any infringement of Article 10 must be the minimum possible to protect the competing Article 8 rights.

32. Mr. Howe's argument that even the revisiting of known facts might risk an elevation of local tension, strikes me as significantly weakened when members of the community continue to be directly engaged in debate online. This is an application to prohibit the reporting of a judgment, which is largely concerned with achieving efficient case management. The importance of that aim, alongside the wider public interest principles engaged and discussed above, tilts the balance of competing rights strongly in favour of Article 10. Looking at the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right, and the proportionality of such intervention, I am satisfied that in the *"ultimate balancing test"*, to use Lord Steyn's phrase, the balance comes down decisively in favour of reporting the judgment. The few further facts entering the public domain are entirely dwarfed by those which are already there. The Article 8 claims themselves, advanced on behalf of M, though not fanciful, are generalised and speculative. I also

consider that for the reasons set out at paragraph 26 above, it is at least arguable that the families' Article 8 rights are afforded greater protection by this judgment.

33. Finally, I should address M's wider concern, expressed in her statement, regarding the other parties to the linked proceedings. Their Article 8 rights are also potentially engaged. I examine M's point on the basis that they are. Any decision by any public body which has the potential to affect a Convention right falls to be considered within the framework of the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates into domestic law the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. I recognise that M's asserted Article 8 rights also apply to other individuals within Webb House. Courts are used to making orders which have potential impact on the Convention rights of various categories and groups of individuals. It is unsustainable to suggest that everybody whose Convention rights are potentially engaged by a decision of a Court must be afforded the right to make representations. In any event, for all the reasons set out in this judgment, the identified disequilibrium between the competing rights in play is not realistically receptive to realignment.

34. By way of postscript, and though I have not been addressed on the point, I have been conscious, when reading some of the earlier authorities, of our very changed technological landscape. In past years, members of the public might have found tracking down judgments on Bailii too wearisome to pursue. These days, information can be scraped readily by Artificial Intelligence, which renders those judgments far more publicly accessible. This judgment is written with that reality in mind.