AAA -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2024-LON-002535

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

27 August 2025

Before:

DHCJ John Halford

Between:

The King on the application of
AAA

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

On an application by the Claimant for anonymity, interim relief and permission for judicial review

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and correspondence from the Defendant.

ORDER BY JOHN HALFORD SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE

  1. Anonymity:
    (a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4), the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
    (ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as AAA
    (b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
    (c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
    (i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;
    (ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;
    (iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
    (d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
  2. Mandatory interim injunction:
    (a) The Defendant is to arrange, within five working days of the date of this order, for the provision of accommodation and financial support to the Claimant pursuant to paragraph 9, schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016 (‘paragraph 9, schedule 10 support’).
    (b) The Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) above, any such application to be served on each party.
    THIS IS A MANDATORY INTERIM INJUNCTION. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(b) ABOVE
  3. Case management directions:
    (a) The Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service (CPR 54.8) must be filed and served by 4pm on 26 September 2025 along with any request that the injunction be discharged on the basis it is no longer necessary in the light of any new decision by the Defendant on supporting the Claimant (assuming there has not already been an application to discharge made under paragraph 2(b) above).
    (b) Any Reply from the Claimant (CPR 54.8A), any submissions on discharge of the injunction and any application for permission to amend the Grounds for Judicial Review must be filed and served by 4pm on 3 October 2025.
    (c) The Defendant has permission to file a submission of no more than 5 pages of A4 in length in response to any application for permission to amend the Grounds for Judicial Review filed pursuant to paragraph 2(b) above provided it is filed by 4 pm on 8 October 2025.
    (d) The papers are to be referred to a judge or deputy judge as soon as possible thereafter for a decisions on any application for permission to amend the Grounds for Judicial Review, permission for judicial review and any application to discharge the injunction.

Reasons

(1) Anonymity:
The Claimant has been an asylum seeker, maintains he is at risk of harm in his home country, Iraq, and the Defendant has yet to make a decision that fear is misplaced. The Claimant also intends to formally renew his asylum claim imminently. There is evidence that naming the Claimant will increase the risk they would face if returned to his country of origin. There are accordingly compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice.
(2) Mandatory injunction:
There is currently a real issue to be tried and the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the interim order sought. As to the issue, according to the Claimant, he is street homeless, has been sleeping in a 24-hour McDonalds restaurant until 5 am thanks to the compassion of the staff and has no income. There is nothing to contradict this and indeed the Defendant accepts the Defendant is, or at least appears to be, destitute. His claim focusses on an apparent lacunae, or error, in the Defendant’s guidance and practice. It arises where a person such as the Claimant is, or is likely to be, exposed to treatment breaching Article 3 ECHR and so section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the sense discussed in the case of R (Limbuela) v SSHD [2005] UKHL 66 but is not:
(a) eligible for s.4 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (‘1999 Act’) support because they are not someone who was (but is no longer) an asylum-seeker and whose claim has been “rejected” (I do not see how a claim treated as withdrawn can be characterised in that way);
(b) treated by the Defendant as eligible for s.95 1999 Act support because they will not be considered to be an ‘asylum seeker’ (whatever the person’s intentions may be and an indication they still seek asylum) unless and until they have made further submissions pursuant to the Defendant’s guidance of 17 July 2023 (see especially page 9);
(c) treated as eligible for paragraph 9, schedule 10 Immigration Act 2016 support because they fall outside the listed examples of persons who may be considered for such support in the Defendant’s 31 January 2025 guidance, in particular because they have yet to make further submissions but say they are about to. The seriousness of this issue is underscored by the potential consequences for such a person of the Defendant’s approach, the actual consequences for the Claimant, the non-binding but very different approach currently taken by the Asylum Support Tribunal to paragraph 9, schedule 10 support which the Claimant describes in his Grounds and permission for judicial review having apparently been granted on this very issue in another case.
The Defendant says all this is academic in the Claimant’s case, that the claim should be withdrawn and that a mandatory interim injunction is unnecessary because she is willing to offer the Claimant paragraph 9, schedule 10 support on certain terms including him accepting his claim is academic and confirming unequivocally that he will make further submissions within 28 days. However, I note the Defendant does not acknowledge, at least not expressly, that she accepts she has power to provide paragraph 9, schedule 10 support to someone in this position. On one reading, her guidance suggests she believes she does not and that is underscored by letter the 11 July 2025 letter sent on her behalf.
The Claimant’s first answer to the Defendant, given by his solicitors, was originally that he needed a little longer to make further submissions: his street homelessness made giving instructions to his solicitors difficult, and he was awaiting the Defendant’s response to his subject access request about his asylum claim. These points have some force on their face because the Defendant’s further submissions guidance requires such submissions to be comprehensive. The subject access request has since been answered and it now appears to be that he can meet the 28-day deadline absent unidentified “special circumstances”.
The Claimant also says that, even if the Defendant begins to provide paragraph 9, schedule 10 support the issues raised by his claim, particularly Ground 3 which targets the legality of the Defendant’s policies and practice, will not be academic. It is unclear whether the Claimant says this because he anticipates he may need more support of this kind, or because there are others in a similar position, or both.
The parties have reached a standoff, with the Defendant refusing to support the Claimant pursuant to paragraph 9, schedule 10 unless and until the Claimant withdraws his claim on the basis it is academic and agrees to make further submissions within the 28-day timetable (though without any scope for more time to be taken if there are “special circumstances”).
Unusually, the Claimant asked the court to pause its consideration of interim relief while further discussions happened. These have not been productive.
In my view, there is no lawful basis for the Defendant to precondition the provision of paragraph 9, schedule 10 support to a person who is destitute, or at least appears to the Defendant to be destitute, in the way she that has in this case. Article 3 is an absolute right enjoyed by everyone in the jurisdiction, including the Claimant, and the Defendant’s section 6 duty is to take positive steps to avoid it being breached or bring any breach to an end. The existence and discharge of that duty is not to be bargained for in the context of negotiations to settle litigation. The balance of convenience weighs heavily in the Claimant’s favour in these circumstances. But for the Claimant’s unwillingness to agree to the preconditions the Defendant is wrongly seeking to impose on the discharge of her duty, the Defendant would be supporting the Claimant in the way the Claimant seeks.
I therefore grant the mandatory interim injunction sought.
However, although I am not persuaded the claim is academic now, it may well become academic at least as far as the Claimant is concerned once he makes further submissions and the Defendant unequivocally accepts either that she owes the Claimant a s.95 duty or that she can and will exercise her paragraph 9, schedule 10 powers to support him until circumstances otherwise change such that neither form of support is necessary. For the claim to continue in such circumstances, it would need to be amended to demonstrate it is not academic for the Claimant, or that it is but there are nonetheless exceptional reasons for the Court to consider it such as the need for a determination of the issue raised because others are, or are likely to be, affected. If the other claim that has been granted permission is proceeding on that basis, it is unlikely to be necessary for a second claim to proceed on that basis.
(3) Case management directions:
In the circumstances discussed above, where the Claimant’s support needs will be met thanks to the injunction, but his claim may become academic imminently, I consider it would be wrong to grant permission now. Instead, the directions I have made allow time for the Claimant’s further submissions to be made (which should be possible within the Defendant’s timescale as both the difficulties identified by the Claimant’s solicitors will have been addressed once accommodation is provided), for the Defendant to consider what further support ought to be provided under s.95 or paragraph 9, schedule 10 in the light of those submissions, and then to acknowledge service indicating (if that remains her position) that the claim is academic and, if so, why. At that point the Defendant may also request discharge of the injunction is it is unnecessary in the light of such a decision. The Claimant can then reply and make any application he is advised to make seeking permission to amend his Grounds of Claim. He can also update the Court if, for some good reason, the further submissions have yet to be made. The Defendant then will have a short opportunity to respond to any application to amend the grounds.
Another permission stage judge can then decide whether this claim should proceed to a full hearing and whether the injunction is still needed. Needless to say, the parties are expected to co-operate and if the injunction becomes redundant, then an application to discharge it should be made by consent.