Committal for contempt of court: Abri Group -v- Yasmin Matheson-Brown

Committal for contempt of courtCounty CourtCommittal for Contempt of Court

Case number: L01RG306

In the County Court sitting at Slough Magistrates’ Court

12 November 2025

Before :

HHJ Vincent

Between:

Abri Group Ltd

-v-

Yasmin Matheson-Brown

Judgment

HHJ Vincent:

  1. This is the hearing of the Claimant’s application, issued on 31 January 2025, for committal of the defendant arising out of breaches of an anti-social behaviour injunction made on 19 August 2024.
  2. The hearing is in public and has been recorded.
  3. The Claimant is represented by Miss Pattni-Evans, the defendant by Mr Osman.
  4. At Court today the Defendant has admitted to twelve of the twenty-four pleaded breaches, and the Claimant has agreed to withdraw the remaining ones. The admitted breaches are as follows:

(3) 31 October 2024 at 9.20pm people arrived at the Defendant’s property making noise and a disturbance. One individual was a male known to Abri and was one of the main perpetrators of the ASB earlier in 2024, around February.

(4) 1 November 2024 after 8pm, people arrived in the block and entered the Defendant’s property causing noise disturbance and nuisance into the early hours.

(5) 3 November 2024 at around 10pm 3 or 4 visitors arrived in the block and entered the Defendant’s property, where there was loud talking, noise and disturbance heard.

(6) 9 November 2024 a group of visitors arrived and entered the Defendant’s property. The noise nuisance continued until 4am.

(10) 28 November 2024 at 9.44pm there were visitors at the Defendant’s property causing noise and disturbance including shouting, loud speaking and social activity. The police were called.

(11) 2 December 2024 there were visitors at the Defendant’s property which extended after midnight causing nuisance and annoyance. The police were called.

(12) 13 December 2024 at 1.50 am the police attended the Defendant’s property and arrested the Defendant’s visitor.

(19) On 25 June 2025 at 11.21 pm noise and banging was heard coming from the Property which continued until the early hours.

(20) On 1 July 2025, that the Defendant had kept a resident awake until 4 am due to the noise coming from the Property.

(21) On 9 July 2025, that at around midnight on 6 July 2025 a loud bang was heard from the Property.

(22) On 11 July 2025 there were loud thumps between 11 pm and midnight from the Property.

(23) On 17 July 2025 the Defendant had visitors in the Property creating noise which continued into the early hours of 18 July 2025. This was reported to the police.

  1. I have read all the evidence in the bundle, and have heard the Defendant give brief evidence, in which she admitted each of these breaches.
  2. By making these admissions the Defendant has saved the Claimant’s witnesses from having to give evidence in Court today, although they only knew that following discussions between the parties before the hearing. The Defendant did make an apology to the Claimant from the witness box, she said:

‘I apologise for the disturbance, I have never been malicious, never tried to be aggressive in any way. I apologise for disturbing anyone if I have and I hope you will give me a chance to be more peaceful.’

  1. I am satisfied to the criminal standard of proof, that the Defendant is in contempt of Court. She has breached the terms of the injunction which prohibited her from having visitors to her property and prohibited her from anti-social behaviour.
  2. I was invited then to proceed to consider sentencing.
  3. I am grateful to Ms Pattni-Evans and to Mr Osman for their skeleton arguments which set out the law clearly, and for their succinct and focused submissions.
  4. I have been referred to the cases of Hale v Tanner [2000] 1 WLR 2377 and to Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 163 which give helpful guidance in the approach the Court should take to sentencing for breaches of antisocial behaviour injunctions.
  5. The Court may impose a term of committal, of up to two years, and/or may impose a fine. The court may confiscate assets, or make such other punishment as is permitted under the law (section 14(1) Contempt of Court Act 1981; rule 81.9 CPR 1998).
  6. If a term of committal is imposed immediately, the contemnor is entitled to automatic release, without conditions, after serving half the term of the committal.
  7. The Court may also order that its execution will be suspended for such period or on such terms or conditions as it may specify.
  8. In imposing any sentence, the court should have in mind the purpose of its powers. Firstly, in respect of punishing the breach. Secondly, such sanction as is necessary to ensure compliance with the existing orders or future orders.
  9. Ms Pattni-Evans helpfully distilled the principles from Lovett as follows:

(i) Sentencing a defendant for breach of orders in contempt of court is a multifactorial exercise of judgment based on the particular facts and circumstances before the judge;

(ii) Suspension is usually the first way of attempting to secure compliance with the underlying order;

(iii) Custody should be reserved for the most serious breaches and for less serious cases where other methods of securing compliance with the order have failed.

  1. The court should first consider whether or not the custody threshold is passed (Liverpool Victoria Insurance Company Limited v Zafar [2019] EWCA Civ 392). Secondly, whether it is unavoidable that a term of committal ought to be imposed, and thirdly what is the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Lastly the court must consider whether the term can be suspended or not.
  2. The antisocial behaviour that form the twelve admitted breaches of the order spans a lengthy period of time. The Defendant is the sole tenant of her property but she has repeatedly, in breach of the conditions of her tenancy and of the injunction, invited visitors to her house, and together with those visitors, caused repeated noise and disturbance to her neighbours, leading to frequent call outs to the police. The Claimant’s witnesses describe not being able to sleep, feeling intimidated and unsettled in their own homes, constantly disturbed by loud shouting and noise. Apart from the three months when a closure order was in place, this behaviour has continued despite the injunction being in place, and it has continued throughout the time that the Claimant has taken proceedings for committal. There have been two previous hearings in these proceedings; in March and in August, but there has not been a change in behaviour since then.
  3. The only time there was abatement was when the closure order was in place. The breaches of the injunction which took place after that time are arguably more serious because they indicate no ability on the Defendant’s part to reflect and change her behaviour. Even when she was deprived of her home for three months, she was not able to make a change upon returning.
  4. I note that the Claimant has not pleaded any allegations relating to the past three months, nor updated its evidence in that respect. However, the Defendant has not suggested that she has taken any steps at all to moderate her behaviour. When she made her apology in Court, she said she was sorry ‘if’ others had been disturbed by the noise. She did not accept what is written very clearly in a number of statements put forward by the Claimant, that she has in fact caused significant harm and distress to her neighbours. She did say that she had separated from her partner, but she did not seem to be taking responsibility for her actions or give any indication that she had used the opportunity of these proceedings as an opportunity for change. She hasn’t engaged with help and support offered to her.
  5. I take into account that the Defendant is a vulnerable person, who has some long-standing mental health conditions, including clinical depression, severe anxiety, leaning difficulties, insomnia, ADHD and agoraphobia. She reports that she is the victim of domestic abuse. She is reported to be struggling with addiction, and has said herself that she can find it difficult to avoid people who are harmful in her life.
  6. I note that there are no allegations of abusive behaviour directly to any neighbour or person working for the Claimant or other third party, nor any complaints of damage to property, threats, or otherwise interfering with her neighbours’ enjoyment of their homes. The issues are largely about the visitors who come to her property and the noise they make.
  7. I note that this is the first time that the Defendant has been brought to court for contempt proceedings.
  8. Both Mr Osman and Miss Pattni-Evans have referred me to the Civil Justice Council’s guidelines of July 2020, which are referred to in Lovett. The Court is advised to give distinct consideration to the degree of harm and the degree of culpability. The three levels of culpability are:

A: High culpability; very serious breach or persistent serious breaches;
B: Deliberate breach falling between A and C
C: Lower culpability; minor breach or breaches.

  1. The level of harm is determined by weighing up all the factors of the case to determine the harm that was caused or was at risk of being caused by the breach or breaches. In assessing any risk of harm posed by the breaches consideration should be given to the facts or activity which led to the order being made. The three levels of harm are:

Category 1: breach causes very serious harm or distress
Category 2: cases falling between 1 and 3
Category 3: breach causes little or no harm or distress.

  1. Counsel agree that in this case we are plainly within Category B for culpability and Category 2 for harm. The starting point for sentencing is one month and the category range is described as ‘adjourned consideration to 3 months’.
  2. Ms Pattni-Evans says that the number of breaches over a sustained period of time justify a custodial sentence, and invites the Court to make that order, of a four week term of imprisonment, suspended until 19 August 2026, which is when the injunction expires.
  3. Mr Osman says that before the Court considers imposing a custodial sentence, in the circumstances of this case, it would be more appropriate to adjourn to give the Defendant an opportunity to demonstrate to the Court, to her neighbours and to the Claimant that she is able to change her behaviour.
  4. In my judgment it is appropriate to look at the breaches together, because on their own they may not be regarded as serious, but their cumulative effect over a long period of time has been significant.
  5. It is evident from the Claimant’s witness statements that Ms Sorce their housing officer has put in a huge amount of time and resource to trying to find ways of supporting the Defendant, of supporting all those of her neighbours who are being adversely affected by her behaviour, and of gathering the evidence to put forward to the Court. This goes to the question of whether it is proportionate to adjourn for sentence and ask the Claimant to come back to Court again, when there have been two hearings already in these proceedings, and to provide updating evidence.
  6. Mr Osman has taken me to three cases of similar conduct and set out the penalties imposed:
  • Birmingham City Council v Flatt [2008] EWCA Civ 739 in which a 4 month immediate custodial sentence was imposed upon Mr Flatt, following a history of violent and threatening conduct towards his neighbour, including driving a van directly at him;
  • Amicus Horizon Ltd v Thorley [2012] EWCA Civ 817 in which the Court of Appeal refused to overturn the judge’s decision to impose a term of immediate imprisonment, but did reduce the length of sentence from four months to six weeks. The defendant had been found to have breached an anti social behaviour injunction by shouting and swearing at neighbours and staff, being drunk and entering a communal lounge from which he was banned;
  • Poplar Housing v McHale, 20 August 2020, HHJ Hellman. The contemnor was sentenced to a custodial sentence of six weeks, suspended for 12 months. Ten allegations of breach of an antisocial behaviour injunction were found, involving the contemnor behaving in a loud, drunken and obnoxious manner on numerous occasions, at all times of the day and night.

31. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, I am not persuaded that adjournment for sentencing would be appropriate. The Defendant has not been able to give any assurance that she can make changes to her behaviour. She has been offered a lot of support in the past but has not engaged with it. When the draconian measure of the closure order was in place, it did not bring about a change in her behaviour. It is not reasonable in my judgment to have a further hearing in these committal proceedings which would just build in delay, and cause the Claimant to come back to court again. I cannot have confidence it would serve the purpose of securing compliance with the order.

32. Although the Defendant has not been verbally or physically abusive to her neighbours or to the claimant’s employees, the number of breaches is significant – twelve – over a sustained period of time, and continued unabated, despite the Claimant doing its level best to work with her.

32. The Defendant has made life for her neighbours extremely difficult. They are miserable. They are entitled to expect the Court to acknowledge their experiences and to show its disapproval of the Defendant’s conduct.

33. This case is similar in facts to both the cases of Amicus Horizon and to Poplar v McHale.

34. I was minded to sentence for two periods of four weeks, for those breaches that occurred before and after the closure order was in place. However, considering all the circumstances in the round, and having regard to case law, I have come to the view that the appropriate sentence to impose is of a term of imprisonment of six weeks.

35. I then consider whether the sentence can be suspended. Sentencing is usually the first way of attempting to secure compliance with the court’s order. This in my judgment is the appropriate course, more so than simply adjourning for sentencing.

36. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to give the Defendant an opportunity to live, as she says, in a more peaceful way, and to comply with the injunction. I will suspend the sentence until 19 August 2026, which is the date the injunction expires.

    HHJ Vincent
    Sitting at Slough Magistrates’ Court
    12 November 2025