AA -v- London Borough of Islington (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: CO/2338/2023
AC-2023-LON-001947

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

24 April 2024

Before:

The Honourable Mrs Justice Lang DBE

Between:

The King on the application of
AA

-v-

London Borough of Islington

and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
(interested party)

Order

On the Claimant’s application for urgent consideration, an anonymity order, transfer to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration & Asylum Chamber), and interim relief;

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant;

Order by the Honourable Mrs Justice Lang DBE

  1. The Defendant shall forthwith provide the Claimant with accommodation in London and support as a former relevant child under section 23C Children Act 1989, on the basis of the Claimant’s claimed age (DOB 5 January 2005), pending the final determination of age, or further order.
  2. The Defendant shall forthwith provide a copy of this order to the Interested Party so that the Claimant is not dispersed out of London to adult accommodation under section 95 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
  3. The claim shall be transferred to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) for directions and a fact finding hearing.
  4. The case management directions at paragraphs 1 to 6 of the order of Rory Dunlop KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dated 10 November 2023, are set aside.
  5. Pursuant to CPR r.39.2, in any report of these proceedings, there shall be no publication of the name and address of the Claimant, nor any other particulars likely to lead to their identification. In the proceedings, the Claimant shall be anonymised and referred to as “AA”.
  6. The Claimant’s solicitors shall, within 14 days of the date of this order, file with the Court copies of case documents which have been anonymised and/or redacted to protect the identity of the Claimant, in accordance with paragraph 5 above.
  7. Non-parties may not obtain any documents from the court file which have not been anonymised and/or redacted to protect the identity of the Claimant, in accordance with paragraph 5 above.
  8. Liberty to apply to vary or discharge this order on 3 days notice to the other parties.
  9. Costs reserved.

Reasons

  1. The Claimant is a refugee from Sudan who claims that he was aged 17 when he entered the UK (DOB 5 January 2005). The Defendant assessed him an adult who was aged 20 upon arrival in the UK (DOB 5 January 2002).
  2. On 10 November 2023, the Court granted permission to apply for judicial review of the Defendant’s age assessment of the Claimant, finding that the claim was arguable.
  3. I am satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried, and that the balance of convenience lies in favour of treating the Claimant as a former relevant child under section 23C Children Act 1989, and therefore providing him with accommodation and support in London. If interim relief is refused, and the judicial review claim is successful, the Claimant will have been unlawfully exposed to a real and immediate detriment to his mental health, welfare, education and the development pathway to becoming a professional footballer as part of the Tottenham Hotspur Development programme.
  4. Urgent consideration has been sought, and granted, because the Claimant is due to be dispersed tomorrow out of London to adult accommodation under section 95 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, by the Interested Party. Plainly that dispersal ought not to take place in the light of paragraph 1 of this order.
  5. If the Defendant and/or the Interested Party wish to apply to set aside this order, they may make an application to do so, and seek an oral hearing, if so advised.
  6. On 15 January 2024, the parties applied by consent for an order for transfer to UTIAC, in accordance with usual practice. It appears that the Court overlooked that application, and so the Claimant has reapplied now. I am satisfied that transfer is appropriate.
  7. I have granted an anonymity order. In the circumstances of this case, a departure from the general principle of open justice is justified.