April 7, 2025

BSO and BSK -v- Suffolk and Somerset county councils (anonymity order)

Administrative Court Civil High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-CDF-000026

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

20 March 2025

Before:

His Honour Judge Keyser KC,
sitting as a Judge of the High Court

Between:

The King
on the application of
(1) BSO
(2) BSK

-v-

(1) Suffolk County Council
(2) Somerset County Council

Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 23.12, 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimants and the Defendants’ respective Summary Grounds of Defence

ORDER BY HIS HONOUR JUDGE KEYSER KC
sitting as a Judge of the High Court

Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR r. 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Claimants’ names are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public.

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimants or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimants in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

Permission:

(a) Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.

(b) The application is certified as totally without merit.

Applications: The Claimants’ applications dated 10, 11 and 13 (filed on 14) March 2025 are refused.

4. Costs: No order as to costs (none having been sought).

REASONS

(1) In accordance with the Orders dated 12 March 2025 and 14 March 2025 of Mr Justice Eyre, I am dealing with (1) the Claimants’ applications dated 10 and 11 March 2025 (which are to be treated as applications to amend the Claim Form and Statement of Facts and Grounds), (2) the Claimants’ application dated 13 March and filed on 14 March 2025 and (3) the application for permission to apply for judicial review.

(2) The case relates principally to issues concerning the welfare of two young children, of whom the First Claimant is the mother and the Second Claimant is the stepfather.
I agree with Suffolk that in the interests of the welfare of the children it is appropriate to anonymise the Claimants and to give directions to prevent the identity of the children from being publicised.

(3) Section 3 of the Claim Form lists nine matters as the decision or decisions to be reviewed. The gist of the complaint, however, appears from sections 5 and 6 of the Claim Form, as well as from the updated position in the applications. At its heart is the allegation that Suffolk has unlawfully retained involvement in safeguarding for the children—including sharing the Second Claimant’s personal data, making home visits, and holding a child protection conference—despite the fact that at the end of January 2025 the Claimants moved into the area for which Somerset has responsibility. The application dated 10 March 2025 alleges inter alia that Suffolk’s decision to proceed with a child protection meeting on that date was unlawful as being an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with family life and as being ultra vires as the children are not within their area. The Claimants seek a range of remedies: an order restraining Suffolk from holding a child protection conference; an order restraining Suffolk from further involvement; an order restraining the Defendants from further “harassment” or home visits; an order restraining further unlawful sharing of the Second Claimant’s personal data; an order requiring that any future involvement by social services be by Somerset’s social services.

(4) So far as Suffolk is concerned, the claim is largely academic and, for the rest, inappropriate. It is academic inasmuch as the child protection meeting on 10 March 2025 has been held and Suffolk and Somerset have agreed that responsibility now rests with Somerset. It is inappropriate, because this Court ought not to legislate for the future. The family might return to Suffolk, or further data-sharing might be legitimate in circumstances then obtaining. Allegations of previous harassment, wrongful data-sharing and defamation are not proper matters for this Court.

(5) Further, the allegations of unlawfulness against Suffolk are not properly arguable. Suffolk was entitled to take steps to ascertain whether the children did or did not remain within its area. The child protection conference on 10 March 2025 was a proper forum for considering the position; it resulted, indeed, in the transfer to Somerset. It is also not properly arguable that Suffolk was not entitled to communicate to Somerset matters it considered to be material to the children’s welfare; if it were otherwise, child protection could be rendered nugatory simply by moving from one area to another. It is unclear on what basis it is said that the sharing of data regarding the children with their natural father (who has parental responsibility and whom Suffolk does not consider to present a risk to the children) or with Somerset (which has accepted a transfer of child protection responsibility from Suffolk) is said to be unlawful. Anyway, it appears to me to have been perfectly lawful and in accordance both with legislation and with Suffolk’s own policy. The allegations of harassment and defamation are baseless (though neither of them would be appropriately made in this court anyway). I am not going to attempt to enumerate the remainder of the diffuse and imprecise allegations advanced by the Claimants. But, in summary, the fact that the Claimants do not like child protection measures and investigations and think them unjustified does not mean that they constitute an unlawful interference with Convention rights, and I do not think it arguable that there has been any such interference or that Suffolk’s actions have been unlawful in any other way.

(6) As for Somerset, it is unclear on what basis it has been joined as a defendant, as none of its decisions appear to be challenged. If and insofar as the Claimants seek a remedy to prevent Somerset from performing child protection functions in respect of the children, the claim is unarguable, because Somerset has a statutory duty of investigation under the Children Act 1989 and, in the light of the referral from Suffolk, cannot properly be prevented from completing its investigation and holding child protection conferences.

(7) In these circumstances, I consider that the application for permission to apply against each Defendant is not merely unarguable but totally without merit (that is, it is bound to fail), and I shall certify both applications for permission as such.

(8) In reaching these decisions I have had regard to the matters raised in the Claimants’ further applications, which have been identified in Mr Justice Eyre’s orders, and it follows that they are refused.

Signed: A. J. Keyser (HHJ Keyser KC)

Date: 20 March 2025