CLT -v- London Borough of Hounslow (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-002584

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

17 September 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mrs Justice Heather Williams

Between:

The King on the application of
CLT

-v-

London Borough of Hounslow

Order

On an application by the Claimant for interim relief and directions

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and the Defendant

ORDER by the Hon. Mrs Justice Heather Williams:

  1. Anonymity:
    (a) Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the Claimant’s name, the name of his Litigation Friend and the name of the maternal cousin referred to in the papers are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
    (ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “CLT”; his Litigation Friend is to be referred to orally in writing as “CLA“; and the maternal cousin referred to at (a)(i) as “IF”.
    (b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant, his Litigation Friend or the maternal cousin referred to at (a)(i) or of any matter likely to lead to their identification, including in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings. For the avoidance of doubt this prohibition includes publication of the Claimant’s address.
    (c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
    (i) the parties must within 7 days file and serve a redacted copy of any statement of case already filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or to the other individuals referred to at (a)(i);
    (ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to their identification, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time and must then be served with the unredacted version;
    (iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
    (d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
  2. Mandatory injunction:
    (a) From receipt of this Order until the conclusion of the proceedings or until further order (if earlier) the Defendant shall treat the Claimant as a “looked after” child and an “eligible” child within the meaning of the Children Act 1989.
    (b) The Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 2(a) above, any such application to be served on each party.

THIS IS A [MANDATORY/PROHIBITORY] INJUNCTION. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(b) ABOVE. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. SEE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW GUIDE 2024, §17.7.4

Reasons

Anonymity: Given that the Claimant is a vulnerable child and given the nature of the evidence relating to him that is relied upon in this case, I am satisfied that there are compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1. The related orders I have made are to prevent jigsaw identification. Whilst this is a decision for the Court, I also note that the proposed order is not opposed by the Defendant.
The practice of the Administrative Court requires that three letter ciphers are used in respect of the parties, where anonymity is granted. To that limited extent I have not adopted the ciphers used by the parties.

Mandatory injunction: The Claimant seeks a mandatory order requiring the Defendant to treat the Claimant as “looked after” child and an “eligible” child within the meaning of the Children Act 1989. The central issue between the parties in this regard is whether the Claimant has been accommodated under s.20 of the Children Act 1989 and thus is owed the duties arising from this. The Defendant contends the duty has not arisen as accommodation was provided pursuant to a private fostering arrangement. I am satisfied that the Claimant’s case on this issue is arguable with a realistic prospect of success, essentially for the reasons identified at paras 13 – 18 of the Reply. In a separate order also made on 17 September 2025, I have granted permission to apply for judicial review on this basis.
I am therefore satisfied that the application for interim relief raises a serious issue to be tried. In light of the description of the Claimant’s current circumstances, I am also satisfied that the balance of convenience falls in favour of granting the relief sought. However, I have not granted the specific orders sought at items 2 – 9 of the Claimant’s draft order. To the extend that they follow from the overarching requirement to treat the Claimant as a looked after child and an eligible child, it is unnecessary to do so. Furthermore, I do not consider it appropriate for the Court (without knowing the full circumstances or competing pressures on the Defendant) to prescribe the specific timescales that the Claimant seeks to attach to each of those steps. It is unnecessary to grant the orders sought in respect of the Claimant’s accommodation as the Defendant has indicated that the tenancy will be granted to his sister (who intends that the Claimant will reside with her).