CAY -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-002700

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

14 August 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Mould

Between:

The King on the application of
CAY

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

On an application by the Claimant for urgent consideration, interim relief and directions

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant

ORDER by the Hon. Mr Justice Mould:

  1. Anonymity:
    (a) Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
    (ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “CAY”.
    (b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
    (c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
    (i) the parties must within 7 days file and serve a redacted copy of any statement of case already filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;
    (ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time and must then be served with the unredacted version;
    (iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
    (d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
  2. Mandatory injunction:
    (a) The Defendant must forthwith provide the Claimant with accommodation and support pursuant to sections 95 and 96 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, such accommodation to be at premises located within the Greater London area.
    (b) The Defendant may apply on 24 hours’ notice to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) above, any such application to be served on each party.
  3. Abridgement of time and expedition:
    (a) The Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service (CPR 54.8) must be filed and served by 4pm on 22 August 2025.
    (b) Any Reply from the Claimant (CPR 54.8A) must be filed and served by 4pm on 29 August 2025.
    (c) The papers are to be referred to a judge or deputy judge for a decision whether to grant permission to apply for judicial review within 7 days thereafter.
  4. Costs reserved.

Reasons

Anonymity: The Claimant is a vulnerable asylum seeker who has received a positive reasonable grounds decision indicating that she is likely to be the victim of trafficking. I am satisfied that there are compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1.

Mandatory injunction: The Defendant appears to accept that it is appropriate to provide the Claimant with support, including adequate accommodation, pursuant to sections 95/96 IAA 1999 pending determination of her asylum appeal. The issue is whether hers is an exceptional case that justifies departure from the “no-choice” principle which ordinarily governs the location of such accommodation. In the light of the information submitted in support of this urgent application, I had decided after some hesitation that I should order that the Defendant must provide such accommodation to the Claimant within the Greater London area, pending determination of her application for permission to apply for judicial review. I do so on the basis that, as things stand, there is a serious issue to be tried and that the balance of convenience favours an order in those terms, on the basis of the documents I have read. Although mandatory in its terms, given the Defendant’s acceptance of the need to provide asylum support and accommodation, the coercive element of the order is essentially the prescription of a location within Greater London. The Defendant has liberty to apply to vary or to discharge that order, whether on notice or in her acknowledgment of service.

Abridgement of time/expedition: This is clearly a case in which the question of permission should be decided at an early date. I have made appropriate directions to enable that to be done