BCF -v- The Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtCivilHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LON-000961

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

1 April 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Sweeting

Between:

BCF

-v-

The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

On an application by the Claimant for interim relief

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant

ORDER BY THE HON Mr Justice Sweeting

  1. Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as BCF

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

  1. Interim Injunctive Relief:

(a) The Defendant shall, by no later than 4pm on Wednesday 2 April 2025, provide the Claimant with accommodation and support pursuant to paragraph 9 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016, such accommodation to be in or around the Dover area if possible

(b) In complying with 2(a), the Defendant shall vary the Claimant’s conditions of immigration bail to impose a condition that he reside at accommodation to be provided by the Defendant pursuant to paragraph 9 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016

(c) The Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) and 2(b) above on 24 hours notice to the Claimant.

THIS IS A MANDATORY INJUNCTION. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(a) AND 2(b) ABOVE

REASONS

  1. I note that the primary reason for the urgency of this application is the imminent risk of the Claimant becoming street homeless on Wednesday 2 April 2025. The temporary accommodation he has been residing in, provided exceptionally by the Dover Outreach Centre, is due to end on this date, and there is no possibility of further extension.
  2. I observe that the Claimant is a recognised refugee and a verified rough sleeper who has spent a significant portion of the past seven years without settled accommodation. He is also a recognised victim of trafficking and modern slavery, which renders him particularly vulnerable.
  3. I have noted the Claimant’s contention that the Defendant’s refusal to provide him with accommodation and support under paragraph 9 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 (‘Sch10(9) IA 2016’) is unlawful. The Claimant argues that this refusal contains a misdirection of law and is wrong in fact.
  4. I am persuaded by the Claimant’s submission that he has a strong prima facie case for being eligible for support under Sch10(9) IA 2016. He does not have adequate accommodation or the means of obtaining it, and the provision of accommodation is necessary to avoid a breach of his Article 3 ECHR rights.
  5. I acknowledge the Claimant’s argument that the Defendant’s assertion that he can return to Syria does not negate the Defendant’s duty to accommodate him to avoid an imminent prospect of serious suffering contrary to Article 3 ECHR. The Claimant remains a refugee, and consideration of returns to Syria and settlement protection applications from Syrians are currently paused.
  6. I further note that a pre-action protocol letter was sent to the Defendant on 26 March 2025, requesting a response by 27 March 2025 due to the urgency of the situation. A further letter was sent by the Claimant’s solicitor on 28 March 2025, giving a final notice for a response by midday on 31 March 2025, failing which urgent judicial review proceedings would be lodged. The Defendant has not provided a satisfactory response to these communications.
  7. I consider that the balance of convenience favours the grant of interim relief. The severe harm to the Claimant if he becomes street homeless, without access to basic necessities, significantly outweighs any potential burden or prejudice to the Defendant in providing temporary accommodation.
  8. I have taken into account the Defendant’s own policy guidance, which envisages that in urgent cases, including for people who are street homeless, reasonable efforts must be made to decide applications for Schedule 10 accommodation within two working days. The current situation constitutes such an urgent case.
  9. I consider the Claimant’s request for anonymity to be appropriate given his status as a recognised victim of trafficking and modern slavery, to avoid the risk of harm and/or re-trafficking.
  10. For these reasons, I find that the application for urgent interim relief should be granted to prevent the Claimant from facing imminent street homelessness and the associated risk of inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, pending the full determination of these proceedings.

Date: 01 April 2025