June 5, 2024

Committal for Contempt of Court: Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary -v- Harvey Sadik

County Court Committal for Contempt of Court

Claim Number: K00CA686

In the County Court at Carlisle

18 March 2024

Before:
District Judge Stone

Between:

Chief Constable of Cumbria Constabulary

-v-

Harvey Sadik

JUDGE STONE:

I have before me four admitted breaches of an injunction that was imposed upon Mr Sadik whilst he was under 18 and in the youth court. All of these breaches occurred after the time that he turned 18 and therefore are matters that appear before this court. There are four breaches for which I am sentencing today.
The injunction that was imposed prohibited Mr Sadik from entering areas that are outlined on a plan attached to the injunction save that he would be able to enter Penrith Railway Station when accompanied by Charlene Hall for the purposes of lawful travel.
(b) Not to engage in any conduct which causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person. (c) Use any insulting language or threaten violence towards any person. (d) Cause any person to fear the infliction of harm. And (e) harm any person by the direct application of force or (f) be under the influence of alcohol and drugs in public.
It is important to note that there were alleged breaches of that injunction prior to Mr Sadik reaching the age of 18. No penalty was taken in respect of the first of those breaches and in respect of the second, a supervision order was imposed for a period of four months.
That is only relevant to the background circumstances and the court knows and recognises that the breaches that are before it today, before me today, are ones that are not the first breaches but they are the only breaches for which I am considering sentence, which I am considering how to deal with. And of course, all of those occurred after Mr Sadiq had turned the age of 18.
Those four breaches are as follows. On 15 December 2023, Mr Sadik was in a public place under the influence of alcohol and drugs. That is clearly in breach of the last of the terms of the injunction. That may cause some limited harm to those who had to observe people in a place when they are under the influence, particularly when there is an order that they should not be.
But when I consider, as I have to in relation to each of the breaches, the category of harm and the culpability for each of the breaches, this is a breach where the culpability is at the lower end of the middle category B, in the sense that it was known that there should not be going into a public area under the influence of drugs and alcohol and it was deliberate given that there were a number of breaches already. The harm, however, is in the lowest category because although there would be nuisance potentially caused to people, there is no significant harm alleged as a result of that breach.
The second breach is that on 15 January 2024 he was in an area within the exclusion zone in the map attached to the injunction at 8.15 pm. That is both low in relation to harm and the bottom end of the middle category for culpability. Again, it is known that there was the breach of any injunction. There has been discussion over clarity and what can and cannot be done in relation to the exclusion zone. But the exclusion zone was known and entering in given the previous breaches would be classed as deliberate and between categories 1 and two.
The third alleged breach admitted today is on 6 February that he was present at Penrith Bus Station. He followed and shouted the name of Kyle Davidson. Kyle Davidson is an alleged previous victim of an allegation of grievous bodily harm that is currently progressing through the criminal court system.
But nonetheless, in circumstances where there are those allegations in the background, to follow the alleged victim in relation to those criminal offences and shout his name is clearly going to cause alarm and distress in breach of the injunction. Again, particularly given the circumstances that can only be classed as a deliberate breach in the middle category with harm that is at least in the middle category, so category 2B for that breach.
The final breach is on 14 February, only eight or so days later, that Mr Sadik attended the George Hotel, entered that area. It would seem on balance that he knew that Mr Davidson would be working there and took the opportunity to stare at him whilst he was there on work experience or working. That again would cause alarm and distress. Again, can only be described as a deliberate act and on top of the very recent earlier alleged breach would equally cause harm because of the nature and the repeated nature of making contact in a manner to cause harm to Mr Davidson.
That then is again at least category B2 when I take into account the categories and the manner of categorisation in the case of Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631 which provides this court with helpful guidance in relation to how to approach sentences.
I have to approach a sentence and deal with a sentence for each of the breaches and I have to consider what is a proportionate sentence for all of the offences taken together. I have to do it bearing in mind that the aim of sentencing, again guidance to this court being set out in the case of Lovett -v- Wigan, is to consider ensuring future compliance with the order.
That is important in this case given there have been four breaches. Two of them in relation to areas or being drunk and two in relation to causing alarm and distress. There has been a failure to fully comply with the order to date and it is important whatever sentence is imposed takes into account the importance of seeking to ensure that Mr Sadik is aware of the importance of complying with the injunction in the future.
The second element is one of punishment for admitted breaches of an injunction and the contempt that that shows to the court procedure for breaches of court orders. And the third element is one of rehabilitation.
In relation to the starting points for sentences, so far as the first two offences are concerned the culpability is within B, the harm is either at the bottom of category 2 or in the case of one, probably in category 3. In the event of an offence within culpability B and harm category 3 the starting point is an adjourned consideration, that is adjourning to consider what sentence is appropriate. The range of sentence that are imposed is an adjournment consideration to one month in custody.
The later two offences increasing within their ambit of the category both fall within category 2 in relation to harm. This clearly is going to cause harm to a victim whatever the rights and wrongs of the underlying criminal case when there are those allegations and those activities of following, shouting names and staring at him in public in breach of the order causing alarm and distress. That is therefore category 2 culpability B. The starting point in that case is a custodial sentence of one month and the range of sentences the court should be considering is an adjournment to a period of custody of three months.
I take into account that credit needs to be given for early admissions, although there is no strict legal requirement as there is in the criminal courts in the same way taking into account the Criminal Justice Act to give deductions. That is relevant matters and guidance suggests that those factors should be taken into account. And any sentence that the court would impose will be reduced by a third to take into account the plea on the earliest occasion, the admission on the earliest occasion so far as each of the sentences are concerned.
In addition, I take into account the presentence report. That presentence report sets out positive elements of engagement. How it is a recent circumstance that gave rise to the injunction and matters that have followed that, that have led to Mr Sadik’s involvement with the criminal justice system and this court. That there had been positive engagement with the supervision and engagement with services when they are offered and I have read and taken into account those circumstances.
I also take into account that the injunction itself is restrictive. That is the purpose of it and there are reasons behind it in the outset. What is important is that there is an understanding that there is a requirement not at all to enter the area within the plan. That does not mean you cannot go to other areas that are outside that exclusion zone whether it is DWP, whether it is Specsavers, whether it is housing. What you cannot do is enter that exclusion zone in order to get there. That means walking a longer way round and making sure you do not go in an area which was imposed clearly for a reason at the time the injunction was imposed.
That of course does impose restrictions and it is important that there has been clarity provided in that regard. The map is clear and it is that area that cannot be entered. That does not mean you cannot walk round the outside of that area and get to other places that are outside the area. And it does not mean in appropriate circumstances as set out in the order.
If there were matters that were impossible in that regard, they could be brought to the attention of the court and an application made to vary the order. There has been no such application that has been made before the court. I only highlight it to show that there is the ability to do that, but otherwise the order unless the court orders something different is to be complied with fully and that means not entering that area.
When there have been four breaches, in relation to the first two I am not satisfied that the custody threshold is crossed. In relation to each of those, on the first occasion I adjourned sentence but it was clear that the adjournment did not work in the sense that there was a further breach.
However, in relation to that time there has already been a period of custody served of the equivalent of six days by the time that that came before the court. On the basis that by that time there had been the equivalent of a six day custodial sentence, I do not consider it would be appropriate to impose any penalty for that breach when I am considering that breach alone.
In relation to the breach on 19 January 2024, again there was culpability there and the starting point would be the one month in custody or the range would be up to one month in custody for that breach. When I consider by that stage there would have been the equivalent of eight days in custody notwithstanding the previous breach, again for that breach given that time spent in custody already by the time that it was before the court, I would not impose any separate penalty or further penalty given the time already spent.
I then move on to the breaches on 6 February and 14 February. Both of those fall into a category that is certainly B2. Where there has already been an adjournment, there have already been breaches of the injunction. When I bear those in mind, in relation to each of those I am satisfied that the custody threshold is crossed. Those are breaches 3 and four before the adult court, breaches five and six in total of the injunction as a whole.
Given the nature of those breaches, the potential harm and indeed the harm suffered that is clear from the statement of Mr Davidson, it is clear that the custody threshold is crossed for the making and imposing of a custodial sentence so far as those breaches are concerned.
In relation to the first, following and shouting a name, I consider that it is appropriate for there to be a custodial sentence. I consider that a six week custodial sentence is the appropriate sentence that would be imposed for that breach. Likewise, the custody threshold is crossed for the breach on 14 February 2024. That is only eight days later. It is going to cause harm to stare at people.
The sentence is going to be the same because although this was very soon afterwards and although it was not making direct matters and therefore there were no direct threats, the impact of staring at someone a number of days later with the background and context is clearly going to cause harm. And it is the equivalent harm that was imposed or caused by the breach on 6 February. So, again I am going to impose a six week, that is 42 day, custodial sentence in relation to each of those breaches.
I have to consider the totality and I consider that although they are together and there would be additional harm, those sentences should be served concurrently, that is at the same time as opposed to be added to each other.
I then also give credit for the fact that there was the admission on the first occasion of both of those breaches and therefore in relation to each of the sentences that would reduce the 42 day period, which is six weeks, to a period of 28 days when I take into account the admission at the earliest possible date for each of those sentences. Again, concurrent.
I then take into account, although I have taken into account in the earlier sentences, that there was an additional two days so far as these breaches are concerned. I do not take into account further the additional days that have been taken into account in relation to no penalty for the earlier breaches because the majority of those time in custody related to those breaches.
So far as these breaches are concerned, I consider that there has been one further day held in custody that relate to these most significant breaches. All of the other time in custody is taken into account fully in the sentences that were imposed for the first two breaches. And therefore the additional time that I need to give credit for when imposing these sentences is effectively two days. Because in relation to any sentence that is imposed, half of the time would be served and therefore any time spent on remand as a result of being arrested would count as two days.
Therefore, that then would lead to a sentence on each of the counts of 26 days’ imprisonment. It is necessary to consider that and then to move on to consider whether or not that should be an immediate custodial sentence or whether it should be a sentence that is suspended. I bear in mind all three of the factors that I have set out as the matters that I need to consider when imposing a sentence, namely causing the order to be complied with, stressing the importance of the order being complied with, punishment and rehabilitation.
When I take into account all of the mitigation, the particular circumstances, the age and the matters that have been set out before this court, I reach the conclusion that today it would not be right to make that an immediate custodial sentence and I am going to suspend the custodial sentence that I have imposed.
Therefore, I am going to impose a custodial sentence for a total of 26 days, suspended until the end of the injunction which is currently 15 September 2024. The injunction will remain in force until that time. I have not received any submissions or application to extend the period of the injunction and it would be right for the suspended sentence to be in place for the same length as the time of the injunction.
The injunction will remain in force as well until that time and of course part of what I have said already stresses the importance of full compliance. And in the event that further breaches are alleged and proved, then it is likely, although it will be for the judge imposing sentence in relation to any further breach, but it is likely that any suspended sentence that I impose today would be activated and considered in addition to any sentence that would be imposed for any further breach.
Mr Sadik, can you please stand up? Mr Sadik, you have heard the reasons for the sentence that I am imposing with my judgment as to the seriousness and the nature of the breaches that are put before the court. Ultimately, on the first two breaches, when I take into account the time spent in custody prior to those breaches I impose no separate penalty for either of those first two breaches.
In relation to each of the later two breaches on 6 February and 14 February I impose a 26 day custodial sentence suspended until 15 September 2024 on terms that you fully comply with the terms of the injunction that remains in force. That means in the event of any further breach being proved, that would be a breach of the suspended sentence and the court would then need to consider imposing that sentence, activating it in addition to any other sentence that is imposed. Do you understand? (Defendant affirms)
I also have to tell you that you have a right of appeal against the decision that I have made today. It is an automatic right. In order for you to appeal, you would need to make that application within 21 days from today on paper to this court and it would be considered by a circuit judge and directions given in relation to that appeal. And you also have the right to apply to vary or discharge the order that I have made today. Do you understand? (Defendant Nods and affirms). Thank you.

This transcript has been approved by the Judge