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Case No: FD26P00746

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 29/10/2026

Before :

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HAYDEN

- -

Between :

The Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police

Applicant

- and -

X

Respondent

- -

Re X (Inherent Jurisdiction: Vulnerable Adult)

- -

Gina Allwood (instructed by **the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police**) for the **Applicant**
Naima Asif (instructed by **Dawson Cornwell LLP**) for the **First Respondent**

Hearing date: 22nd and 29th October 2026

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Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HAYDEN

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their

family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Mr. Justice Hayden :

1. This urgent application came before me as the out of hours judge. Accordingly, it was made by telephone. Ms. Gina Allwood appeared on behalf of The Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police. Detective Sergeant Luke Portch also attended and gave evidence which, in the circumstances, was unsworn. The application relates to X, a woman in her late twenties. She is of middle Eastern heritage who, until recently, resided in Europe with her husband (Z) and their young son.

2. Paradigmatically, out of hours applications require judges to make facilitative orders, e.g. Return Orders, Deprivation of Liberty Orders, etc. Not uncommonly, judges have to make orders which 'hold the ring' until a case can be heard by a judge, if possible, the following day. Such orders frequently do not require a judgment. The agreed recitals to any order made will often suffice. Occasionally, however, a case comes before the out of hours judge which requires a significant decision, and thus, public scrutiny, in a Court committed to transparency. For this reason, I have prepared this short-written judgment on what I consider are important points raised by the application.

3. The information placed before me indicates that the couple's marriage had, for some time, become deeply troubled. X alleges that she was subjected to controlling and abusive behaviour by her husband. Those allegations include a raft of restrictions on her independent agency including financial control, monitoring of her communications, degrading treatment, physical violence, an incident of strangulation and also rape. These allegations remain untested and no findings have been made in respect of them.

4. In September 2026, X travelled to England. She maintains that she had effectively fled her home in Europe and was seeking respite from her husband. The evidence suggests that she sought advice concerning divorce and, shortly thereafter, claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on the basis that she was seeking protection from domestic abuse. An asylum interview has been scheduled for 4th November 2026.

5. Whilst in the UK, X stayed with a Mr. S. The nature of their relationship is disputed. It has been described as *"intimate"*; X characterises it as *"platonic"*. The distinction has assumed significance because allegations concerning her relationship with Mr. S appear to lie at the centre of subsequent events.

6. In early October 2026, Devon and Cornwall Police became involved, following reports that X's electronic accounts had been compromised and that her whereabouts in England had been discovered. The information before the Court recounts that her husband had accessed her iCloud account, tracked her devices, identified her address and communicated information concerning her location to members of her family. This kind of behaviour is a frequently seen facet of coercive control. It is further alleged that threats were then relayed through family members, including threats of significant violence and death, should she refuse to return and resume the marriage.

7. The allegations made by X to the police were considered sufficiently grave for the matter to be assessed as presenting a high risk of harm. Honour-based abuse and domestic abuse assessments both identified significant safeguarding concerns. X is recorded as expressing fear for her life and, at one stage, assessed the likelihood of her suffering serious injury in the future as *"10 out of 10"*. Though I emphasise that the evidence has not been tested, I would signal that it is cogent. In his telephone evidence, DS Portch told me that, in accordance with good practice in cases of this gravity, DNA samples are taken for the purposes of identifying the body, should the death threats be carried out. What struck DS Portch pointedly was the flat and emotionally disengaged manner in which X acquiesced to the testing. DS Portch was anticipating a distress reaction, given that the process itself effectively required X, who is a mother of a very young boy, to contemplate her own death.

8. Extensive safeguarding measures followed. Emergency accommodation, specialist support, alarms, address markers and multi-agency intervention were offered. Some assistance was accepted; some was declined. Throughout this period, the police remained concerned that X was vulnerable to pressure from family members and from her husband.

9. The chronology reveals, however, a striking change in X's position during the latter part of October 2026. Following her renewed contact with her husband, she expressed a desire to reconcile with him and to reunite with her son. She indicated that her husband wished to determine whether allegations concerning an intimate relationship with Mr. S were true and that reconciliation depended, at least in part, upon her ability to persuade him that she had remained faithful. I do not regard this volte face as necessarily weakening the integrity of X's accounts. Those who have been subjected to

the particularly insidious abuse alleged here frequently question their own thoughts and perceptions and yield to those of others.

10. During interviews with the police on 21st and 22nd October 2026, X repeatedly denied that she was being forced or coerced into travelling. She stated that she wished to return voluntarily, that she trusted assurances given by her husband and family, and that she believed her family would protect her. This is entirely irreconcilable with her own earlier accounts of the risk to her safety. However, it has been noted that she has continued to make observations which cause professional concern. Most notably, she was recorded as saying, *"I have to go"*, explaining that she needed to *"prove"* that she had not lied and that she needed to *"put things right"*.

11. By 22nd October 2026, arrangements had been made for X to leave England, travelling from Heathrow Airport to the Middle East. Her plans had altered from initially meeting family in a hotel to staying at her parents' home, notwithstanding that her father was among those whom she had previously identified as presenting an immediate risk to her safety. It is important to signal that whilst we ordinarily perceive families as most likely a source of support and protection, in this context they can be the exact opposite.

12. It was against this background that the police and other professionals became increasingly concerned that, notwithstanding X's clear capacity to make decisions and her repeated insistence that she was acting of her own free will, her autonomy had, in reality, become compromised by coercion, undue influence, threats, familial pressure and emotional manipulation. The contrast between her present position and her earlier, detailed, resolute and consistent accounts of abuse is striking. Significantly, she has never actively retracted or disavowed those allegations.

The Application

13. This application is brought by the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The application seeks urgent protective relief in respect of a *"vulnerable adult"*. For the avoidance of doubt, the police expressly recognise that X is capable of understanding, retaining and communicating information relevant to her decisions. The police believe, however, that her capacity to assert her own autonomy, even in the face of a real risk to her life, has been squashed by coercion, undue influence and other external pressures.

14. The applicant seeks short term and tightly focused injunctive relief preventing X's departure from England and Wales, together with associated passport and travel restrictions, for a limited period only. The purpose of the proposed intervention is not to compel any particular course of action but, as DS Portch puts it, to *"give her some breathing space"* to organise her thoughts and feelings. What is contemplated is a limited intervention to afford a period of decompression, bearing in mind that X is a capacitous adult with the agency to make her own decisions, be they objectively good or bad. In other words, the relief sought from the Court is to facilitate X's decision-taking, not to remove it from her.

15. The applicant contends that there is a real possibility that X faces grave harm if the concerns identified in the police assessments prove, as they are perceived to be, well founded. It came to light that X had booked coach travel to Heathrow Airport and had been booked on a flight that evening. DS Portch proposes to stop her at the airport and to encourage her to remain in the United Kingdom for the reasons I have set out above. That is why the application was made urgently to an out of hours judge.

16. Thus, the application engages the difficult issues surrounding the existence, scope, and reach of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction relating to vulnerable adults. In *London Borough of Redbridge v SNA* [2015] EWHC 2140 (Fam), I deprecated the overuse of this jurisdiction, which had been expressed by Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court (1970) Current Legal Problems 23, in these terms and cited with approval in a High Court judgment:

> *"The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court "may be invoked in an apparently inexhaustible variety of circumstances and may be exercised in different ways. This peculiar concept is indeed so amorphous and ubiquitous and so pervasive in its operation that it seems to defy challenge to determine its quality and establish its limits.""*

17. The tone of that passage is, for me, rather difficult to read. Taking it at face value, I made the following observations:

> *"33. …The concept of the 'inherent jurisdiction' is by its nature illusive to definition. Certainly, it is 'amorphous'… and, to the extent that the High Court has repeatedly been able to utilise it to make provision for children and vulnerable adults not*

> *otherwise protected by statute, can, I suppose be described as 'pervasive'. But it is not 'ubiquitous' in the sense that its reach is all - pervasive or unlimited. Precisely because its powers are not based either in statute or in the common law it requires to be used sparingly and in a way that is faithful to its evolution. It is for this reason that any application by a Local Authority to invoke the inherent jurisdiction may not be made as of right but must surmount the hurdle of an application for leave pursuant to s100 (4) and meet the criteria there."*

18. Where it has been deployed by judges, it has largely been directed towards protecting adults from situations where their own decision taking has been vitiated or overborne by others, exposing them to risk of serious harm. Some academics have been highly critical of the case law in this sphere, which has been said to be built on the *"shakiest of foundations and used as a springboard to create an entirely new jurisdiction over vulnerable adults where the prerogative jurisdiction never historically existed"* (Sir James Munby *"Wither the Inherent Jurisdiction"*).

19. Where an individual has capacity, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not apply; the inherent jurisdiction is *"targeted solely at those adults whose abilities to make decisions for themselves has been compromised by matters other than those covered by the 2005 Act"* (see *Re L (vulnerable adults with capacity: court's jurisdiction))* [2013] Fam 1, para. 53. The leading authority is *Re SA (vulnerable adult with capacity: marriage)* [2006] 1 FLR 867. Munby J, as he then was, described *"vulnerable adults"* thus:

> *"82. In the context of the inherent jurisdiction I would treat as a vulnerable adult someone who, whether or not mentally incapacitated, and whether or not suffering from any mental illness or mental disorder, is or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation, or who is deaf, blind or dumb, or who is substantially handicapped by illness, injury or congenital deformity. This, I emphasise, is not and is not intended to be a definition. It is descriptive, not definitive; indicative rather than prescriptive."*

20. This judgment was written 21 years ago. The passage above is one of very few Munby J's judgments, if I may respectfully say so, which has not aged well. I do not think for a moment that anybody would consider the jurisdiction might be established on the basis of an individual being deaf, blind, dumb, or in some way physically vulnerable. It is a misconceived analogy. I note that Lieven J, as she then was, took a similar view in *London Borough of Croydon v KR* [2020] COP LR 285, at para. 60. Nonetheless, it establishes the existence of the jurisdiction. In *Re L* (supra) (at paragraph 19 above), Maurice Kay LJ, agreeing with McFarlane LJ's leading judgment, expressed the view that it would be *"most unfortunate"* if the Court had no power to protect a person *"against unscrupulous manipulation"* by an 'oppressor' in deference to that person's autonomy. Those concise observations strike me as precisely capturing the concern which arises in this case. Respect for autonomy is a cardinal principle, but it cannot require the Court to avert its gaze from evidence suggesting that a person's apparent choices may in fact be the product of coercion, intimidation or manipulation. The Court's task is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the individual, but to ensure, so far as it is able, that the individual is genuinely free to exercise their own.

21. In this challenging sphere, judges are required to address fundamental principles of autonomy and human agency in circumstances where an individual's decision-making may be so compromised, whether by coercion or other constraining influences, that they are unable genuinely to safeguard their own welfare and may consequently place their safety, or even their life, in jeopardy. That exercise is entirely different from recognising and respecting the right of a capacitous adult to make choices which others may regard as eccentric, imprudent or plainly wrong. The law protects autonomy, not wisdom. Its concern is not with bad decisions but with decisions that are not truly free.

22. The evidence, as presented, strikes me as establishing a real risk both to the mother's safety and to her life. In my judgement, this engages X's Article 2 Rights ECHR. There is also a very young child here. Both he and his mother have Rights to respect for their private and family life, thus Article 8 is also engaged. I note that the ECHR has reasoned that domestic abuse is not solely a private matter between individuals, but where authorities know or ought to know of a real and immediate risk of serious violence, the State may be under a positive obligation to take proactive and preventative operational measures: *Opuz v Turkey* (2009) 50 EHRR 28:

> *"126. In the context of domestic violence, victims were often intimidated or threatened into either not reporting the crime or withdrawing complaints. However, the responsibility to ensure accountability and guard against impunity lay with the State, not with the victim. International practice recognised that a broad range of interested persons, not just the victim, should be able to report and initiate an investigation into domestic violence. Further, international practice increasingly suggested that where there was sufficient evidence and it was considered in the public interest, prosecution of perpetrators of domestic violence should continue even when a victim withdrew her complaint. These developments indicated a trend away from requiring victim participation towards placing the responsibility for effective prosecution squarely on the State.*
>
> *127. While a decision not to prosecute in a particular case would not necessarily be in breach of due diligence obligations, a law or practice which automatically paralysed a domestic violence investigation or prosecution where a victim withdrew her complaint would be. In respect of these obligations and with reference to the Fatma Yildirim v. Austria decision of the CEDAW Committee (cited in the relevant international materials section above), it was submitted that the State had not only to ensure an appropriate legislative framework, but also to ensure effective implementation and enforcement practice."*

23. Similarly, in *Kurt v Austria* [GC] (2021) 73 EHRR 6, the Grand Chamber reaffirmed that domestic abuse cases required particularly careful and proactive risk assessment. Authorities are required to investigate allegations rigorously, evaluate patterns of behaviour, and assess future risk rather than responding to isolated incidents.

24. In the context of domestic abuse, the obligations incumbent on the State authorities could be summarised as follows:

> *"(i) An immediate response to allegations of domestic violence was required.*
>
> *(ii) The authorities had to establish whether there existed a real and immediate risk to the life of one or more identified victims of domestic violence by taking due account of the particular context of domestic violence cases. Violence against children belonging to the common household, including deadly violence,*

> *could be used by perpetrators as the ultimate form of punishment against their partner. The authorities were under a duty to carry out an autonomous, proactive and comprehensive risk assessment. The terms "autonomous" and "proactive" referred to the requirement for the authorities to not rely solely on the victim's perception of the risk, but to complement it by their own assessment, collecting and assessing information on all relevant risk factors and elements of the case. Furthermore, the use of standardised, internationally recognised checklists, which indicated specific risk factors and had been developed on the basis of sound criminological research and best practices in domestic violence cases, could contribute to the "comprehensiveness" of the risk assessment. It was important for the relevant authorities to receive regular training and awareness-raising, particularly in respect of risk assessment tools, in order to understand the dynamics of domestic violence. Any risk assessment had to be apt to systematically identify and address all the potential – direct or indirect – victims, keeping in mind the possibility that the outcome could be a different level of risk for each of them.*
>
> *...*
>
> *(iii) The choice of an operational measure inevitably required, at both general policy and individual level, a careful weighing of the competing rights at stake and other relevant constraints. On the one hand, any such measures had to offer an adequate and effective response to the risk to life as identified. On the other hand, and to the extent that they had an impact on the alleged perpetrator, any measures taken had to remain in compliance with the States' other obligations under the Convention, including the need to ensure that the police exercised their powers in a manner which fully respected due process and other safeguards, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8. The nature and severity of the assessed risk would always be an important factor with regard to the proportionality of any protective and preventive measures to be taken."*

25. In the light of the allegations as I have analysed above, and having considered both the domestic and European jurisprudence, I am persuaded that the intervention of the Devon and Cornwall Police in the way proposed is both lawful and proportionate. Accordingly, I grant the application.

Return Hearing on 29th October 2026

26. It is convenient to connect this short judgment, on the return date, to the above, in order that the fuller picture emerges. Following the out of hours hearing, I received a message, via my clerk, the following day to inform me that the plan to intercept X at the boarding gate was successful and that the order was served and passport obtained. Arrangements were made for X. I am told that she engaged actively with the police and was immediately receptive to offers of support.

27. For this hearing, I have received several police statements. The statement of DS Portch sets out in detail what has occurred since the initial intervention. It is important that I preface this by identifying DS Portch's expertise. He is currently stationed within the local safeguarding investigation team of the public protection unit, specialising in investigations into abuse of children and vulnerable adults. Prior to this, he worked as a detective within both specialist rape and serious sexual offences teams and domestic abuse teams. He is the tactical lead for Devon and Cornwall Police in matters of what is paradoxically termed 'honour-based abuse (HBA)', female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. Alongside this formidable responsibility, he is also the deputy strategic lead, with force-wide responsibility in these subjects and through this role is involved in regional and national discussions on these topics. He has oversight of the vast majority of HBA incidents reported to the Police. I have found his leadership of this investigation very much reflects his considerable experience. It is a paradigm of good practice. His team, which includes PC Gemma Henderson, PC David Coot, PC Julia Trytko, each of whom has provided statements, has also been impressive.

28. On occasion, I have found it necessary to be critical of police investigations. Fairness requires me to record that this investigation stands at the opposite end of the spectrum. It was conducted with conspicuous professionalism, sensitivity and acuity throughout. In my judgement, it represents progressive policing of the very highest calibre, in a case of considerable sensitivity. Such work merits recognition, not merely for the expertise, diligence and commitment it reveals, but also because it serves a wider public purpose. It should reassure the public, and vulnerable women in particular, that their circumstances can be understood, that their voices can be heard, and that there exists a resolute determination to provide carefully calibrated protection and support where it is needed. I am very much aware that policing of this quality, in this sphere of abuse, is

not ubiquitous. I highlight it here to the degree that I have to demonstrate that it exists and to offer it as a template for others.

29. DS Portch had no involvement with the case prior to 22nd October 2026. After reviewing the police investigation materials, including domestic abuse and HBA risk assessments, he concluded that it presented an exceptionally high level of risk. I agree with that assessment.

30. The information before him indicated that X had reported:

(i) Stalking, coercive and controlling behaviour, threats to kill, and rape allegations against her husband;

(ii) Threats to kill from family members, including her own father;

(iii) Cogent evidence that her husband had unlawfully accessed her iCloud account, search history, photographs and other personal information; and

(iv) Information from an individual that discussions had taken place between her husband and father about travelling to the UK and killing her for dishonouring the family.

31. The case was assessed as both a high-risk domestic abuse matter and a high-risk HBA.

32. In his statement, DS Portch emphasised that whilst X was not suffering from any impairment of mind or brain so as to engage the Mental Capacity Act 2005, he nevertheless considered that her ability to make genuinely autonomous decisions was being significantly compromised by coercive influences. In particular, he considered that the use of her child as a means of exerting emotional pressure upon her was a powerful factor affecting her decision-making. Again, I agree entirely with that analysis. It was against that background that he began to explore what legal protection might be available to a capacitous but vulnerable adult. The following passage from DS Portch's statement requires highlighting:

> *"…it was my opinion based on my experience in this area of safeguarding that her decision making was nonetheless hampered by the coercion she was under, in particular the use of her child as a 'bargaining tool'. I therefore conducted research into options and came across an article by 39 Essex in*

> *relation to the concept of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. This was not an area of law I was familiar with, however having read the summary provided I believed it could apply to this case. As such I requested contact be made with the legal services unit of Devon and Cornwall Police for advice, with counsel subsequently being instructed and an urgent hearing scheduled."*

33. The energy involved in researching and planning here, illustrated by the above, reveals just what can be achieved, in a crisis, and in a very short timescale by those who are prepared to go the extra mile. DS Portch had plainly decided that X's life was at risk and that she was aware of that. In the following paragraph of his statement, he proffers the following:

> *"As previously mentioned, this case was assessed by officers, and is an assessment I share, as a high risk case both in terms of domestic abuse and HBA. It is, I believe, a widely accepted stance that domestic abuse victims are a group at heightened risk of serious harm or death. Taking UK Government 2025 data for example, there were 111 domestic homicides linked to 811,493 domestic abuse crimes reported to Police. Whilst to my knowledge there is not a dedicated study or nationally gathered data looking at so called 'honour killings' the key charities in this sector such as Karma Nirvana and Halo all agree that approximately 12-15 such killings take place in the UK each year. This is against a reported 2949 HBA related offences being reported in the year ending 2025, as such the evidence strongly suggests that those who are victim of HBA are of much higher risk of homicide than a non-HBA domestic abuse case."*

34. Alongside the police evaluation of risk, I would also note the significance of X's allegation of non-fatal strangulation. In *Lancashire County Council v M & Ors* [2023] EWHC 3097 (Fam), I made the following observations:

> *"26. Section 70 Domestic Abuse Act 2021 (DA Act 2021) introduced the offences of non fatal strangulation and non-fatal suffocation. Schedule 2, paragraph 4 DA Act 2021 introduced the offence of racially or religiously aggravated non-fatal strangulation or non-fatal suffocation. The offences came into force on 7th June 2022 and are not retrospective. The summary report on data collected from SUTDA survey emphasised the following:*

> *"Intimate Partner Homicide (IPH) has a strong relationship to domestic abuse and coercive control and international research has established that there are certain characteristics of domestic abuse or what are called 'high risk markers' that are especially strongly associated with future homicide and serious harm. Any kind of strangulation is one of the strongest markers. Research has shown that this increases the risk of homicide by eight times. This is not simply because NFS could 'accidentally' end as homicide, but because people who use strangulation are more dangerous."*
>
> *27. The impact on victims also needs fully to be understood:*
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> *"NFS is also associated with severe trauma in its victims and is in fact experienced as a real threat to life. Victims of it report not only that it is incredibly painful, but it is also an experience of potential death. Perpetrators of NFS very often have this as their motivation. It is a particularly traumatic, and because of this an effective, way to exert the ultimate control and leave the victim in no doubt that their life has been threatened. It would be a mistake to think that NFS is a spontaneous and angry assault, it is more likely to be a controlled and determined threat.""*

35. This serves, in my judgement, to reinforce the police evaluation of risk. To be explicit, had X boarded the aircraft and returned to her family, I think it likely that she would have been killed. Moreover, I think X and the police are of the same view. Indeed, both have said so explicitly. It was the Metropolitan Police, liaising with their colleagues in the South West, who effected service on X at the airport. The two forces have continued to collaborate. I do not propose to burden this judgment with the details of the arrangements, not least to protect the privacy of X's present whereabouts.

36. DS Portch concludes his statement with these remarks:

> *"I have found the fact that [X] has engaged well with both police and support agencies since the order being granted as a positive in this case. Not only has she shown acceptance that the likely outcome of her travel would be death, her engagement allows ongoing support work to safeguarding her in the longer term. I am aware officers are also exploring options via Interpol with [European] authorities in relation to the welfare of [X]'s son, who understandably continues to be a draw for her to be*

> *reunited with, however whilst he remains with her husband such reunification will inevitably hold with it the risks as discussed."*

37. It strikes me that this final passage reveals that X has begun to reclaim her autonomy. For a sustained period, as the evidence strongly indicates, her capacity for independent decision-making had been overpowered by those who exploited and abused her. I do not for a moment underestimate the challenges that lie ahead. However, I am entirely satisfied that this is precisely the kind of situation in which the protective ambit of the High Court's inherent jurisdictional powers fall to be deployed. The Court's intervention has never been directed towards the subjugation of X's autonomy. Quite the reverse. Its purpose has been to create the space within which she might, freely and authentically, recover it. The objective has been to restore, rather than to restrict, her ability to make her own choices. There are encouraging signs that those objectives are being achieved.

38. To have prioritised X's overborne and distorted decision-taking under the banner of respect for her autonomy, whilst simultaneously disregarding the grave risks to her life, would have been to abdicate responsibility to a vulnerable woman whose ability to exercise truly independent judgement had been profoundly compromised. The balance to be struck is captured succinctly by Maurice Kay LJ in *Re L* (supra):

> *"79. Where a person lacks capacity in the sense of s2(1) of the MCA 2005, he has the protection provided by that statute. A person at the other end of the scale, who has that capacity and is not otherwise vulnerable, is able to protect himself against unscrupulous manipulation, if necessary by obtaining an injunction against his oppressor. This case is concerned with a category of people who, in reality, have neither of those remedies available for their protection. It would be most unfortunate if, by reference to their personal autonomy, they were to be beyond the reach of judicial protection. For the reasons given by my Lords, they are not. The inherent jurisdiction continues to exist. I have nothing to add as to its scope."*

39. At this hearing, X has been represented by Counsel. With the consent of both parties, I have extended the order of 22nd October 2026, retaining the passport and permitting further enquiries through Interpol. The matter will be further reviewed later this month.