AIS -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)
Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order
Claim number: AC-2024-LON-001752.
In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court
23 May 2024
Before:
The Honourable Mr Justice Sweeting
Between:
The King on the application of
AIS
-v-
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Order
On the Claimant’s application for anonymity urgent consideration and interim relief
Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant
ORDER by the Honourable Mr Justice Sweeting
1. The Defendant shall forthwith provide the Claimant with suitable single occupancy
asylum support accommodation (not at an ex-MoD site or vessel) by no later than 4 pm on 24 May 2024
2. The Defendant has liberty to apply to vary or discharge the order at paragraph 1 above on 1 days written notice to the Claimant.
3. Any application made under paragraph 2 is to be referred to a High Court Judge consideration immediately after issue.
4. Pursuant to CPR Rule 39.2(4) there shall be no publication in any newspaper or other media or other disclosure of any name, address, image or other information tending to identify the Claimant in relation to his involvement in these proceedings. In any publication or broadcast relating to these proceedings, the Claimant shall be known by the letters ‘AIS’
5. No later than 4pm on 3 June 2024, the Claimants’ solicitors shall file with the Court copies of case documents which have been anonymised and/or redacted to protect the identity of the Claimant, in accordance with paragraph 4 above.
6. Non-parties may not obtain any documents from the court file which have not been anonymised and/or redacted to protect the identity of the Claimant, in accordance with paragraph 1 above.
7. Any interested party, whether or not a party to the proceedings, may apply to the Court to vary or discharge this Order, providing that any such application is made on notice to the Claimant’s Solicitor and that 7 working days’ prior notice of the intention to make such an Application is given. The Court will affect service of the application.
8. Costs reserved.
This is a mandatory injunction. Breach of paragraph 1 this order may give rise to contempt proceedings. Even if an application has been made under paragraph 2 to vary or discharge, the order at paragraph 1 must be complied with unless or until such an order is made.
Reasons
1. There is a serious issue to be tried. Given the prevalence of the “Libya Risk” and the likelihood that the Claimant, like many asylum seekers, transited through Libya, it is arguable that he should have been recognised as potentially trafficked. This recognition should have triggered a mandatory referral to the NRM for victim identification. Alternatively, D should have conducted a more thorough investigation to determine the necessity of an NRM referral. This would have been relevant to his placement.
2. Wethersfield’s established suitability criteria acknowledge that victims of torture and individuals with physical or mental disabilities may not be suited for the facility.
3. The Claimant provided substantial evidence of vulnerability, including documented torture, physical and psychological violence endured in Egypt and Libya. Additionally, evidence exists for his mental and physical disabilities significantly impacting daily life. This evidence came from reputable sources such as Doctors of the World (DoTW), a consultant psychiatrist, and his own accounts.
4. The Claimant asserts that the Defendant’s failure to comply with the statutory duty under Section 95 of the Immigration Asylum Act 1999 to provide suitable accommodation constitutes a clear breach and further exacerbates the risk of deterioration in the Claimant’s mental and physical health conditions, as detailed in the submitted Grounds and the Claimant’s own evidence.
5. The balance of convenience favours the grant of relief. His mental and physical health conditions, documented in the Grounds and his own evidence, have worsened due to his time at Wethersfield. This includes an exacerbation of pre-existing back problems, necessitating specialist medical attention in London. He slept rough in London for two nights before informing his solicitors (DPG) of his situation.
6. The Defendant has already accepted a legal obligation to house the Claimant under Section 95 of the Immigration Asylum Act 1999 (IAA 1999). This obligation is further bolstered by D’s statutory duty to assist potential victims of trafficking, including providing accommodation, even before a final trafficking determination is made.
7. Given the immediate nature of C’s situation and his lack of alternative options, a mandatory court order is appropriate. The specific accommodation type aligns with the Defendant’s established suitability criteria, which prohibits room sharing for individuals deemed unsuitable for ex-military facilities.
8. The case involves sensitive information regarding the Claimant’s asylum claim, mental and physical health struggles. Public disclosure of his identity could have a detrimental impact on his privacy and potentially jeopardise his health.
9. The Claimant’s rights to under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR should be regarded as paramount in this case. There is no compelling public interest, including the public interest in open justice, that outweighs the need to protect those rights.
10. Practice Note [2006] 1 WLR 2461 establishes a presumption of anonymity for asylum seekers unless compelling reasons dictate otherwise.
11. The Court of Appeal’s Practice Guidance, “Anonymisation of Parties to Asylum & Immigration cases (2022)” reinforces the longstanding practice of anonymizing asylum and immigration appeals to mitigate risks faced by claimants in their countries of origin.
12. I consider that anonymity is justified and there is no countervailing public interest that justifies compromising his privacy rights.