ABY -v- Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-000327

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

3 February 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mrs Justice Heather Williams DBE

Between:

The King on the application of
ABY

-v-

Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole Council


Order

On an application by the Claimant for urgent consideration, interim relief and directions

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant

ORDER by the Hon. Mrs Justice Heather Williams DBE:

1. Anonymity:
(a) Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
(i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “ABY”.
(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
(c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
(i) the parties must within 7 days file and serve a redacted copy of any statement of case already filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;
(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time and must then be served with the unredacted version;
(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

2. Mandatory injunction:
(a) The Defendant must continue to provide the Claimant with suitable accommodation until further order.
(b) The Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) above, any such application to be served on each party.

    ***THIS IS A MANDATORY INJUNCTION. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(b) ABOVE. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. SEE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDE 2024, §17.7.4***

    3. Timetable for submissions and paper decision on interim relief:
    (a) The Defendant may file and serve any response to the application for interim relief by 4pm on 5 February 2025.
    (b) The Claimant may file and serve a reply to that response by 4pm on 7 February 2025.
    (c) The papers are to be referred to a judge or deputy judge for a decision whether to grant interim relief as soon as possible after 7 February 2025.

    4. Costs reserved

    REASONS

    Anonymity: Whilst the Claimant’s account of violence in Glasgow and the leaving of his accommodation in that city appears to be less than compelling for the reasons identified in the Defendant’s 9 January 2025 letter, in light of the ongoing review of the Defendant’s decision and the Claimant’s previous (apparently unrelated) period in witness protection I am persuaded, for now at least, that there are sufficiently compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1.

    Mandatory injunction: The Claimant challenges the Defendant’s decision of 30 January 2025 to refuse to exercise its power under section 188(3) Housing Act 1996 to provide interim accommodation pending the review of the decision that he is not homeless; and seeks an interim order requiring the provision of such accommodation.  The discretion to provide accommodation in these circumstances is an exceptional one (ex parte Mohammed (1997) 30 HLR 315 QBD). Representations were made on the Claimant’s behalf in letters dated 10 and 27 January 2025. As I have already observed, the contentions raised about the violence in Glasgow and the Defendant’s investigations of the same, appear to be relatively weak. However, the 27 January 2025 letter raised a number of issues regarding the Claimant’s medical conditions, which are relevant to the impact of the loss of his current accommodation upon him and (possibly) to the reasonableness of his occupation of the premises in Glasgow (although his case could have been more clearly put in that regard). There is some potential force in the contention that the 30 January 2025 letter does not adequately take account of and address these matters. However, the Defendant should have an opportunity to respond to this, rather than the Court making an order at this stage requiring the Claimant to be accommodated until permission is determined (not least given the competing pressures upon the Defendant’s resources).
    In the circumstances I consider it appropriate to grant an injunction for a short period of time to “hold the ring” whilst the Defendant has the opportunity to respond. The matter can then be further considered on the papers by a judge of this Court.
    I also note – as the Claimant acknowledges – the relative lack of supporting medical evidence thus far available. It may also be that this is a position that can be further addressed by the Claimant during the intervening period.

    Timetable for submissions and paper decision on interim relief: In the circumstances I have set out a relatively tight timetable for the parties to make representations on the question of interim relief and for the matter to then be referred to a Judge for determination. For the avoidance of doubt, if the Defendant does not to file a response and/or the Claimant does not file a reply by the stipulated deadlines, the papers will in any event be referred to a Judge as soon as possible thereafter.