Committal for Contempt of Court: Chief Constable of Merseyside Police -v- Roach
Liverpool County Court
19 July 2024
Before:
His Honour Judge Gregory
Between:
Chief Constable of Merseyside Police
-v-
Jack Roach
Judgment
HHJ GREGORY:
1. On 19 March 2024, I passed a sentence of 12 weeks’ custody in relation to breaches by Mr Roach that have been proved or admitted by him in respect of the terms of injunction that was imposed upon him, and still has to run until, as I understand it, a date in November of this year. When that suspended sentence was imposed – and I imposed the sentence – I made it as clear as I possibly could to Mr Roach that I was giving him a chance, because my view was that the offences, the breaches that he admitted in relation to the injunction, were serious enough to have crossed the custody threshold, and I faithfully went through the approach recommended by the Court of Appeal in the case of Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631 and identified the various levels of culpability and the degrees of seriousness associated with those breaches that led me to a 12-week sentence. However, as I have said, I made it as clear as I possibly could, that if he were to breach the terms of that injunction order again, he could expect to have that sentence activated, and in addition, to receive a sentence for whatever new breach had brought him to the attention of the Court.
2. Lovett v Wigan Borough Council, of course, is the case that sets out the approach recommended in civil courts for a breach by a defendant of injunctions that are imposed within the context of civil proceedings; that is to say including family proceedings, and any breach or contempt of a court order. That, of course, includes proceedings and injunctions made under the Police and Crime Act 2014, as indeed is the case here.
3. Lord Justice Birss, in delivering the judgment of the Court in the Lovett case, set out the background of the breaches for contempt of court and considerations to be kept in mind by judges in the civil jurisdiction in sentencing persons who were adjudged to have, or who had admitted contempt of court for a breach of a court order. It draws some important distinctions between the criminal sentencing process and indeed the process used in the family courts for breaches of court orders, and civil penalties within the civil jurisdiction, notably for breaching anti-social behaviour orders.
4. The objectives of sentencing are set out in brief form at paragraph 39 of the Lovett judgment, and list of sentencing options available to civil court at paragraph 40. Paragraph 41 deals with the suspension and adjournment; and paragraph 43 that of the custody threshold. Paragraphs 44 and 45 are primarily concerned with issue of suspending a sentence. There then follows a table, as produced by the Civil Justice Council, that identifies the categorisation, which is in terms of culpability and the harm caused by the breach. The three levels of as culpability are high, Category A, which is described as a very serious breach or persistent serious breaches; Category B or level B, is a deliberate breach falling between Categories A and C; and C is lower culpability involving a minor breach or breaches.
5. The level of harm is described as a process involved weighing up all of the factors of the case to determine the harm that was caused, or was at risk of being caused, by the breach or breaches. Category 1 harm is a breach that causes very serious harm and distress; Category 2, those cases that fall between Categories 1 and 3; and Category 3 is the bracket for the least or no harm or distress caused.
6. In evaluating the effect or quality and seriousness of the admitted breaches in this case, it falls to me in weighing up how to dispose of the matter to assess the culpability and assess the harm caused by the incident overall.
7. The aggravating features in relation to this matter are the history, whereby two days – a mere two days – after the imposition of the suspended sentence, there was a further breach of the order by this defendant. In accordance with the considerations identified at paragraph 49 of the Lovett case, aggravating features increasing seriousness include a history of disobedience; that is to say, in this case, recent failure to comply with court orders, failure to comply with a suspended sentence, and indeed, other breaches and a failure to comply with the criminal behaviour orders. Persistent breaches of injunction are likely to amount, as the Court of Appeal says, to an important aggravating factor. All of those factors are in play here.
8. To clarify the matter as best as I can, in terms of harm being caused, or potential harm being caused by breaches of a civil injunction: in the context of the Police and Crime Act, every breach undermines the effectiveness of the Merseyside Police and their ability to curb the activities of organised crime groups operating in this area. It is for that reason that I identify the breach as brought in these proceedings, in these contempt proceedings before the Court, the breach on 21 March 2024. I characterise that in culpability terms as culpability, Category B.
9. This is, in my judgment, a case that falls within Category B2 in terms of the categorisation of the Civil Justice Council’s evaluative process. In my judgment, the appropriate sentence in this case is one that reflects the fact that the defendant’s conduct has of course crossed the custody threshold, and he was also in persistent breach of these orders.
10. I am going to order that the existing suspended sentence imposed on 19 March 2024 is activated in full, which is 12 weeks. In addition to that, I impose a sentence of six weeks’ custody to run consecutively to the 12-week sentence, making a total of 18 weeks all together.
11. I acknowledge that this is the first occasion on which the defendant has been asked to enter a plea in terms of admitting or denying the contempt application, because on an earlier occasion when he was before the Court, he was un‑represented and I have given him full credit for his admission of the contempt of the breach today, and that is reflected in the relatively modest sentence of six weeks that I attach to this latest breach.
12. That means the sentence of the Court is a total of 18 weeks, made up of the activation of the suspended sentence of 12 weeks and an additional six weeks to reflect the breach that he admitted before the Court this afternoon. It may be that given that he has been arrested at some stage during the course of the process, he is entitled to some form of credit for having been in custody for part of that time. If that is the case, it can be rectified administratively and the appropriate note made on the court file.