Committal for Contempt of Court: Sovereign Housing Association -v- David Gray
Case Number: K01BH126
In the County Court at Bournemouth
5 August 2024
Before:
District Judge Lacey
Between:
Sovereign Housing Association
-v-
David Gray
Judgment
District Judge Lacey: Thank you. This is a committal (inaudible) sentencing with regard to an antisocial behaviour injunction which was granted by this court, District Judge Lowe on 23 November 2023. That injunction, amongst other things, prevented the Defendant, Mr Gray, from entering or attempting to enter a defined area, which is attached by the way of a Google map to the injunction.
I think it’s appropriate to give a degree of history to this matter to give some context to the sentence that I am about to give. It is my understanding that Mr Gray accepts that he has breached the injunction on several occasions. The first of those, as I understand it, was an acceptance which took place before District Judge Ashby on 20 May 2024 where the Defendant, to his credit, admitted that he had breached the order by being in the exclusion zone on 19 March 2024 and also on 19 May 2024. At that time, Mr Gray had served, as I understand it, a day in custody, and therefore was released upon that occasion with no further order being made.
Later, he appeared again before this court, this time on 12 July 2024 and before District Judge Lowe. On that occasion, he again admitted to breaching the terms of the injunction by way of entering the excluded area and the exclusion zone, first on 29/06/24, second on 11/07/24 and third on 12/07/24. Again, he admitted to his credit those breaches and they were found proven by District Judge Lowe and adjourned for sentencing until 19 July 2024. On that date, Mr Gray, the Defendant, appeared before myself and representations were made as to his sentence which should have been applied to him. On that occasion, I myself adjourned the sentence for consideration for a period of three months, that is until 17 October 2024 at two o’clock at which point reconsideration would be given to the matter.
Upon the order of District Judge Lowe and myself, bail conditions were set whereby Mr Gray was to reside at his grandmother’s property, Upper Gordon Road in Highcliffe, during that time. Mr Gray was further arrested and brought before the court on 31 July 2024, this time before District Judge Ashby, and on that occasion, he faced two alleged breaches on 23 and 30 July 2024 again being within the exclusion zone. On that occasion, Mr Gray, as is entirely his right, stated that he wished to, not, not wished to admit the breaches and Judge Ashby adjourned the matter to be listed before me today not least so that consideration of the alleged breaches which were due to be considered in October could also be considered in light of the new breaches. Mr Gray on that occasion waived his right to legal advice, as of course he’s free to do so, and so we find ourselves here today. Mr Gray indicated to me at the outset of the hearing that he would like the opportunity to take legal advice. However, when I indicated to him that he would be remanded in custody whilst that took place, he took the view that he would rather deal with the matter today and has consequently waived his right to legal advice on this occasion.
Consequently, I need to consider in terms of the sentence today both the three previous breaches where sentencing was adjourned together with the two breaches which have been put to Mr Gray today and indeed that he has now admitted. As with any sentence of this kind, I need to go through the usual stepped approach and the first step is to determine the seriousness of the breaches and that very much depends on the assessments of culpability and harm. I’ve heard representations from Ms Dad in relation to that and also from Mr Gray himself.
Step one is determining the relevant category of culpability and harm, and it seems to me in the circumstances having considered this that due to the persistent nature of these breaches that the lower culpability C simply isn’t appropriate in these circumstances. The Claimants would invite me to find that this is a category A culpability case, a very serious breach, or persistent serious breaches. I am of the view that, upon this occasion, the culpability lies somewhere between the two and therefore sits in category B where it’s described as a deliberate breach falling between A and C. I say that because I’m very conscious that this is a breach whereby Mr Gray has been found in the exclusion zone. There have not been put before me, or certainly I’m not having to deal with today, any other suggestions that the injunction has been breached save for the exclusion zone.
As a result of that, I do have to consider the persistent nature and whilst I’m only sentencing for the five breaches today, I’m conscious that there was an earlier breach, or two earlier breaches which were accepted by Mr Gray which were dealt with by Judge Ashby, and given the persistent nature, it must therefore be that category B is where this falls between. As a result of that, I need to go on and consider the level of harm that has been caused with regard to weighing up all the factors of the case, and I’m conscious again that there are three categories here, breach for very serious harm or distress and then category 3 breach that causes little or no harm, distress and then category 2. I’m of the view that this again falls in the middle and is a category 2, B2. I’m not satisfied, given the nature of the breaches that it caused very serious harm and distress, but I’m conscious that it does cause distress, and they have been persistent in nature. And therefore, B2 is where we find ourselves.
Now, in terms of that, my starting point is 1 month, and the category range is adjourned consideration to 3 months. In terms of what I need to take into account, it’s the case in all matters such as this that there is a non exhaustive list of additional factual elements which I need to run through in my mind. And consideration must be given to whether any combination of these or other relevant factors should result in an upward or downward adjustment from the starting point. I must be careful not to double count factors, and I am conscious that Mr Gray has spent some time in police custody as a result of these breaches. I’m also very conscious of course that the two most recent breaches were committed very shortly after Mr Gray appeared before me and pleaded guilty to three other breaches and at a point where sentencing was adjourned, him having told me he now had got a job and him ensuring me that there would be no further breaches moving forward.
I am conscious that Mr Gray has admitted these breaches, I know he didn’t on the previous occasion but on all other occasions as I understand it, he has admitted them, and I must give credit for that to a degree. I’m not aware of any other, save for his job which I do take into consideration, but I’m not aware of any other mitigating factors with regard to his personal circumstances which I need take into account today. I therefore need to consider any reduction in the penalty for any admissions made, and there have been admissions made, albeit at the second time of asking with regard to the most recent breaches. In terms of where penalties are being imposed for more than one breach or when the response is in breach of a suspended committal, which isn’t the case here, I must give consideration to whether the total penalty is just and proportionate to the breaches in all the circumstances.
With regard to if I’m minded to issue a custodial term today, I must also give consideration as to whether it should be suspended in all the circumstances and with regard to that I would consider whether Mr Gray presents a risk or danger to others, whether the punishment is appropriate and can only be achieved by immediate custody and if there has been a history of poor compliance with orders. It seems to me that I’m not aware that an immediate custodial sentence will have a significant harmful impact on others. I note the mitigation that’s been put forward by Mr Gray himself today and the fact that he has admitted most of the breaches and indeed has again done so today. I’m also conscious of the fact that he does say he has a job now, although I have no particular evidence of it.
As a result of that, it seems to me that, in all the circumstances, it is appropriate to impose an immediate custodial term in the circumstances. I say that largely because of the fact that these have now been persistent breaches, and I’m mindful of the fact that Mr Gray was only before this court a couple of weeks ago when it was made very clear to him that there simply could not be any further breaches in the intervening period and, if there were, there would be very serious consequences. As a result of that, I have very grave concerns that, if an immediate custodial sentence is not imparted today, that that will simply lead to a further breach of the injunction which has been demonstrated by Mr Gray’s behaviour in the past and we will all end up back here again probably as a result of an arrest and that simply shouldn’t be the case in all the circumstances.
I of course do need to consider the time that Mr Gray has already spent in custody. My understanding is that his current incarceration is not with regard to these proceedings, so I need not worry myself about that, but I am conscious that, in terms of the breaches I’m dealing with today, he has been in police custody for four days in all the circumstances. Bearing that in mind and having considered that, I am still of the view that an immediate custodial sentence should be imposed and consequently, I find that you should be sentenced to a period in custody of 28 days, Mr Gray, in all the circumstances.
Now, I need to advise you that you have the right to apply to purge your contempt at any time and that permission to appeal this decision is not needed. And that, unless the government change their policy, it is likely that you will serve 14 of those 28 days. I can see you nodding. I think you’re aware of that.