Committal for Contempt of Court: Tewkesbury Borough Council -v- Billy-Joe Roper and seven others
Business and Property CourtsHigh CourtCommittal for Contempt of Court
Case No: PT-2023-BHM-000142
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
(Sitting at Birmingham District Registry)
2 January 2026
Before:
HIS HONOUR JUDGE RAWLINGS
Between:
Tewkesbury Borough Council
-v-
Billy-Joe Roper
and seven others
Judgment
HIS HONOUR JUDGE RAWLINGS:
- On 9 October last year, I found that Mr Billy-Joe Roper (“Mr Roper”), was guilty of contempt in respect of nine of the nineteen alleged counts of contempt, in relation to an injunction which was originally granted on 23 August 2023 and was continued thereafter on several occasions, with a final injunction being granted on 9 October 2025 (“the Injunction”). The Injunction relates to land at Warren Fruit Farm, Toddington, Gloucestershire, GL54 5BN (“the Land”).
- The nine breaches were counts 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 18. Count 4 was the cementing together of a brick staircase and installing a concrete breezeblock surround in the front of the caravan at Plot 6 occupied by Mr Roper a wooden extension built on the cabin on Plot 6A; count 7, the erection of a marquee or conservatory on Plot 10; count 9, laying a hard surface track at the entrance to Plot 11; count 10, siting a lorry and additional structure on Plot 11A; count 12, forming terraces on Plot 14; count 13, changing the use of Plot 20 to residential use; count 15, the erecting of timber decking on Plot 23 at the front of the cabin; and count 18, siting of a caravan on Plot 25.
- On 9 October 2025, I also granted, as I have said, a final injunction in relation to the Land. It contained both mandatory and prohibitory elements. The mandatory elements were: (a) a requirement to remove the breezeblock staircase and breezeblock surround and surface in front of Mr Roper’s caravan on Plot 6; (b) a requirement to remove the wooden extension erected on the cabin at Plot 6A; (c) removal of the firepit, children’s play equipment, trampoline and ornamental pond on Plot 6A; (d) removing the marquee structure erected on Plot 10; (e) removing a caravan sited on Plot 11; (f) removing a hanging punchbag, weights and decorative ornaments on Plot 11; (g) removing the aggregate hard surface laid on Plot 11; and, (h) remove the timber decking constructed adjacent to the cabin at Plot 23.
- I ordered that Mr Roper should complete the removal of all of those items by 4 p.m. on 14 November 2025 and that, on a date between 21 and 28 November 2025, the applicant and Mr Roper should meet to agree the extent to which the mandatory injunction had been complied with, by the removal of the eight items to which I have just referred and I gave permission for evidence to be served by 4.00 p.m. on 5 December last year.
- In an affidavit of Mr Cole, senior planning compliance officer employed by the applicant, sworn on 4 December, he deals with his visits to the Land on 23 October 2025 and 26 November 2025. In his affidavit, he refers to meeting with Zainah Salam on 23 October, who, on that occasion, was acting as representative of Mr Roper, when they discussed what works needed to be done and, in particular, the breezeblock staircase which gave access to the caravan on Plot 6. Mr Cole confirms that he agreed that the staircase itself could remain, so far as the applicant was concerned and that it would not seek to enforce compliance with the requirement to remove that staircase (at least until a planning appeal lodged by Mr Roper is determined).
- Mr Cole says that, on 26 November 2025, he met with another representative of Mr Roper, on this occasion Ms Frid to, record the extent to which the mandatory order had been complied with. Both the breezeblock staircase and surround remained in place and Ms Frid produced a letter from Mr Roper, in which he said that it was not possible to remove the surround without affecting the structural integrity of the staircase. Mr Cole’s reaction to the letter, he said, was to say that he thought that as much of the surround as possible should be removed insofar as it did not affect the structural integrity of the staircase. As to the remaining items which were the subject of the mandatory order:
(a) the wooden extension to the cabin on Plot 6A had been substantially removed but its base remained in place and Ms Frid subsequently confirmed on 1 December that the base had been removed, The firepit and pond had been removed but the metal frame of the trampoline remained buried in the ground and the metal pole remained. Ms Frid provided photographs on 1 December showing that they had been removed;
(b) the marquee structure on Plot 10 had been removed;
(c) the caravan on Plot 11 had been removed;
(d) the hanging punchbag, weights and decorative ornaments had been removed from Plot 11. As for the aggregate hard surface, part of that had been removed but the rest of it had not and Ms Frid said that Mr Densham had been tasked to remove the remainder and, on 1December, Ms Frid provided photographs showing piles of hard core formed from what had been removed from Plot 11; and
(e) the timber decking adjacent to the cabin on Plot 23 had been removed but three supporting posts remained in place and, again, Ms Frid supplied photographs on 1 December to show that those had been removed. Mr Cole says that during his visit to the Land on 26 November, he found an additional caravan on Plot 14 and discussed the matter with the occupant of that caravan. - Mr Roper did not file any witness statement or affidavit but in a skeleton argument, his representative, Mr Manu, who appeared today, said that at the meeting on 23 October 2025, Mr Cole had agreed that the staircase could remain and Mr Manu produced a report from a builder to the effect that the structural integrity of the staircase may be affected if the breezeblock surround was removed.
- Mr Waller, who appears for the applicant, has brought my attention to a number of authorities which set out the principles that I should apply in deciding what sanction to apply in relation to the breaches of an injunction. For present purposes, it is sufficient that I simply refer to the Divisional Court case of [2022] ENVLR National Highways Limited v Heyatawin and others [2022] ENVLR 17 at paragraph 49, which said as follows:
“The key general principles are as follows:
(a) The court has a broad discretion when considering the nature and length of any penalty for civil contempt. It may impose: (i) an immediate or suspended custodial sentence; (ii) an unlimited fine; or (iii) an order for sequestration of assets;
(b) The discretion should be exercised with a view to achieving the purpose of the contempt jurisdiction, namely (i) punishment for breach; (ii) ensuring future compliance with the court’s orders; and (iii) rehabilitation of the contemnor;
(c) The first step in the analysis is to consider (as a criminal court would do) the culpability of the contemnor and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused by the breach of the order;
(d) The court should consider all the circumstances, including but not limited to: (i) whether there has been prejudice as a result of the contempt, and whether that prejudice is capable of remedy; (ii) the extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure; (iii) whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional; (iv) the degree of culpability; (v) whether the contemnor was placed in breach by reason of the conduct of others; (vi) whether he appreciated the seriousness of the breach; (vii) whether the contemnor has cooperated, for example by providing information; (viii) whether the contemnor has admitted his contempt and has entered the equivalent of a guilty plea; (ix) whether a sincere apology has been given; (x) the contemnor’s previous good character and antecedents; and (xi) any other personal mitigation;
(e) Imprisonment is the most serious sanction and can only be imposed where the custody threshold is passed. It is likely to be appropriate where there has been serious contumacious flouting of an order of the court;
(f) The maximum sentence is 2 years’ imprisonment: s. 14(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. A person committed to prison for contempt is entitled to unconditional release after serving one half of the term for which he was committed: s. 258(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
(g) Any term of imprisonment should be as short as possible but commensurate with the gravity of the events and the need to achieve the objectives of the court’s jurisdiction;
(h) A sentence of imprisonment may be suspended on any terms which seem appropriate to the court.”
9. As to those factors, the breaches of planning control have continued since the original injunction was granted on 23 August 2023. The applicant has incurred a significant amount of cost and time in taking steps to enforce the injunction inspecting and re-inspecting the Land and matters connected therewith, resources which could otherwise have been used elsewhere.
10. Mr Roper says that he was under pressure, at least so far as the erection of a breezeblock staircase to his caravan is concerned, in the sense that it was necessary because of his size and mobility issues, otherwise he would not have been able to gain safe access to or exit from his caravan. I am not satisfied that that is so, a robust metal staircase, it seems to me, may have been equally suitable and the breezeblock surround, which runs the full length of the caravan, was not necessary in order to allow Mr Roper to enter and leave his caravan safely. However, as I will come to, agreement has been reached in relation to that item but it does nothing to wash away, that particular breach of the Injunction.
11. As to whether the breaches of the Injunction were carried out deliberately by Mr Roper, at least three of my findings of contempt are based upon work that was carried out at the direction of Mr Roper, namely the breezeblock staircase and surround on Plot 6 and the aggregate surface laid on Plot 11. The remaining seven items may well have been carried out by the occupants of the plots concerned but I found on 9 October that Mr Roper, notwithstanding his denials, controlled the Land and permitted those works to be carried out knowing or being reckless as to whether they amounted to a breach of the Injunction to which he was subject. There is therefore a high degree of culpability on the part of Mr Roper, although perhaps not as high as it would have been if all nine counts amounted to work that he himself personally carried out or which were carried out at his direction.
12. As to whether he appreciated the seriousness of the breaches, Mr Roper knew that the applicant was closely scrutinising what was being done on the Land and yet he still allowed, or in some cases directed, works to be carried out which amounted to breaches of the Injunction and which he knew were breaches of the Injunction, or was reckless as to whether they were.
13. As to whether he has cooperated or admitted his contempt at an early stage and the question of an apology. Mr Roper denied all the breaches throughout. It may be that in evidence which he filed late, he did not deal with some of the factual allegations which were made of breaches but he did seek to persuade me that he had an overarching defence, that he did not actually control the Land, which I rejected. Mr Roper’s approach has increased significantly the costs incurred by the applicant in dealing with the contempt application. He ought to have accepted at an early stage that he had breached the injunction in a significant number of ways.
14. In terms of an apology, there was, as I have indicated, no affidavit and no witness statement submitted by Mr Roper and, initially, there was no apology offered. Mr Manu, who appears as Mr Roper’s representative, in his skeleton argument offered an apology and today Mr Roper did offer the court an apology. In my judgment, that apology was a sincere one and I will take it into account in deciding on the appropriate sanction.
15. In light of the number of breaches of the injunction, nine, over an extended period of some two years, which amounted in my judgments to deliberate and/or reckless flouting of the Injunction which Mr Roper knew existed and knew was being closely monitored by the applicant council, I am satisfied that the threshold for imposing a custodial sentence has been crossed. Mr Manu did not dispute that that was the case but he says that any custodial sentence should be suspended, which is a matter to which I will return in due course. Mr Manu says that because of Mr Roper’s size and build, he requires significant assistance from his wife, Lorraine, to carry out normal tasks of daily life and that if he were imprisoned, both the medication that he requires and his size would mean that he would struggle significantly within the prison environment. Mr Manu suggests that Mr Roper has cooperated, so far as the mandatory element of the final injunction which I granted on 9 October last year is concerned, in that the substantial amount of works that were required to be carried out have been carried out.
16. Mr Waller, for the Applicant points to certain aggravating features, including Mr Roper’s failure to ensure that tenants did not carry out works which amounted to breaches of the injunction, his evidence, which I rejected, to the effect that he did not have control over the Land and his asserting that he has certain rights in relation to operations that were being carried out on the Land, in particular the laying of hard core without ensuring that he was entitled to do so. All of those, Mr Waller says, are aggravating features.
17. Whilst I accept that Mr Roper’s size and build may make it difficult for him to carry out the tasks of normal daily life, I do not have before me any medical evidence which supports a finding that Mr Roper would suffer particular difficulties or injury to his health if he were to be subject to a period of imprisonment and the submissions made by Mr Manu do not persuade me that it would not be appropriate to impose a term of imprisonment, having regard to the matters of mitigation that he raised with me.
18. I find, for those reasons that the appropriate period of imprisonment, making allowance for the matters that have been put forward in mitigation, is six months. I need to consider, however, whether it is appropriate to suspend that period of imprisonment and, for the following reasons, I consider that it is appropriate to do so:
(a) there was an apology from Mr Roper, which I took to be a genuine apology; and
(b) there has been substantial compliance with the mandatory terms of the injunctions I granted on 9 October last year; and
(c) there is, I consider, a realistic chance that if I impose a period of suspended imprisonment, Mr Roper will comply with the terms of the Injunction going forward.
19. So far as that suspension is concerned, the suspension will last for the period of two years, which means that during that period, Mr Roper is at danger of having his suspended sentence triggered should he fail to comply with the terms of the Injunction. He must also comply with the remaining terms of the mandatory injunction of 9 October 2025, insofar as he has not done so (save for the breezeblock staircase and breezeblock surround which the Applicant no longer presses for compliance with, namely: (a) the removal of the hard core piles that have been created (but not removed) following the removal of hard core from the surface of Plot 11; and (b) the removal of the timber which has remained behind on the Land, following the demolition of timber extensions to cabins, demolished in compliance with the mandatory injunction, but again not removed from the Land.
20. Three caravans must be removed from Plot 14, but this, it appears is more difficult and I will invite submissions from Mr Waller as to how we deal with that in the order, given that Mr Manu has told me that whilst two of the caravans might be removed within a given timescale, the third may not because the occupant is resisting attempts to remove her from the Land. So I will hear submissions as to what timescales may be imposed in relation to those three caravans.