Committal for contempt of court: Luton Community Housing Limited -v- Earl and others

Committal for contempt of courtCounty CourtJudgment

Claim number: M00LU691

In the County Court at Luton
Luton Justice Centre

5 June 2026

Before:
His Honour Judge Davies

Between:

Luton community housing limited (“squared”)

-v-

1. Christopher Earl

2. David Earl

3. Charlotte Earl

4. Roger Litchfield

    MR VAUGHAN appeared on behalf of the Claimant
    THE FOURTH DEFENDANT appeared In Person (part)
    NO APPEARANCE by or on behalf of all other Defendants


    Judgement (approved)

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    HHJ DAVIES:

    1. The first decision that I need to make now at 10.10 am is whether to proceed with this adjourned sentencing hearing in the absence of each of the defendants. I am satisfied that the defendants have been duly served with notice of today’s hearing in accordance with the Court’s previous orders. In so far as the fourth defendant was concerned, he was in court when I adjourned the matter on the last occasion and I fixed the date on that occasion. However, he has also been served with the Notice of Hearing, as have the other three defendants. There have been numerous previous hearings on this contempt application. At the substantive hearing at which I found proved a number of breaches of the injunction order made by His Honour Judge Murch, the second and fourth defendants attended court. The first defendant, Christopher Earl and the third defendant, Charlotte Earl have not attended court on any of the occasions on which the case has been listed. I adjourned the hearing on the last occasion to give the defendants one final opportunity to obtain advice or representation or to consider what material they want to put forward to the Court in relation to mitigation and no further information has been forthcoming and, nor am I told, have they been in contact with the claimant and they have not been in contact with the court.
    2. I consider the various matters, as identified in the well-known decision in Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam) dealing with proceeding in absence on a contempt application. I bear in mind that that is a decision that should not be taken lightly but, in my judgment, in this case, the defendants have demonstrated that adjourning the matter yet again is most unlikely to secure their attendance. In the circumstances, I conclude that they voluntarily absented themselves from this adjourned sentencing hearing and that the appropriate thing to do is to proceed in their absence. It does not seem to me that there is anything to be gained by putting the matter back for a few minutes on the occasions when, in particular, the fourth defendant has attended, he has attended promptly and it seems to me most unlikely that this is a case in which he is simply late.
    3. I have also considered whether the appropriate thing to do is to issue a bench warrant to secure the attendance of the defendants at the sentencing hearing but, in my judgment, it is more appropriate to deal with the sentencing hearing in their absence rather than issuing a warrant now and putting it back until that warrant is executed.

      Adjourned hearing (after the Fourth Defendant attended court)
    4. I am now dealing with the adjourned hearing of two applications to commit the defendants for breach of an injunction order made by His Honour Judge Murch on 17 June 2025 under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. At a hearing on 16 April 2026, which was attended by the second defendant, David Earl, and the fourth defendant, Roger Litchfield, but not the first defendant, Christopher Earl or the third defendant, Charlotte Earl, I found that each of the defendants breached the injunction order on the dates and in the manners set out in the applications and in the order that I made on that date. I adjourned the matter to 6 May 2026, a little under 28 days ago. At the hearing on 6 May 2026, only the fourth defendant, Mr Litchfield, appeared and told me that he had been in touch with solicitors who may be able to help him and I adjourned the case again until today. At the hearing on 6 May 2026 I extended the term of the injunction order, the terms of which I will come to in a moment, to 23:59, that is a minute before midnight, on 5 May 2027.
    5. At the hearing this morning, again only the fourth defendant, Mr Litchfield, has attended. He told me that he has not been able to obtain legal assistance and he realistically asked me to deal with the matter today. I am satisfied, for the reasons that I explained earlier on in the hearing when it appeared that nobody had attended, that notice of today’s hearing has been properly served on those three defendants who are not in attendance and that they are aware of the hearing and that the appropriate thing for me to do is to proceed to deal with the matter in their absence.
    6. The background is as follows. The third and fourth defendants, Ms Earl and Mr Litchfield, are, and have been since 2015, the claimant’s tenants of Flat 2, Frank Hamel Court, Hexton Road, Barton-le-Clay, MK45 5JT. The first and the second defendants, Christopher and David Earl are the third defendant’s adult sons. Although they are not Mr Litchfield’s biological sons, he and Mrs Earl have been together for a very long time and the first and second defendants are very much, in fact, if not in law, as much Mr Litchfield’s adult children as they are Ms Earl’s. They are all part of the family.
    7. There is a long history of anti-social behaviour by the first and second defendants at the property since 2017, if not before. The order that was originally made by His Honour Judge Murch at a hearing without notice to the defendants provided as follows. Having defined the property in paragraph one, paragraph two provided that the first defendant, Mr Christopher Earl, shall remove himself from the property within 48 hours of the order being served on him. The second defendant, Mr David Earl, shall remove himself from the property within 48 hours of the order being served on him. These 48-hour periods are intended to provide an opportunity for the first and second defendants to approach the Local Authority for such housing assistance as they may require.
    8. Paragraph three provided that upon the expiry of the 48-hour periods described in the previous paragraph, the first and second defendants were forbidden from entering any part of the property for the duration of the order. Paragraph four provided for a power of arrest to be added to paragraphs two and three of the order. Paragraph five provided as follows:
      The third defendant, Ms Earl, and the fourth defendant, Mr Litchfield, are forbidden from enabling or encouraging the first defendant or the second defendant to access, enter or remain on any part of the property for the duration of the order.

    The property, as I say, was defined in paragraph one as Frank Hamel Court, including the buildings, the car park, gardens and other land as shown outlined in red on a plan that was attached to the order. Both the order and the associated power of arrest were to last until 16 June 2026 unless revoked by further order of the Court.

    1. A return date was set for 8 July 2025, and the papers were personally served on 2 July. The only order from around 8 July that appears in the bundle or I am able to find on the court file is, in fact, an order that was made on 9 July by Judge Murch, following the arrest of the first defendant at 6pm on 8 July on suspicion of having breached the injunction order that was made on 17 June. At the hearing on 9 July, Judge Murch made no order, on the basis that the claimant informed the Court that it envisaged issuing a contempt application against each of the defendants. The claimant then issued the first contempt application on 9 October 2025, as amended on 28 January 2026 and a second contempt application on 28 January 2026.
    2. I heard the substantive hearing of the contempt applications on 16 April 2026. For the reasons given at the time, I decided to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the first and third defendants. I was invited to consider a representative sample of 10 allegations of breach of the injunction order. The second and fourth defendants respectively admitted the allegations against them. In relation to the second defendant, those allegations related to being at the property in breach of paragraph three of the injunction order on the eight occasions between 6 July 2025 and 25 January 2026, which were specifically identified in the order I made on 16 April. In relation to the fourth defendant, the allegations related to enabling or encouraging the first or second defendant to access, enter or remain at the property on the identified occasions.
    3. No admissions were made by the first or third defendants who did not attend the hearing and did not communicate with the Court. I found it proved beyond reasonable doubt that the first defendant breached the injunction order by being present at the property on the four occasions identified in the order and that the third defendant breached the injunction order by enabling or encouraging the first or second defendants to access, enter or remain on the property.
    4. At the hearing today, Mr Litchfield has told me, as is apparent from the evidence and from what has been said at previous hearings, that both the first and second defendants have serious addiction problems with crack and heroin. David, at least, has severe mental health problems and although he has another property available to him, he rarely goes to it. Christopher, Mr Litchfield has told me, has nowhere to live and is on the streets. He has told me that both he and Mrs Earl find it extremely difficult to turn away their adult sons when they come to the property seeking assistance. These are the circumstances in which the breaches of the injunction order have taken place. He has also told me that he, Mr Litchfield, has serious health problems. He has told me has got heart failure and Mrs Earl is severely disabled and rarely leaves the property.
    5. As I explained to Mr Litchfield earlier on in the hearing, the objectives of sentencing for breach of an order under Part 1 of the 2014 Act are, in this order:
      (1) ensuring future compliance with the order;
      (2) punishment; and
      (3) rehabilitation.
    6. There are five options available to the Court, in descending order of severity. They are as follows:
      (1) an immediate order for committal to prison;
      (2) a suspended order for committal to prison with conditions;
      (3) adjourning the consideration of a penalty;
      (4) a fine; and
      (5) no order.

      The maximum custodial term that can be imposed is two years imprisonment: section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. One-half of any custodial term imposed will be served in prison before automatic release under section 258 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Any time spent on remand is not automatically deducted so if credit is to be given to that, consideration should be given to doubling the period deducted and for less serious cases where other methods of securing compliance with the order have failed. A custodial sentence should never be imposed if an alternative course is sufficient and appropriate. If the Court decides to impose a sentence of imprisonment, that should always be the shortest term which will achieve the purpose for which it is being imposed. As recommended by the Court of Appeal in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA CIV 1631, I adopt the approach of giving distinct consideration to the degree of harm and the degree of culpability.
    7. Dealing with culpability first, the three levels of culpability are:
      a. high culpability, very serious breach or persistent serious breaches;
      b. deliberate breach falling a) and c); and
      c. lower culpability – minor breach or breaches.

      In my judgment, so far as each of the defendants in this case are concerned, culpability falls into category b. These are deliberate breaches. They are not minor breaches. They obviously have a significant impact on the neighbours, but they do not fall into the category of high culpability. They are not very serious breaches or persistent serious breaches and that is the case, as I say, in relation to each of the breaches and each of the defendants. In so far as the level of harm is concerned, that, as the Court of Appeal say in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council, is determined by weighing up all the factors of the case to determine the harm that was caused or was at risk of being caused by the breach or breaches and in assessing any risk of harm posed by the breaches, consideration should be given to the facts or activity which led to the order being made. The three levels of harm are:
      (1) Category 1 – very serious harm or distress;
      (2) Category 2 – cases falling between categories 1 and 3; and
      (3) Category 3 – breach causes little or no harm or distress.

    In my judgment, having re-read the evidence in support of the committal application, is this is a case towards the lower end of Category 2. It is clear that the continued presence and the continued behaviour of the first and second defendants at the property after the injunction order has been made causes some distress to the neighbours, although it does not, in my judgment, fall into the category of serious harm or distress and, indeed, it is towards the lower end of Category 2.

    1. The starting point in the case of each of these breaches and each of the defendants, on the basis of the Civil Justice Council’s proposals as adopted by the Court of Appeal in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council, is one month’s imprisonment with a category range of adjourned consideration to three months. In my judgment, these breaches are sufficiently serious in the cases of each of the defendants to cross the custody threshold.
    2. In the case of the first defendant, there are a number of breaches, no admissions and no mitigation other than what Mr Litchfield has told me on the first defendant’s behalf. In my judgment, the appropriate penalty in relation to the first defendant is one month’s imprisonment in accordance with the matrix at paragraph 54 of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council which is the CJC matrix. I have considered whether it is appropriate to give the first defendant credit for the fact that he was arrested and spent part of one day in custody before being brought before His Honour Judge Murch but, in my judgment, it is not appropriate to give credit for that.
    3. In so far as the second defendant is concerned, there are a larger number of breaches identified. However, the second defendant is entitled to credit for the admissions that he made and, in the circumstances, bearing in mind the aggravating and mitigating factors, in my judgment one month’s imprisonment is also the appropriate penalty in relation to the second defendant.
    4. In so far as the third defendant, and indeed the fourth defendant, are concerned there are significant mitigating factors. The third and fourth defendants are, I have no doubt, put in an extremely difficult position by the addiction problems of their two adult sons. However, it is their responsibility, as tenants of the property, to comply with the order and to have the courage to turn away the first and second defendants when they come seeking help. That is what the order required. It may be that, in the case of all of these defendants, what they need is help and assistance rather than punishment, but unfortunately the options available to the civil court are extremely limited. As I have said, in relation to the third and fourth defendants, bearing in mind the number of breaches and the manner in which the order has been breached, it does seem to me that the custody threshold has been crossed. Bearing in mind the mitigation in the case of both third and fourth defendants, the appropriate punishment, in my judgment, is 21 days imprisonment.
    5. I turn, then, to consider whether, in the case of one or all of the defendants, that those sentences can be suspended. I bear in mind the Sentencing Council’s guidelines, albeit in the criminal context, in relation to when it may or may not be appropriate to suspend a custodial sentence. What causes me the greatest concern in this case is the history of poor compliance with the court orders and the issue of whether, if I suspend a sentence, the orders will be complied with in the future. However, I am persuaded that at the end of the day this is a case in which it is appropriate to suspend the sentences that I have imposed in relation to each of the defendants, and to give each of the defendants an opportunity to demonstrate that, now that they are aware what the Court will do if the orders are further breached, they are capable of complying with those orders.
    6. Therefore, in the case of each of the defendants, I impose the sentences that I have indicated in relation to each of the breaches, those sentences to be served concurrently. Each of the sentences are suspended. The terms of suspension are compliance with the injunction order originally made by Judge Murch as extended by me. The term of suspension is concurrent with the term of the injunction order, so that is until 5 May 2027.
    7. In the case of each of the defendants, they have the right to apply to the Court to purge their contempt. They have the right to appeal without seeking permission or without needing permission. The appropriate route of appeal is to the Court of Appeal and the time to do that is within 21 days. I am required to and do direct that a transcript of the sentencing remarks should be obtained at public expense and should be published on a website of The Judiciary of England & Wales once that transcript has been approved by me and that should be done at the earliest possible opportunity.

    End of Judgment.