ACL -v- The Family Court at Nottingham (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-BHM-000014

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

17 January 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Eyre

Between:

The King on the application of
ACL

-v-

The Family Court at Nottingham

and

ADC
(Interested party)


Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant,

ORDER BY THE HON. MR JUSTICE EYRE

  1. The mother of the children who are the subject matter of case no NG24P00013 shall remain a party to the claim as an interested party.
  2. Nottinghamshire County Council and Tarun Bhatia are removed as interested parties.
  3. Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the names of the Claimant and the Interested Party are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
    (ii) the Claimant and the Interested Party are to be referred to orally and in writing as ACL and ADC respectively.
  4. Pursuant to section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or the Interested Party or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or the Interested Party in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
  5. Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4) no non-party may obtain a copy of any statement of case in this matter unless the court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6).
  6. Any person wishing to vary or discharge paragraphs 3 – 5 of this Order must make an application, served on each party.
  7. The Claimant’s application for an extension of time is refused.
  8. The claim is dismissed as being out of time.
  9. Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
  10. The Claimant’s application for interim relief is refused.
  11. No order as to costs.
  12. Renewal directions: Where the Claimant makes a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below), the following directions apply:
    (a) The permission hearing is to be listed with a time estimate of 1 hour, including submissions by the parties and an oral judgment by the judge. If the Claimant considers that more time should be allowed, the time estimate must be included with the request for reconsideration of permission.
    (b) Within 21 days of the service of this Order, the Claimant must file and serve an electronic copy of the Permission Hearing Bundle, prepared in accordance with the guidance on the Administrative Court website and containing the following documents:
    (i) the Claim Form, Statement of Facts and Grounds and any evidence or other documents filed with the Claim Form;
    (ii) any Acknowledgment of Service, Summary Grounds of Defence and any accompanying documents served by any Defendant and/or Interested Party;
    (iii) any Reply or other document served by any party to the proceedings at the paper permission stage;
    (iv) this Order;
    (v) the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review (on Form 86B);
    (vi) any other document the Court would be likely to consider material to its decision on permission to apply for judicial review.
    (c) If the Claimant fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), permission will be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the Court at the paper stage, unless at the hearing the Court otherwise directs.
    (d) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, the Claimant must file and serve:
    (i) a skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages;
    (ii) an electronic bundle containing any authorities which the Court needs to read at the hearing (the Authorities Bundle: see para. 22.1.2 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide); and
    (iii) if requested by the Court, a hard copy version of the Permission Hearing Bundle and Authorities Bundles.
    (e) At least 7days before the date listed for the hearing, any party other than the Claimant intending to participate in the hearing must file and serve any skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages.
    (f) If a party fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), (d) and/or (e), the Court may have regard to the failure when considering any question about costs at the hearing.

Reasons

(1) In the claim form Mr Tarun Bhatia is named as an interested party and in the N463 form it appears that Nottinghamshire County Council is named as an interested party. Neither of them are interested parties within the meaning of the CPR.
(2) The mother of the Claimant’s children is properly joined as an interested party. It is arguable that the children should also be interested parties but in light of the conclusions I have reached on the questions of an extension of time and of permission it is not necessary for them to be joined as interested parties at this stage.
(3) Anonymisation of the Claimant and of the Interested Party is justified despite the strong public interest in open justice. That is because anonymisation is necessary to protect the interests of the children who are the subject matter of the Family Court proceedings.
(4) The claim is significantly out of time. The decision was made on 4th August 2024 but the claim was not issued until 14th January 2025 and so is more than 2 months out of time.
(5) The Claimant’s explanation for the delay is that he did not discover the relationship between the judge and the Interested Party’s solicitors until 19th December 2024. As I will explain below the material to which the Claimant refers provides no basis for the allegation of apparent bias. As a consequence it does not provide a reason for extending time.
(6) It follows that the claim is to be dismissed as being out of time. However, even if the claim were in time or if an extension were to be granted permission would be refused for the reasons I set out below.
(7) As the claim is out of time and is also not worthy of permission the application for interim relief is to be refused.
(8) The first reason for refusing permission is that the Claimant has an adequate alternative remedy. It would be open to him to appeal the decision. The court will not normally grant relief by way of judicial review where a party has an adequate alternative remedy. There is no basis in this case for granting such relief notwithstanding the existence of the alternative remedy by way of appeal.
(9) The court does have jurisdiction judicially to review the decisions of a county court. However, that review jurisdiction is a highly attenuated one. It will only be exercised if there has been a failing in the county court amounting to a complete abrogation of the judicial process in the context of a right to a fair trial. In that regard see R (Ogunbiyi) v Southend County Court [2015] EWHC 1111 (Admin) and R (Watkins) v Newcastle County Court [2018] EWHC1029 (Admin). There will be such a failing where the judge has made a jurisdictional error in the sense of embarking upon an exercise which the judge had no jurisdiction to embark or if there has been a gross procedural failure amounting to a denial of the right to a fair hearing (see R (Sivasubramaniam) v Wandsworth County Court [2002] EWCA Civ 1738, [2003] 1 WLR 475 at [34] and [56] and R (Strickson) v Preston County Court [2007] EWCA Civ 1132 at [34] and [35]). The judicial review jurisdiction is not necessarily limited to such cases but they indicate the kind of circumstances in which it may be appropriate to hold that there has been such an abrogation of the judicial process as to bring the judicial review jurisdiction into play.
(10) Some of the grounds which the Claimant advances are matters which could form the basis for a judicial review claim on those grounds if they were substantiated. However, when they are considered none of them are tenable such as to warrant the grant of permission.
(11) The contention that there is a relationship between the judge and the Interested Party’s solicitor such as to give rise to an appearance of bias is simply unarguable. The judge and another judge together with the relevant Family Justice Boards have given support to a website sponsored by a number of solicitors’ firms and barristers’ chambers. The website provides information about the way the Family Court works and the help that is available to those involved in family disputes. The fact that the Interested Party’s solicitors are one of the firms which are sponsoring the website does not give rise to any appearance of bias.
(12) The action of the judge in asking the Interested Party’s solicitor to provide a draft of the order is a perfectly normal step and does not support the allegation of bias.
(13) The Claimant alleges that there was the fabrication and/or concealment of evidence. That is not an allegation as to the conduct of the court. Instead it is a contention as to the evidence put before the court. To the extent that the Claimant is in fact saying that the judge disregarded evidence which should have led to a different conclusion then that may give rise to a ground of appeal but it does not provide a public law ground of challenge.
(14) The allegations of judicial overreach and of bias amount on analysis to no more than the Claimant’s disagreement with the conclusion which the judge reached on the evidence and are not grounds for judicial review.
(15) The allegations of irrationality and that evidence was disregarded are also, when analysed, expressions of disagreement with the conclusion reached and/or with the judge’s case management decisions. They do not provide a basis for the grant of permission.
(16) The email of 4th March 2024 from the Interested Party’s solicitor was an explanation of why that solicitor was not intending to include particular documents in the bundle. It was open to the Claimant to apply to the court for them to be included. Even if the actions of the solicitor were unjustified (which does not appear to be the case) they
would not provide a ground for a challenge to the decision of the judge.
(17) The allegations of breaches of natural justice and of interference with the Claimant’s Convention rights add nothing to the other matters.
(18) Permission would, therefore, be refused even if the matter were in time.
(19) The claim comes very close to be one which should be certified as being totally without merit but by a narrow margin I have concluded that such certification would not be appropriate.