Committal for contempt of court: Muir Group Housing Association -v- Caitlin Hardcastle

CivilCounty CourtCommittal for Contempt of Court

Claim number: L01MA358

In the County Court at Middlesbrough

10 March 2025

Before:

His Honour Judge Robinson BEM

Between:

Muir Group Housing Association

-v-

Caitlin Hardcastle

Judgment

  1. On 19 February 2025 I delivered a judgment concerning the Claimant’s application for contempt of Court against the Defendant. The application centred on an injunction pursuant to the Anti-Social, Crime and Behaviour Act 2014 which had been granted at the County Court at Manchester but which was then amended by District Judge O’Donnell when transferred to the County Court at Darlington. The original injunction was made on 23 April 2024 and the date it was amended was 3 June 2024.
  2. My previous judgment was relatively lengthy and it is neither necessary nor proportionate for me to repeat it today, but I made a number of findings which I extracted and exhibited in a schedule to the Order which I made that day. Those findings were as follows:

a. On 2 May 2024 at 13:20 hours, the Defendant shouted threats including ‘giving a statement…fat…she’s next’ and pointed at Katerina Robson.

b. On 17 July 2024, the Defendant and two of her visitors went onto Katerina Robson’s drive. One visitor said ‘you’re a bastard…You’re a fucking cunt’ to the other.

c. On 4 August 2024 two visitors to the Defendant were screamingly loudly

d. On 13 August 2024, at approximately 2am, shouting, banging and a noise of running water was coming from the Defendant’s Property and the Defendant displayed disorderly conduct and was stumbled out of the Property and fell into the paddling pool in Victoria Smith’s garden. The Defendant admitted to have taken drugs.

e. On 13 August 2024 at some point in the early hours after 2am, the Defendant entered Mr. Sayer’s Property and made contact with him.

f. On 26 September 2024 at approximately 1.20am there was a loud humming static noise coming from the Defendant’s Property.

g. On 29 October 2024 at approximately 1pm, the Defendant shouted ‘fuck off you fat twat’ and stuck up her middle finger at Katerina Robson.

h. On 3 November 2024, at approximately 11.20pm, the Defendant threatened to kill her sister with a knife and this were heard in the road.

i. On 3 November 2024, at approximately 1am, the Defendant crawled over the grass in front of Victoria Smith’s Property and appeared intoxicated by drugs.

j. On 4 November 2024, between approximately 9.45pm and 3:00am, there was loud music blaring from the Property.

k. On 19 November 2024, a visitor of the Defendant kicked and banged the door of the Defendants Property.

l. On 25 November 2024 the Defendant sent a WhatsApp message to Victoria Smith.

m. On 26 November 2024 at approximately 7.20pm, the Defendant shouted and screamed at a neighbour.

n. On 26 November 2024 at approximately 7.45pm the Defendant smashed a glass over Victoria Smith’s driveway and threatened to set fire to her house.

o. On 26 November 2024 the Defendant threw an object at Victoria Smith’s house, chipping the kitchen window.

  1. Despite personal service of the proceedings and notice of hearing, the Defendant did not attend that hearing, and I adjourned sentencing so that she had the opportunity to attend and make any representations she may wish to make, which I considered afforded her the utmost fairness in respect of the proceedings. However, given her non-attendance and non-engagement in the proceedings at that stage, I issued a bench warrant to secure her attendance back before the Court.
  2. The Defendant attended last Monday having been arrested by the police last Sunday and being brought to Court. The Defendant sought legal representation and despite the best efforts none was available last Monday. I considered the case and remanded the Defendant to prison, and it returns today where I am grateful for the assistance of the legal representatives before me.
  3. I turn to consider sentencing today. I have heard no further evidence, but I have heard submissions on behalf of the parties. On behalf of the Claimant it was submitted that the Defendant’s breaches demonstrate a high level of culpability and very serious harm. It was said that there has been persistent disregard for the injunction, in addition to threats, weapons and demands on police with 75 incidents reported. It was said there has been a refusal by the Defendant to engage in rehabilitation despite opportunities and interventions. It was also submitted for an extension of a 6-12 month period extension of the injunction.
  4. On behalf of the Defendant it was submitted that the Defendant actively seeks an immediate custodial sentence. It was said that in the week on remand it has been identified that there are clear bereavement issues, and that she is accessing psychiatric support. It is submitted that she has also made some friends during the last week. It was submitted that the Defendant is only 26 years of age. It was also set out that the Defendant lost her partner in 2023, and that after that loss there was also a house fire, and that animosity began. Instead of relying on support and help it was submitted that the Defendant has put barriers in place, and that she has become entrenched in her own position. It was submitted that she has indicated she would have pleaded guilty had she attended.
  5. I remind myself at the very outset of the “totality principle”. This means that any sentence which I do impose today must reflect all the findings of contempt of Court which have been found, and then stepping back and looking at any sentence it must be proportionate to the Defendant’s overall conduct.
  6. I further keep in mind throughout this analysis and my decision the purposes of sentencing. The first purpose is to ensure compliance with Court Orders, notably reinforcing the injunction made, a second purpose is as a form of punishment for the breaches found and then a third purpose is to enable rehabilitation. I weigh those in the balance as I consider any sentence of the Defendant and I will return to them shortly.
  7. It is also important to recognise that the most serious sentence I can give today is imprisonment, but that such a sentence should only be given for the most serious of offending behaviour, but that does also include cases where there is repeated contempt.
  8. Having set those matters out by way of an introduction, I move on to consider the Defendant’s level of culpability. Firstly, there are 15 findings of contempt which have been made. There are direct threats which have been made, including of violence and arson. There is conduct which is demonstrated by the volume of evidence before the Court to have impacted a number of people. The Defendant’s conduct cannot by any stretch of argument or imagination be considered to of lower culpability or minor in nature. When moving up to the next level, being culpability following between the lower and higher end, I find that too cannot be said to be appropriate in the context of the number of breaches found and their nature. The Defendant has acted deliberately in her actions and they have been persistent. The threat made of arson is very serious indeed, with all the connotations attached to such a threat, and I find that this is a case at which there is a high level of culpability.
  9. I next turn to consider the level of harm. The breaches which are set out emanate from a number of different witnesses. They were all present in Court previously to provide evidence. Their respective evidence spoke as to the impact upon them. I find that having considered all of the evidence before me, there has been very serious harm and distress caused to a number of individuals. Again, without labouring the point, the threat of arson is very serious indeed and instilled serious harm. The other threat made, the name calling and the fact that one witness, Mr. Sayer, described not even being able to walk across the road without being “jumped” on by the Defendant, also adds to an increased level of harm. The Defendant’s behaviour is continuing to have a very high level of harm and distress. This is a case which does merit a classification of 1 by the guidelines in Lovett v Wigan CC [2022] EWCA Civ 1631.
  10. In having made such an assessment of culpability and level of harm, the guidelines indicate that the starting point for sentencing is 6 months imprisonment, with a category range of 8 weeks to 18 months imprisonment.
  11. There are a number of aggravating factors, notably the nature of the offending, the threats made, the persistent nature and the non-engagement.
  12. In terms of mitigation, the Defendant’s past and her mental health offer a degree of mitigation as to her personal circumstance, but the more significant mitigation is the insight that has come within the last week and the fact she is now engaging in rehabilitation support at prison.
  13. I return to the totality principle as I have set out, I find that a total sum of 150 days (being 5 months but I express it as days) imprisonment is proportionate and appropriate in respect of the breaches which have been found and their nature. That is also consistent with the purposes of sentencing. The Defendant has not desisted from her conduct notwithstanding the imposition of the injunction. The Court does not make injunctions lightly and in having done so the Defendant has had very little, if any, regard to it. There must be adherence to Court Orders and such a sentence is consistent with promoting that. Furthermore, the Defendant does need to be punished for the serious contempt which has been found. Even if the Defendant produced evidence to indicate she could pay a fine, a fine would not, in my view, give sufficient justice to the number of individuals who have provided evidence and set out the harm and distress caused to them. Finally, there is no indication that the Defendant can otherwise be rehabilitated in the community and has not engage with support. However, after only a week in prison she is now accessing support, so much so she actively seeks to remain in prison. The ability to access rehabilitation and support will be key in preventing reoffending in the future. Such a focus on rehabilitation, and the change in the last week, coupled is the reason for my slight downward move from the starting point of a sentence of 6 months to 5 months.
  14. I also add that when I delivered my judgment as to the findings made, I commended the number of witnesses who assisted the Court with the provision of evidence, and appreciating it was likely not ease to do so. Punishment by way of imprisonment is likely to promote the rule of law and compliance with Court Orders, and it will give a very clear message that this behaviour is not tolerated, and it may further promote witnesses coming forward in cases in the future knowing that the Court takes these matters very seriously indeed. Conversely, any other sentence is likely to undermine the rule of law given the high level of culpability and the high level of harm which I have found.
  15. I have considered whether the sentence I have passed should be suspended. Suspension of a custodial sentence can be significantly impactive and can often give an immediate shock to those who have committed contempt and who show genuine remorse. There are a number of findings of contempt. I find that the point at which suspension of the sentence could be considered appropriate has long since passed. Suspending the sentence would likely weaken any deterrent effect and would undermine the rule of law as I have already set out. Furthermore, the Defendant does not seek suspension and suspending would run contrary to the purpose of rehabilitation given that the Defendant is now accessing support whereas in the community she has been unwilling to do so.
  16. I therefore sentence the Defendant to 150 days imprisonment, less 2 days for the time spent when arrested last week (being a Sunday), plus 7 days spent on remand, and therefore amounting to 9 days. Once the Defendant has served one half of her sentence she can then be unconditionally released pursuant to section 258 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In view of this, I do the maths now, and therefore double the 9 days to provide credit of 18 days, and therefore the balance remaining is 132 days.
  17. Finally, in respect of the amended injunction dated 3 June 2024, which is due to expire at 4pm on 2 June 2025, I consider in light of the findings which have been made previously and context of this judgment, it is necessary, just and proportionate to extend the duration of that injunction until 4pm on 2 June 2026, and I do so today.
  18. The Defendant is at liberty to appeal without permission within 21 days.
  19. A copy of this judgment will be made available on the website for the judiciary of England and Wales.

His Honour Judge Robinson BEM
10 March 2025