Committal for Contempt of Court: Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council -v- Sean Soley
Case Number: L00WJ873
In the County Court at Dudley
23 February 2026
Before:
District Judge Moan
Between:
Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council
-v-
Sean Soley
Judgment
The applications
1. Dudley MBC, the Claimant, made an application for an injunction on 20th September 2024 against the Defendant, Mr Soley, pursuant to the Antisocial Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. On 24th September 2024 an interim injunction was made against the Defendant on an urgent basis without notice to him. A copy of that injunction can be found on page 177 of the bundle but in summary, the injunction prohibited the Defendant from causing nuisance or annoyance to anyone who resides, visits or is engaged in an activity within the Broadway, the prohibition of use or storage of any explosive substance, and a prohibition against being abusive or a nuisance towards the Claimant’s employees or contractors. At that stage the Defendant was a secure tenant of the Claimant and lived in The Broadway in Norton. On 17th January 2025 the Court amended the injunction because a possession order had been granted to the Claimant in respect of the Defendant’s rented accommodation and the amended provisions additionally prohibited the Defendant from entering or remaining within The Broadway.
2. The Claimant made an application for contempt dated 23rd April 2025. That application was amended on 13th November 2025 to include further alleged breaches committed during the currency of the proceedings. A hearing took place on 9th January 2026 to determine whether the interim injunction should be made final and whether the Defendant had breached the interim injunction.
Background to the injunction application
3. The Defendant had been a secure tenant since 20th December 2006. In the injunction application the Claimant described the Defendant as aggressive towards the Claimant’s employees over the telephone and in-person. Examples were given of incidents between April 2015 to September 2024 of abusive behaviour including racist remarks, keeping weapons at his home address and using explosive devices in the vicinity of the property. Facebook posts by the Defendant with photographs and concerning comments underpinned the concern of the Claimant about what substances the Defendant was experimenting with, in and outside his property. The local authority wrote to the Defendant in June 2022 and October 2023 highlighting the behaviour that they considered to be unacceptable and that if this behaviour persisted a possession Order may be sought.
4. Whilst an interim injunction had been granted, as amended, the Facebook posts continued to harass the Council and in particular the housing officer that he named in those posts.
The breaches of the injunction
5. The breaches of the injunction are summarised as follows:
i) Breach 1 – a Facebook post dated 11th March 2025 where he referred to the local authority as lying, antisocial and being corrupt. He also named the housing officer as stalking his Facebook profile.
ii) Breach 2 – A Facebook post dated 17th March 2025 where he claimed that the council lied in Court on more than one occasion and described them as corrupt horrible scummy bastards and corrupt twats. He named the same housing officer by surname and referred to her looking worried when he last saw her.
iii) Breach 3 – A Facebook post dated 5th July 2025 where he exhibited a photograph of documents in the proceedings and referred to the local authority as being corrupt and as narcissistic dictating Nazi Dudley Council who were stalking him. He said that since the named housing officer started working at the Council they had “gone to proper shit”, literally lying about people and faking evidence. The council had become corrupt tyrants and that was the consequence of letting migrants run anything.
iv) Breach 4 – A Facebook post dated 2nd August 2025 where he described the named housing officer as the devil and evil, and that he was going to carve himself a witch.
v) Breach 5 – A Facebook post dated 18th August 2025 where he described Dudley Council as up to some “shady bullshit” working with the police, manipulating stories to get rid of any threats to them. He said he was a threat to them, so they lied about him and to others.
vi) Breach 6 – A Facebook post dated 19th August 2025 stating that the police were now “shittin” themselves along with the council because they got caught and that the council were harassing him. He mentions the housing officer by describing her as that migrant and ridiculed her name stating that at the end of this the whole country is going to know about Dudley migrant Council.
vii) Breach 7 – By email when responding to Court Orders sent to him by the Council, the Defendant sent emails dated 13th November 2025 that the local authority could “suck my dick” and a further email that the Council “keep harassing me it’s my turn now you racist migrant bastards”.
6. At a hearing on 9th January 2026 the Defendant did not attend and nor did he exercise his right to provide any written evidence. Having responded to the Claimant’s email dated 11th November 2025 which included notification of the hearing 9th January 2026, I was satisfied that the Defendant was aware of the trial on 9th January 2026. The Court found beyond reasonable doubt that he had breached the interim injunction and made the interim injunction a final Order. However, the breaches remained outstanding to be sentenced which are the subject of today’s hearing.
7. I have a statement from the Community Housing Team Manager who sent an email and text message to the Defendant on 29th January 2026 which included my Order dated 9th January 2026 and a note of the hearing for 23rd February 2026. Communication methods are limited as the Defendant has no fixed address. Permission was given on 9th January 2026 for the Order and notice of hearing to be served by email and text. The email address used for service is the same as the one used by the Defendant on 13th November 2026. The Defendant duly attended today.
8. The Defendant was reminded of his right to get legal representation and actively encouraged to do so by me on 1st July 2025, and in the Order following that date. He told me he had struggled to obtain representation.
9. The Defendant advised that he had not appreciated he would be breaking an injunction. He was in poor mental health previously and recognised that his language was strong in the social media posts. He provided care for his mother and still has yet to secure his own accommodation. He apologised repeatedly for his actions and to the housing officer who attended Court. He remained in disagreement with the Council about some issues but accepted his language was too strong.
Antecedents
10. The Defendant has convictions albeit not within the last four years. Those convictions show a propensity not to comply with Court Orders.
Sentencing structure
11. I remind myself that the options available to the Court are to either impose no order, impose an unlimited fine, or to commit to custody for an immediate or suspended term.
12. Part 81 of the Civil Procedure Rules applies to breaches of anti-social behaviour Orders which may be treated as a contempt of Court. The maximum penalty is two years’ imprisonment on any occasion by virtue of s.14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
13. I have had regard to the sentencing guidance provided by the Civil Justice Council Guidelines for Anti-Social Behaviour published in June 2020as approved by the Court of Appeal in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council and others [2022] EWCA Civ 163.
14. At Paragraphs 39 and 40 of that judgment, Birss LJ’s confirmed:
39. As these orders are injunctions made by a civil Court, the objectives in sentencing for breach are the ones applicable to civil contempt, namely (in this order):
i) Ensuring future compliance with the order;
ii) Punishment; and
iii) Rehabilitation.
40. For the same reason, that this is concerned with civil contempt, the five options available to the Court when dealing with a contemnor are:
i) An immediate order for committal to prison.
ii) A suspended order for committal to prison, with conditions.
iii) Adjourning the consideration of a penalty.
iv) A fine.
v) No order.
Assessment of seriousness
15. To assess initial seriousness, the Court considers culpability and harm.
16. The three levels of culpability are:
A High culpability; very serious breach or persistent serious breaches
B Deliberate breach falling between A and C
C Lower culpability; Breach causes little or no harm or distress.
17. There are seven breaches. Some of the comments involved derogatory remarks about the local authority. Article 10 of the ECHR enshrines an individual’s freedom of expression. This however is not an absolute right and statutes such as the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and Public Order Act 1986 are Parliament’s necessary restriction upon free speech. The Defendant was able to complain about the Council and convey his disappointment, disagreement and outrage at their conduct. Where he clearly crossed that boundary was accusations of criminality and the derogatory remarks about the housing officer and making repeated reference to her ethnicity.
18. I consider the breaches to be level B culpability which is mid-range.
19. The level of harm is determined by weighing up all the factors of the case to determine the harm that was caused or was at risk of being caused by the breach or breaches. In assessing any risk of harm posed by the breaches, consideration should be given to the facts or activity which led to the injunction being made. I am aware that the injunction was made to protect the Claimant’s employees and contractors specifically from abuse.
20. The three levels of harm are:
Category 1 Breach causes very serious harm or distress
Category 2 Cases falling between categories 1 and 3
Category 3 Breach causes little or no harm or distress
21. The housing officer concerned provided written evidence and said that when she found out about the posts in April 2025 that she felt anxious and worried, that it was necessary to change her Facebook profile as a result, she felt conscious about her use of social media and the impact on people who may be linked to her. She said this intrusion of her privacy had left her feeling scared, violated, fearful and anxious. She also felt cautious when visiting properties as part of her role.
22. The housing officer confirmed that she saw the posts from July and August in October 2025 and upon seeing them felt a surge of anger and then concern. She said the content was deeply offensive, inciting hatred and referring to her as a migrant. She found the comments about her name as being deeply disrespectful to her family and she felt targeted because of her Indian heritage. She felt particularly threatened by the disturbing phrase “let’s go carve ourselves a witch”. She said her professional role as a housing officer had been undermined and that she was very anxious about returning to the area for home visits. Temporary arrangements had been made for her to be accompanied on visits but that was not a sustainable solution. She felt unsafe and constantly on edge as though she must always be looking over her shoulder whilst performing her duties.
23. The final statement of the housing officer confirmed that she had been relocated to a different area due to the potential risk to her safety. She described her anxiety as significantly worsening and that the transition to a new area had significantly impacted on an already anxious and stressful situation. This had impacted on her work and home life and was beginning to affect her family and their overall well-being.
24. The community housing team manager served the Court Orders on the Defendant on 11th November 2025 by email. She received three responses from the Defendant on 13th November 2025 which she found to be concerning and upsetting.
25. Clearly the impact on the housing officer concerned has been significant. She was anxious, distressed and fearful; she had been moved to another area to keep herself safe impacting on residents, the local authority and the housing officer herself. The naming of the housing officer and calling her a stalker and liar were compounded by the mockery of her heritage and ethnicity. In my view, this is a category 2 case.
26. Using the CJC Guidelines the starting point is 1 month custody, and the range starts from adjourned consideration to a three-month sentence. Adjourned consideration is similar to a deferred sentence and an opportunity to see if compliance can be achieved.
27. I take into account that the posts are Facebook posts. The content was offensive and abusive but fell some way short of incitement or encouraging action. Intense media coverage of inflammatory social media posts that have led to criminal convictions and sentences of imprisonment have highlighted how seriously such actions are considered.
28. The breaches occurred during the currency of the proceedings. The interim Order was imposed in September 2024; The first breach was six months into the interim Order. This is also an aggravating feature.
29. There is no doubt that it is the posts that relate to the housing officer and contain racially abusive comments are the posts that set the seriousness bracket of the sentencing exercise. A central aggravating feature in this case is the racial aggravation in the continued reference to the housing officer’s ethnicity. The fear to her went beyond naming and shaming, calling her dishonest or even suggesting that she was stalking him. The victim in this case was a housing officer simply trying to do her job and serve the community. The posts singled her out based on her ethnicity. She was fearful, harassed and ultimately had to move jobs because of his conduct. I have considered the harm to the housing officer of being named and criticised as part of the category of harm assessment. The racial aggravation element will be considered separately.
30. The Defendant has previously been unapologetic about his posts. Despite giving him sage advice at the hearing on 1st July 2025 about the boundary between complaints and criticism, and online abuse, the Defendant continued to breach the interim Order. The breach proceedings started in April 2025 and the later breaches were committed whilst a contempt application was pending. The ongoing proceedings were not sufficient deterrent to the Defendant.
31. During the currency of these proceedings the Defendant has been evicted from his home. He does not have a permanent address but sofa surfs. That eviction would have a punitive effect on him noting he had lived in that home for over 18 years; and so, in some way he has been penalised for his behaviour already. I also considered the Defendant’s personal mitigation to me today about his mental health, caring responsibilities, and his understanding and agreement not to post online abuse. He was remorseful today.
32. I consider that there are several breaches of the Court Order and that any sentence needs to consider the totality of those breaches.
33. Two of the posts refer to migrants and one post ridicules the housing officer and her heritage. I consider the language to be racially aggravating.
34. Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides that the Court should increase sentences for those Defendants convicted of racially aggravated offences. The principles apply here equally.
Sentence
35. Without reference to the ethnicity of the housing officer, the sentence would have been one of 21 days, including the racial aggravation the sentence will be one of 28 days for breaches 3, 4 and 6 to run concurrently. There will be no separate penalty on the other four breaches number 1, 2, 5 and 7. This is the shortest possible term I can impose for repeat offending that has had a significant impact on the housing officer whom he targeted.
36. The Defendant has not spent any time in custody during these proceedings.
37. Under CPR 81.29 and considering the Sentencing Guidelines Council Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences (Definitive Guideline), I have also considered whether to suspend the term of imprisonment. Suspension is appropriate when there is a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and/or strong personal mitigation.
38. The total sentence imposed today is 28 days. In the light of the Defendant’s contrition and his personal mitigation, I will suspend that sentence for 2 years. That means as long as there are no further breaches of the injunction, that will be the end of the matter. If there are further breaches, the Court may deal with the Defendant for those further breaches as well as for these breaches that I am dealing with today, and most likely with consecutive prison sentences.
39. The Defendant understood the sentence and the likely outcome of further breaches of the Order.
40. The Claimant has not asked for an order of costs against the Defendant.
41. The injunction was made final on 9th January 2026. This means that the Defendant is subject to the restrictions in that Order until 23.59 on 8th January 2031.
42. The Defendant has a right of appeal against my sentence to a Circuit Judge. This must be received within 21 days of todays’ date and be in writing on the N161 application form.