AS -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Immigration and Asylum Chamber (Upper Tribunal)Anonymity Order

Case number: JR-2025-BHM-000058

In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

In the matter of an application for permission to apply for Judicial Review

21 July 2025

Before:

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Between:

The King
on the application of
AS
(Anonymity order made)

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (UT rule 30(1))

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the applicant and the Acknowledgement of Service filed by the respondent

Order by Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds:

Permission is refused

Reasons

(1) The applicant seeks to challenge the decision made by the respondent dated 30 April 2025 in which the respondent certified the applicant’s asylum and human rights claim as clearly unfounded pursuant to section 94 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
(2) The applicant’s immigration history is set out in the papers and the AOS. The applicant entered the UK on a student visa on 8 October 2022. On 4 May 2023, his sponsorship was withdrawn by the University due to the applicant’s failure to attend classes. On 28 November 2023, the applicant’s leave was curtailed to expire on 27 January 2024.The applicant was encountered during an enforcement visit on 4 March 2025 and detained due to the fact that his student leave had been curtailed following the withdrawal of sponsorship by the University and was an overstayer. On 10 March 2025, the applicant claimed asylum. On 30 April 2025, the applicant’s asylum claim was refused and certified as clearly unfounded under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
(3) Ground 1 is not arguable. Paragraph 55 of the decision letter needs to be read in the context of the decision reached as a whole. The respondent sets out the Convention reason of political opinion at paragraph 18 but at paragraph 22 sets out the reasoning as to why the claim is not objectively well-founded by reference to the objective material, and as it was determined that there was sufficiency of protection available for the applicant alongside the ability to internally relocate all of which are relevant in determining whether the Refugee Convention was met.
(4) Ground 2 does not disclose any public law error. The respondent assessed the risk of harm based on the factual account provided by the applicant and the objective evidence available between paragraphs 29 – 54, expressly considering the claim to be a Khalistan supporter and the attacks claimed in India, it was not irrational to reach the view that those he feared were nonstate actors and as assessed by the respondent ( see paragraph 30 of the decision letter read in the context of the interview questions at 34 and 37) and that the applicant had not faced persecution from the authorities either from the state in the form of the police or otherwise (see paragraphs 31, 32 and 33 in the decision letter). It was not irrational to reach the conclusion that those he feared were nonstate actors who had no connections to the state or any influence and in the circumstances sufficiency of protection would be available as set out in paragraph 36 – 43 alongside the ability to relocate to another area in India.
(5) Ground 3 is not arguable. The respondent did consider the claim at its highest but in doing so was not required to accept each and every aspect of the claim (see paragraph 22 of the decision letter) . The respondent considered the factual claim he had made, which the respondent properly assessed by reference to the country conditions (relevant CPIN’s and case law). The decision assessed sufficiency of protection and that of internal relocation. In doing so it was rational for the respondent to conclude that the those identified were non-state actors and that the applicant was not able to demonstrate in his factual account that those he claimed to fear had the power and influence to cause harm to the applicant wherever he lived in India. The respondent properly considered that the applicant would be able to relocate to another part of India and did so by taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances.
(6) The decision properly considered all the information advanced by the applicant with the application and later material and the Secretary of State correctly directed herself to the appropriate threshold for certifying a claim as clearly unfounded. It is unarguable that the respondent did not consider the claim rationally and in accordance with the law. It is not arguable that the respondent’s decision was not within the range of reasonable responses properly open to her. She considered all the evidence in the round, and with anxious scrutiny and took into account all the relevant circumstances. Consequently, the correct test was applied and that the Secretary of State was arguably entitled to conclude that the application was lacking in substance and would be bound to fail.
(7) The time limit for challenging this Order under Rule 30 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 is 9 days from the date of sending this Order. Any application for renewal shall be expedited.

Costs:
(8) The applicant will pay the respondent’s costs of £678, subject to any representations
in writing to be received within 9 days of the date on which this order is sent.

Reasons

(9) The applicant has not succeeded in his claim and the respondent has incurred the costs of defending the claim and in the absence of any further representations should be entitled to recover these.

Anonymity:
(10) Whilst the application has been refused, as a precautionary measure in light of paragraph 7 above and that the facts of the claim involve a protection claim, I make an anonymity order pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the applicant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the applicant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
(11) The order can be varied or discharged on application by either party upon notice.

Signed: Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Dated: 21/7/25