Committal for Contempt of Court: Muir Group Housing Association Limited -v- Caitlin Hardcastle
Claim No: L01MA358
In the County Court at Middlesbrough
28 May 2025
Before:
His Honour Judge Robinson BEM
Between:
Muir Group Housing Association Limited
-v-
Caitlin Hardcastle
Order
1. I am concerned today with the sentencing of Caitlin Hardcastle for admitted breaches of an injunction made pursuant Anti-Social, Crime and Behaviour Act 2014 which had been granted at the County Court at Manchester but which was then amended by District Judge O’Donnell when transferred to the County Court at Darlington. The original injunction was made on 23 April 2024 and the date it was amended was 3 June 2024.
2. By way of background, on 19 February 2025 I found Ms Hardcastle in contempt of Court for 15 breaches of the said injunction, for which I sentenced her to 150 days imprisonment less the time which she had spent on remand. Pursuant to section 258 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, on serving one half of her sentence she was to be released unconditionally.
3. The defendant, within a matter of days of being released, has committed 2 further breaches of the injunction, firstly in contacting Ms Smith who was named in the injunction and secondly by threatening her. She was duly arrested and placed before me last week on 20 May 2025 when she accepted the breaches as follows:
“On 18 May at 21:17 hours, the Defendant contacted Victoria Smith by telephone and threatened to use violence towards Victoria Smith by saying “You thought prison would stop me but I’m out now. You watch, your house is going up in flames”.
4. I was told at the hearing last week that the defendant seeks a custodial sentence. I granted an adjournment to enable those representing the defendant to gain further information in respect of her mental health which may then assist with any submissions in respect of mitigation. I remanded the defendant.
5. On the matter returning to court today I heard submissions on behalf of the claimant housing association, who submitted that the defendant was released on 15 May 2025 and that 4 days later the defendant contacted Ms Smith by telephone and threatened violence towards her. It was submitted that the serious threat of violence and the fact that the defendant has committed the offence so close after being released places the category qw A1. I was referred to the statement of Ms Smith and the wider impact by the defendant on others who have moved out of the area. It was submitted that the starting point for sentence is 6 months in custody but that there are the said aggravating factors.
6. On behalf of the defendant, it was submitted that the defendant saw a psychologist yesterday in prison and that further appointments have been arranged with her psychiatrist and a housing manager. It was said there is a plan to have a place with supported accommodation for the defendant on her release with support. I was assisted today by a report in respect of the defendant’s past mental health issues. It is suggested in that report that the defendant “appears to be belligerent generally, however, involved professional reported not seeing any behaviour from her that indicates she would harm anyone, assessing risks to others as impression ‘to simply communicate in this manner as a rule”.
7. I remind myself at the very outset of the “totality principle”. This means that any sentence which I do impose today must reflect all the findings of contempt of Court which have been found, and then stepping back and looking at any sentence it must be proportionate to the Defendant’s overall conduct. It is also the findings of contempt as set out above, and not the previous contempt for which the defendant has already been sentenced.
8. I further keep in mind throughout this analysis and my decision the purposes of sentencing. The first purpose is to ensure compliance with court Orders, notably reinforcing the injunction made, a second purpose is as a form of punishment for the breaches found and then a third purpose is to enable rehabilitation. I weigh those in the balance as I consider any sentence of the defendant.
9. With those matters set out, I move on to consider the defendant’s culpability. I find that the defendant’s culpability is high. Whilst in some respect this is a singular incident which has resulted in 2 breaches, it was a very serious breach. It was a breach which threatened arson, with all the connotations and anxiety which flows from that. It also is a breach which connects to the previous court proceedings by the words used by the defendant, referencing her period in prison. In those proceedings the defendant heard me praise the witnesses involved for coming forward, recognising the toll which I appreciated it inevitably had upon them. The words used by the defendant demonstrates she not taken heed of that and therefore has seeming no insight into her actions, a matter I will return to in a moment. I have considered whether the threat made is simply a means to communicate, as suggested within the medical report before the court. I find it may well be, effectively to cement her desire to return to a place of safety in prison where it is reported she receives support and has friends. However, that does not reduce her culpability in this regard and is more a matter to be considered by way of mitigation in a moment.
10. As to the level of harm caused by the defendant through the 2 breaches admitted and found, Ms Smith said in her statement:
“I am sick of all the threats of violence. I live in a house next to her with my husband and children, I just want to be able to live my life in peace. This is infuriating that it’s still on going and that she just continues with this. It makes me anxious and terrified for my children. I have even lost sleep over this as it makes me so on edge”.
11. Whilst sentencing of the defendant must only be for the breaches before the court, those breaches do not operate in a vacuum. When assessing the level of harm, it is important to recognise the position of Ms Smith. If one were to apply the analogy of a jug of water – the previous proceedings caused such a level of harm that the jug was overflowing. Whilst Ms Smith has had a break and the opportunity to hopefully move away from that position, and thus the water has reduced in the jug, it has not had time to reset and empty, and therefore the defendant’s actions in such proximity to those previous findings has caused that jug to potentially overflow again by way of just a little bit more water being added. The defendant must take her victim as she finds her, with all that previous history engrained in every fibre of Ms Smith. The level of harm which has been caused by the 2 breaches from the singular incident is such that it has caused very serious harm and distress to Ms Smith.
12. When looking at the guidelines in Lovett v Wigan CC [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, these findings therefore translate to a classification of 1A, with a guideline sentence range of 8 weeks to 18 months imprisonment, and with the starting point at 6 months imprisonment.
13. I find that there are a number of aggravating features. Firstly, the nature of the threat made is so significant. It is a threat of arson, one with the potential to kill. It is a threat in relation to Ms Smith’s home, which should be a place of safety. Homes are where people should be able to shut the door and relax. Whilst the medical evidence before the court indicates that there is that there is no indication that the defendant would harm anyone, to Ms Smith who has been on the receiving end that is of limited consolation not least because she is not aware of the defendant’s medical history. Furthermore, and as I have referred to, the defendant, Ms Hardcastle, has shown not one ounce of insight into the impact of her actions on Ms Smith. Whilst it was indicated last week that she did her actions to get a ticket back to prison, that does not negate the impact. It is entirely self-centred and self-indulgent. The defendant knew what she was doing, which adds further aggravation. Finally, there is the context of these proceedings and the context of the proximity to her release. When looking at the principles of sentencing which I have set out, the previous sentence has clearly had not deterrent effect.
14. In respect of mitigation, I note the submissions made in respect of the defendant’s mental health. However, there are mental health services and agencies able and willing to work outside of the prison environment, and I note the defendant has disengaged from these. Whilst the defendant presents, as per the medical information before the court, as possible having ADHD, I have no evidence as to how, if diagnosed, it presents with the defendant, recognising there is no standard presentation and each person will have their own traits and presentation. This is a case whereby the defendant has sought out Ms Smith with no reason to have done so. It is also a mitigating factor that the defendant has pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity.
15. Whilst there are 2 breaches, they relate from a singular incident and are connected by the one telephone call to Ms Smith. It has effectively been presented as a singular breach within the Order last week and in terms of sentence I proceed on that basis. I find that such are the aggravating factors, I find that from that starting point of 6 months the sentence should increase rather than decrease. The mitigation is limited as I have just noted. The mitigation has an impact in that I find it would be inappropriate to proceed to the top of the guideline bracket, but I find that a period of 8 months imprisonment, equating to 240 days, is appropriate in the circumstances in light of the aggravating factors identified. This is also consistent with the principle of rehabilitation, as it is evident that the defendant has been receiving support whilst in prison but has struggled to engage with services outside of the prison environment. Such a period of time may enable ongoing support to be provided and may assist in rehabilitating the defendant. In addition, it very clearly sends a message of the court’s approach to enforcing the injunction made in addition to punishing the defendant for her breaches of it.
16. The seriousness of the breaches is such that I find that suspension of the sentence would not be appropriate, particularly in the context of these proceedings being the second time in which the defendant comes to this court, and I consider suspension is unlikely to have any deterrent effect.
17. I therefore sentence the defendant to 240 days imprisonment. I provide her credit of a reduction of 1 third given she has accepted responsibility right at the outset, which therefore reduces this to a period of 160 days. I also give credit for the time already served. She has spent 1 day in custody when arrested last week, plus 8 days spent on remand, and therefore amounting to 9 days. Once the defendant has served one half of her sentence she is then to be unconditionally released pursuant to section 258 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In view of this, I do the maths now, and therefore double the 9 days to provide credit of 18 days, and therefore the balance remaining is 142 days.
18. I hope that within that period of custody the defendant can continue to receive support for her mental health, and that prior to her release support is put in place to prevent reoffending and to encourage her engagement with services; that will be key to prevent reoffending in the future.
19. Finally, it will be noted that on the last occasion I extended the duration of the injunction until 4pm on 2 June 2026. However, in the information submitted by the police they are under the belief it expires in 2025. The claimant must therefore ensure that an amended injunction is served upon the police to avoid any confusion in the future, although I sincerely hope that the defendant is not back before this court.
20. The Defendant is at liberty to appeal without permission within 21 days.
22. A copy of this judgment will be made available on the website for the judiciary of England and Wales. Those who instruct the defendant may also wish to ensure a copy of this judgment, along with the previous judgments, are provided to those offering assistance to the defendant whilst she is serving her sentence.