BAS -v- Leicester City Council (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-BHM-000136/137

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

Before:

HHJ Tindal (sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

Between:

The King on the matter of
BAS
and
BFE
(Interested party)

-v-

Leicester City Council

Order

Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for urgent consideration and permission to apply for judicial review (CPR 54.12) Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant only.

ORDER by HHJ Tindal (sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

  1. Claims AC-2025-BHM-000136 and AC-2025-BHM-000137 are consolidated.
  2. An anonymity order is made. The Claimant shall be referred to in these proceedings as ‘BAS’ and the mother of his child, the Interested Party as ‘BFE’ and pursuant to CPR 39.2 there shall be no publication of the name or address of the Claimant, his child or the Interested Party and any particulars of the case likely to lead to the identification of them without leave of the Court. Any person has liberty on three days’ written notice to the parties to apply to vary or discharge this order.   
  3. The applications for permission to apply for judicial review are refused.
  4. The applications dated 12th and 13th May 2025 are refused.
  5. Both claims are certified as totally without merit.
  6. No order for costs.

Reasons

  1. These are two claims for judicial review against the Defendant Leicester City Council relating to the exercise of their child protection functions and care proceedings in the Family Court in 2020-2021 in relation to the Claimant’s and the Interested Party’s child. In the circumstances, I will make an anonymity order, referring to the Claimant as ‘BAS’ and the Interested Party as ‘BFE’. There is no need for any other Interested Party, like the Football Association in Claim -137, or the Family Court in Claim -136.
  2. The Claimant is a litigant-in-person who explains that he has been diagnosed with autism since 2000 and has long-standing sensory and communication needs. A short excerpt from an expert report he has enclosed suggest he also has a diagnosis of ADHD. I entirely accept the Claimant has a disability under the Equality Act 2010 and is a ‘vulnerable party’ for the purposes of Civil Procedure Rule PD1A.
  3. However, that does not change the fact that the Claimant’s claims are both bound to fail. They can be certified as totally without merit without troubling the Defendant for a Defence, which I what I also did with the Claimant’s previous judicial review claim against the Defendant relating to his child that he issued in September 2022 (CO-3435-2022, where they were anonymised by their actual initials I will not repeat). In that order (which I enclose for the Claimant’s reference and need not repeat in detail), I noted the Claimant effectively challenged by judicial review the Care Order relating to his and BFE’s child in Leicester Family Court in November 2021. I refused that claim and certified it totally without merit on three grounds, namely: (i) there was an alternative remedy to appeal the Care Order; (ii) the claim was far outside the 3-month time limit under CPR 54.5; and (iii) the claim was totally unarguable on its merits. All three points apply to these two claims (issued against the same Defendant on slightly different grounds for reasons which are unclear) and which I consolidate. 
  4. Claim -136 is totally hopeless. It challenges the Family Court’s original Interim Care Order in February 2020. However, it is clear in 2021-2024, the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal various orders of the Family Court. Therefore, the Claimant has now pursued his alternative remedy and the current judicial review claim is an impermissible attempt to re-open those issues and so is an abuse of process. In any event, the new claim is almost five years out of time and is academic, since the 2020 Interim Care Order under challenge now was superseded by the Final Care Order in 2021 unsuccessfully challenged in 2022 and in the Court of Appeal. This claim can be certified as totally without merit, so it cannot be renewed again. Likewise, I refuse the Claimant’s applications dated 12th and 13th May 2025 (strictly within Claim -137, but actually more relevant to Claim -136) for a fresh parenting assessment, a new ‘parenting order’ (which may mean a Child Arrangements Order) and to ‘bar’ professionals and others from involvement in proceedings. Such welfare-related orders if made at all should be made by the Family Court, not the Administrative Court: Father v Worcestershire CC [2025] 2 WLR 155 (SC).
  5. The Claimant describes the decision under challenge in Claim -137 as follows (sic):

“The decision of [15/11/21] of local authority to share false information including sensitive information regarding the claimants disability, historic mental health conditions with the fa and the claimants ex employer this was done without the claimants consent or lawful basis in breach of article 5 & 6 of UK GDPR and data protection act 2018.”

The ‘FA’ is a reference to the ‘Football Association’. But in the Claimant’s Statement of Facts on Claim -137, he presents various grounds e.g. breach of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act, the Autism Act 2009 and Care Act 2014 and the Data Protection Act 2018. But even if the Defendant’s conduct was unlawful (that I do not accept), judicial review would not be available, indeed hopeless, for these reasons:

5.1. Once again, the Claimant is woefully out of time to claim judicial review, despite being reminded of the three-month time limit in my order on the previous case in September 2022. Even if he had claimed then, he would have been almost a year out of time and he has waited over two years since.

5.2. Once again, the Claimant has an alternative remedy, either by complaint to the Information Commissioner, or a claim for damages under the Data Protection Act 1998. I note the Claimant is already pursuing County Court proceedings against the Defendant under the Equality Act 2010 and Human Rights Act 1998 in Birmingham County Court (Case Number 547MC202).

5.3. Once again, the claim does not identify any prejudicial impact of any (alleged) unlawful disclosures in November 2021: after the final Care Order was made, especially to the Claimant’s former employer and to the Football Association. (If this had been the only problem with this claim, I would have simply refused permission in the exercise of my discretion without certifying it totally without merit, but it is not the only problem, as I have explained).

6. The Claimant now has three totally without merit orders and could be the subject of an Extended Civil Restraint Order (‘ECRO’). However, there has been a gap in time between the two judicial review claims and I am unaware of whether other such orders have been made by the Family Court or the Court of Appeal. So, it is better to let the Defendant make an application for an ECRO if it chooses, which can then be considered on its merits and to which the Claimant can respond. For now, as the Defendant has not needed to respond to this claim, there will be no order for costs.

CPR 54.12(7) APPLIES. THE CLAIMANT MAY NOT REQUEST THAT THE DECISION TO REFUSE PERMISSION TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW BE RECONSIDERED AT A HEARING.