Committal for contempt of court: Norfolk County Council -v- Stephanie Lund and HJ

Family CourtCommittal for Contempt of Court

Case number: NR23C50131

In the Norwich Family Court

25 November 2024

Before:

His Honour Judge North

Between:

Norfolk County Council

-v-

(1) Stephanie Lund

(2) HJ

MS MANTELL-SAYER appeared on behalf of the Applicant
THE FIRST RESPONDENT appeared In Person
[NO APPEARANCE by or on behalf of the Second Respondent?]

JUDGMENT
(For Approval)

This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part, other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

 
HHJ NORTH:

  1. This is my judgment in respect of an application for committal brought by Norfolk County Council against Ms Stephanie Lund (Ms L) , for alleged contempt of court in respect of Children Act proceedings related to two children, S, born [redacted] and D, born [redacted]. I direct that their names be anonymised in respect of any transcript of this judgment.
  2. Ms L is the mother of those children. By order of Recorder Hopkins made on 16 May 2024, those children live with their father under a child arrangements order and are subject to a supervision order in favour of the applicant until 11:59pm on 15 May 2025.
  3. That was a final order of the Court and includes a confidentiality warning in the usual terms, which are these:
    “Until the conclusion of the proceedings no person shall publish to the public at large or any section of the public without the court’s permission any material which is intended or likely to identify the children as being involved in these proceedings or an address or school as being that of the children. Any person who does so is guilty of an offence.
    “Further, during the proceedings or after they have concluded no person shall publish information related to the proceedings including accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge, documents filed in the proceedings, transcripts or notes of evidence and submissions, and transcripts and notes of judgments (including extracts, quotations, or summaries of such documents). Any person who does so may be in contempt of court”.
  4. The Local Authority issued its application on 24 July 2024. It came before me on 30 July 2024. At that stage, it pursued its contempt application against another woman as well, HJ, also known as DB.
  5. The Local Authority withdrew that application today, with the Court’s permission, on the basis that Ms J, or Ms B as she is otherwise known, had not been served with the order endorsed with the aforementioned confidentiality notice.
  6. I gave directions on 30 July, which included recitals inviting Ms L to remove the material which allegedly breached the Court’s order.
  7. I also provided for Ms L to file evidence upon which she intended to rely, and I listed today’s hearing.
  8. At today’s hearing, I have endeavoured to the best of my ability, and in the face of Ms Lund’s constant interruptions, to advise her of her legal rights, including her right to silence, her right to give evidence, her right to cross-examine.
  9. Previously, I made Ms L aware of her ability to seek legal representation. I advised her of the Legal Aid scheme.
  10. Putting it bluntly, my efforts have largely been in vain with Ms L because she has been steadfast in her mistaken belief that she is exempt from the jurisdiction of the Courts of England and Wales. She claims effectively some magical legal status. The arguments put to this Court, both orally and in the papers that Ms L has sent into the Court, are nothing more than pseudo-legal gobbledygook.
  11. The pseudo-legal commercial arguments have no authority in the Courts of England and Wales. Indeed, the Canadian case Meads v Meads [2021] AB QB 571 sets out key indicators of such spurious legal arguments and those spurious legal arguments are abundant in the ill founded notions put forward by Ms L, particularly in her attempts to distinguish between her, my words, “real” and “legal” persons.
  12. I cannot do better than to cite an authority from this jurisdiction, CH v SSWP [2018] UKUT 320 (AAC), at paragraph 42, where it says this:
    “The tenets and beliefs of the FOTL (Freedom of the Land) movement have been shown to have no legal basis whatsoever. The notion of a family name motif is one such pure affectation in FOTL thinking, indicative of a litigant’s purported attempt to adopt a double or split person strategy to litigation. I see no reason to indulge the Appellant in this misguided way of thinking and every reason not to permit its usage in official documents”.
  13. The arguments that Ms L has paraded before me today with her constant interruptions are meaningless and also, incomprehensible on the papers. To indulge Ms L by attempting to address those arguments would, in fact, be a breach of the overriding objective in both the Civil and Family Court Rules, because it would be wasting the Court’s resources and further encouraging Ms L not to respect the authority of the Court.
  14. I do not care what Ms L thinks about me in person. However, I do care about the authority of the Court.
  15. The specific allegations of contempt that the Local Authority seeks to prove, and it must prove them to the criminal standard, that is beyond a reasonable doubt, have been helpfully set out by their counsel at paragraph 14 of the skeleton argument.
  16. The nature of the publications is set out at paragraph 17 of the skeleton argument, in respect of what was discussed by Ms L at a meeting and was videoed and then posted to a video channel and given links on her public Facebook.
  17. I heard evidence today from the Local Authority’s team manager, Ms Kelly Green. She explained how the alleged breaches came to the Local Authority’s attention, namely through the children’s father. She spoke of the potential harm to the children, should they see this material online and she was particularly concerned about S accessing that material.
  18. The only point put to Ms Green by Ms L during cross-examination was effectively that the video recordings were taken by a third party and that the meeting was private.
  19. I have viewed the video prior to this hearing; the video having been filed by the Local Authority, and I have also read a transcript of the video, which is exhibited to Ms Green’s statement. It is an accurate transcript.
  20. Ms L offered no evidence to challenge the allegations, other than to seek to engage the Court in bogus and unintelligible legal argument.
  21. I am satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms L was served with the order of 16 May. Indeed, she exhibited a copy of that order to one of her own documents.
  22. I am further satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she has disclosed information from within these proceedings, firstly to a number of people who witnessed the video being recorded, and subsequently, that the video has been published to the wider world via a video channel and there has been further publication by Ms L by posting a link on her Facebook pages.
  23. I am further satisfied that Ms L knows and understands that by her actions she has disclosed information from within these proceedings.
  24. I urged her, in the recital to my order of 30 July, to remove that material. She has chosen not to do so other than taking the steps as explained to me by the local authority.
  25. She has disclosed confidential information as to what has transpired in Court before Recorder Hopkins although, somewhat typically, there is a misrepresentation as to what occurred or, at least, a complete misunderstanding as to why, for example, people were excluded or prevented as acting as her McKenzie Friend. Nevertheless, there has still been disclosure of material from within these proceedings, both in terms of the circumstances which led to the application for an emergency protection order, and also, very specifically, in terms of matters which took place before Recorder Hopkins, misrepresented, as they were.
  26. I am, therefore, persuaded that the Local Authority has proven the breaches, as set out at paragraph 14 of the skeleton argument.
  27. That, accordingly, is my judgment in respect of the breaches.
  28. At this stage, Ms L, you are entitled to offer to me mitigation in respect of the contempt of court that I have found you to be in.
  29. In deciding the appropriate sentence on Ms L’s breaches, I have regard to the totality principle, to ensure the sentence I impose, in respect, and I say this for the record, of the three proven breaches, as identified at paragraph 14:
    (a) Ms L has appeared in a video for the Community Law Court, whereby the public law proceedings in relation to her children were discussed in detail in front of members of the public acting as a jury.
    (b) The video was then published to YouTube on the LSB Film Productions channel. This channel has 12.2 thousand subscribers, and the video has been viewed 1,011 times as of 10:45am on 22 July 2024, that is prior to the issue of the application for a committal.
    (c) That on 15th, 23rd and 25 July, Ms L published the video on her public Facebook page”.
  30. Those are the allegations that I have found to be proven.
  31. As I have just said, it is important that I pay regard to the totality principle when applying a sentence for those breaches.
  32. The most serious penalty for contempt is committal to prison. Any such order must be for a fixed term and may not, on any one occasion exceed two years.
  33. The contemnor is entitled to unconditional release after serving half of any prison sentence.
  34. Committal serves two purposes. Punishment and secondly securing compliance. A committal may be suspended. An important matter in sentencing is whether the contemnor has caring responsibility for children or any other person that may need her support and assistance.
  35. Despite my repeated invitations to Ms L to provide me with any mitigation, she has steadfastly refused to do so, effectively telling me that she does not recognise the court’s authority. I am aware, of course, that she does not have care of the children.
  36. The Court may, in appropriate circumstances impose a fine. Generally, the Court should bear in mind the desirability of keeping a first-time offender out of prison. Imprisonment is only proportionate where there is a serious flouting of orders.
  37. The key issues are culpability and harm caused by the offending. Mitigating factors, not offered to me, can include whether there is remorse for the contempt, where there has been an admission of contempt or any belated compliance. Fortunately for Ms L, there is some evidence of belated compliance, provided to me by the Local Authority’s counsel, for which I am most grateful. I can also pay regard, obviously, to the contemnor’s character.
  38. Sadly, before me today, I see not one ounce of respect for the Court or any remorse. That is a serious matter.
  39. When I look to what factors may persuade me to sanction these breaches without a long period of imprisonment, I alight upon these. Firstly, there has been a removal of the video from the Facebook page. Secondly, and this is why I asked my questions of Ms Green, it would appear, at this point in time, the children about whom the Court is concerned, appear not to have been harmed by the breaches.
  40. I am satisfied, though, that the contempt is serious. As I have said, Ms L offers no mitigation of any substance herself. She is, though, a seemingly intelligent woman, who has been caught up in the ludicrous fictional legal world that she and others of her ilk inhabit. A custodial sentence, namely imprisonment, is warranted.
  41. I impose a sentence of 28 days. I impose that sentence, for each breach concurrently and in totality.
  42. I then go on to consider whether I may suspend the sentence. I have given careful consideration to the issue of suspension of sentence as Ms L continues to show a degree of contempt by her behaviour even at this court hearing.
  43. However, the basis upon which I suspend the order is to try to ensure further compliance with the Court’s order and so, I will suspend the order for a period of 12 months, on condition that there is no further breach of the court order.
  44. In the event of there being further publication of material from within the private Children Act proceedings, the suspended sentence will be immediately activated.
  45. I sincerely hope that Ms L will now abide by the terms of the order. If she does not, she will go to prison.
  46. Ms L has indicated to me throughout my hearing that she intends to appeal me on a number of legal matters. I say again, none of her arguments made any sense to me, but perhaps they will to a higher court. I advise her that she has 21 days to appeal my decision.
  47. My decision will be properly published in accordance with the rules. In addition, it is my understanding that the official solicitor reviews every committal order imposed by a judge in these circumstances because it is a contempt of court. Therefore, speaking directly to Ms Lund, others seek to offer some degree of protection for your person, despite the way in which you behave in Court.

End of Judgment