AXA -v- The Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LON-001703

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

9 June 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Sweeting

Between:

The King
on the application of
AXA
(Claimant)

-v-

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Defendant)

and

Secretary of State for Justice
(Interested Party)

Order

On applications by the Defendant and Interested Party to vary the terms of the interim relief Order of 2 June 2025 (“the Order of 2 June 2025) or replace it with a further order.
And on an application by the Defendant for relief from sanctions.
And on the Claimant’s application for anonymity and in respect of the costs of the application made herein for interim relief.

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the parties.

ORDER BY THE HON. Mr Justice Sweeting

  1. Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as AXA

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

    1. The Secretary of State for Justice is added to this claim as an Interested Party.
    1. The Order of 2 June 2025 is varied only to the extent that:
      (a) The word “business” is inserted before the word “day” in paragraphs 3 and 5; and
      (b) The period of “48 hours” is varied to “72 hours” in paragraph 4
    2. The application by the Defendant for relief from sanctions is granted.
    3. The costs of the application for interim relief are reserved.
    4. Costs reserved.

    REASONS

    Anonymity

    1. The Claimant seeks an order that he be granted anonymity in these proceedings, with the cipher “AXA” being substituted for his name. The grounds for this application are the Claimant’s significant vulnerability, including a history of severe trauma, diagnosed C-PTSD, Recurrent Depressive Disorder, epilepsy, and chronic pain, and being assessed at Level 3 under the Defendant’s Adults at Risk (AAR) policy. The Claimant has previously been granted anonymity in separate proceedings in relation to his immigration detention in 2023. The Claimant is still pursuing his protection claim by way of an appeal. The Defendant is neutral on this application.
    2. I note the Practice Note (Court of Appeal: Asylum and Immigration Cases) 1 W.L.R. 2461, which establishes a presumption in favour of anonymity in cases involving asylum seekers. The Claimant’s vulnerability, documented medical and psychological conditions, and the sensitive nature of his protection claim lend significant weight to the need for privacy. Continuing the anonymity granted in previous related proceedings avoids the risk of undermining that protection.
    3. In my judgment, the circumstances of this case, particularly the Claimant’s acute vulnerability and the ongoing protection claim, satisfy me that non-disclosure of his identity is strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice and protect his interests. There is no sufficient countervailing public interest in disclosure of his identity to justify interfering with his Article 8 rights. The cipher “AXA” has already been adopted in the proceedings and in the Consent Order of 30 May 2025.

      Application to Vary or replace the Consent Order
    4. I formally add the SSJ as an Interested Party to the proceedings, given the impact of orders made in this case upon the Probation Service.
    5. The SSJ applied to vary paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Consent Order of 2 June 2025. That Order directed steps to be taken by the Defendant and the Probation Service, for which the SSJ has overall responsibility. Paragraph 3 currently requires the Probation Service to assess the suitability of a proposed release address within 3 days of notification by the Defendant and to provide written reasons. Paragraph 5 requires that if an address is found to be unsuitable, the process of proposing and checking addresses (as per paragraphs 2 and 3) shall repeat “on a rolling basis and within no more than 3 day intervals”.
    6. The SSJ sought to remove the specified timeframes from these paragraphs. In relation to paragraph 3, the SSJ proposed replacing the 3-day limit with a requirement to use “best endeavours to assess the suitability … within a reasonable period of time after notification by the Defendant”. In relation to paragraph 5, the SSJ sought to remove the phrase “on a rolling basis and within no more than 3 day intervals”. The SSJ submitted that the current terms may prove unworkable and that the Claimant would not be prejudiced by the variations.
    7. In relation to monitoring, I am told that the Defendant’s electronic monitoring hub has stated that 72 hours is required for release in order to induct the Claimant into mandatory electronic monitoring. I take that at face value and do not consider that I should second-guess an operational matter of this nature.
    8. The SSJ and the SSHD have now proposed a fresh order replacing the consent order.
    9. The Claimant opposes these variations or the replacement of the order save that he is content with the use of “business days” for the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 5. It is submitted that the proposed variations would remove the urgency required by the Order of 2 June 2025 and prejudice the Claimant by reducing the prospect of his urgent release. The Claimant highlights his vulnerability and history of self-harm and suicide attempts as reasons why uncertainty and delay are particularly inappropriate.
    10. The Claimant’s email of 6 June 2025 provides material information in relation to the SSJ’s application. It confirms that the Defendant provided a proposed release address to the Probation Service on 3 June 2025. The SSJ’s representative confirmed on the morning of 6 June 2025 that the proposed address had been assessed as unsuitable and notified to the Defendant. This assessment was completed within the 3-day timeframe mandated by paragraph 3 of the Consent Order.
    11. The fact that the Probation Service was able to complete the assessment and notify the Defendant within the 3-day period demonstrates that the timeframe in paragraph 3 is workable, at least in this instance. The SSJ’s submission that the terms may prove unworkable is, at this stage, not supported by what has already taken place. Whilst other agencies may be involved the order requires to be directed at the Probation Service as the agency with the primary responsibility for making the assessment.
    12. Furthermore, the finding that the first proposed address is unsuitable underscores the need for the process in paragraph 5 to operate efficiently to secure the Claimant’s release. Removing the 3-day interval requirement from paragraph 5 would introduce unnecessary delay and uncertainty into a process that is intended to lead to the Claimant’s urgent release, particularly given the Defendant’s own decision to release him conditionally on 30 April 2025. The Claimant’s liberty is at stake, and the prejudice in further delaying his release outweighs any unsubstantiated concern about the workability of the current timetable.
    13. The Consent Order was agreed by the parties, and the applications to vary or replace it now, effectively seeking to re-litigate the agreed terms on grounds that have not been substantiated by events, is not persuasive. The Claimant’s vulnerability, the agreed urgent nature of the interim relief, and the demonstrated ability of the Probation Service to meet the initial deadline weigh strongly against granting the variations or fresh order sought.

      Costs of the Interim Relief Application
    14. The costs of the Claimant’s application for interim relief were reserved by the Consent Order of 30 May 2025, with directions for written submissions. The Claimant seeks his costs of that application, while the Defendant submits that costs should be reserved until the substantive issues are determined.
    15. The general practice where interim relief is granted by consent and the substantive claim remains ongoing, is that the costs of the interim application remain reserved pending the outcome of the substantive judicial review proceedings. That is the appropriate course here.
    16. Accordingly, the costs of the Claimant’s application for interim relief are reserved.

    Signed: Mr Justice Sweeting
    Date: 9 June 2025