BYB -v- London Borough of Hounslow (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-001380

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

26 June 2025

Before:

Christopher Kennedy KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

Between:

The King on the application of
BYB

-v-

London Borough of Hounslow

Order

Notification of Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents filed by the Claimant, the Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence and the Claimant’s Reply

  1. Anonymity:
    (a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
    (ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as BYB.
    (b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
    (c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
    (i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;
    (ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;
    (iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
    (d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
  2. Extension of time
    (a) The time limit for filing the claim form shall be extended to 2 May 2025.
  3. Permission to apply for judicial review:
    (a) Permission is granted on ground (i) (wrong factual conclusion).
    (b) Permission is refused on grounds (ii) and (iii) (procedural unfairness and noncompliance with ‘Merton’ Principles and Positive Evidence of Age).
  4. Case Management Directions:
    (a) The claim shall be transferred forthwith to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) for directions leading to a fact finding hearing.
    (b) Any application by the Claimant for reconsideration of the decision to refuse permission on grounds 2 and 3 shall be made direct to the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) by filing and serving a completed Form 86B within 7 days after the date of transfer or the date on which this order is served on the Claimant, whichever is the later.
    (c) Further directions shall be given by the Upper Tribunal following the transfer.

Observations and reasons

Anonymity

(1) I accept the submissions regarding anonymity at §15 of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds. (There are, understandably, no submissions on this issue from the Defendant.) He shall be known as ‘BYB’.

Extension of time

(2) The Claimant is under the impression that the claim was issued in time – date of decision 29 January 2025, date of grounds 28 April 2025. The claim form was however issued on 2 May 2025, just outside the 3 month time limit. I have considered whether the claim was brought promptly and whether to use my power under CPR r.3.1(2)(a) to extend time. The Claimant did not have legal representation at the time of the decision and did not manage to obtain it until 22 April 2025. I find that he required representation to bring this claim acted and that he acted sufficiently promptly given his situation as an asylum seeker. I further exercise my discretion to extend time on the basis that the extension required is a matter of days; it is not a serious and significant breach. The suggestion made in the summary grounds of resistance that the delay has caused prejudice is not supported by reference to anything specific. The case can be dealt with justly.

Ground 1

(3) Ground 1 is arguable.
(a) Both parties agree that the test is that set out in R (FZ) v Croydon LBC [2011] P.T.S.R. 748 at [9], that the court should ask whether the material before it raises a factual case which, taken at its highest, could not properly succeed in a contested hearing.
(b) The age assessors conducted a detailed age assessment which identified material inconsistencies in the Claimant’s account. However not all the evidence pointed in the same direction. For instance,
(i) Although the Claimant’s case as to his age was not accepted by the Home Office when he arrived and not accepted by the age assessors following their October 2024 to January 2025 assessment process, it was accepted, albeit pending a Merton compliant age assessment, by two of the Defendant’s age assessment trained social workers when they conducted a welfare check.
(ii) The Claimant’s social worker, who saw him every six weeks expressed herself as uncertain as to his age. His placement manager who appeared to be familiar with him believed him to be the age he claimed to be. It is not clear what weight was attached to this evidence by the assessors, in particular the evidence of the placement manager.
(iii) The assessment of the image of the Tazkera by the NDFU Official was that it was impossible to reach a definitive conclusion as to its authenticity. It is therefore not clear why the assessors made a positive determination that it was not genuine. If it were considered genuine it would provide significant support to his case.
(iv) The weight attached by the assessors to a bone density test undertaken in Turkey which they had not seen might not be the same weight which a fact finding tribunal applied to it.
(v) The assessors considered the inconsistencies in the Claimant’s account and drew the inference that the Claimant was not telling the truth. They acknowledged however that he had undergone challenging life experiences including the journey itself and the recent loss of his brother. They also had evidence from his social worker that he had struggled with recall since his loss. The conclusion of the assessors was that some but not all the inconsistencies could not be explained by trauma, language barriers or literacy issues. A fact finding tribunal might plausibly take a different view.
(vi) The assessors attached medium weight to the Claimant’s physical appearance. Less weight might be accorded to it at a hearing.

Grounds 2 and 3 are unarguable

(4) Two reasons are advanced as to why the age assessment was procedurally unfair. Neither are arguable. In relation to the change of appropriate adult, I adopt the reasoning at §19 of the Defendant’s grounds of opposition. The change of appropriate adult only occurred at the outcome meeting. It was not complained of at the time and, separately, I find the change did not render the age assessment process unfair. The second reason relied on is that there was a delay of 12 months before the assessment. The delay is sufficiently explained in the body of the assessment itself. The Claimant had lost his brother and information was needed from external sources.
(5) In relation to ground 3, the Claimant has not yet adduced any evidence from his placement manager but that evidence is mentioned in the assessment itself and is one of the reasons for my grant of permission under ground 1, see §3(b)(ii) above.

Interim relief

(6) It is not clear whether the Claimant is making an application for interim relief. His form N461 states that he is not doing so but his statement of facts and grounds states that he is. I would have refused such an application were it to have been made. I accept that it follows from my grant of permission that there is a serious issue to be tried. However such evidence as there is relevant to the point suggests that the balance of justice/injustice is against the granting of interim relief. On his own evidence the Claimant is now over 18. He could not therefore return to his previous placement. He has not provided particulars of how his situation would change if interim relief were granted. A hearing would be needed to determine what if any further steps were required and what the implications would be for the Defendant and its other service users if the relief were granted. I am not satisfied that justice
demands such a hearing.