Committal for Contempt of Court: The Financial Conduct Authority -v- Iain Clifford Stamp
Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWCR 8
Case No: U20250864
In the Crown Court at Southwark
In the matter of Iain Clifford Stamp (also known as Iain Clifford) and in the matter of an application pursuant to Rule 48.9 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020
30 July 2025
Before:
His Honour Judge Baumgartner
Between:
The Financial Conduct Authority
-v-
Iain Clifford Stamp (also known as Iain Clifford)
Judgment
HIS HONOUR JUDGE BAUMGARTNER:
1. In a judgment handed down on 16 July 2025 ([2025] EWCR 6), I found each of the nine allegations of contempt made by the Applicant against Mr Stamp proven.
2. I must now impose upon Mr Stamp a punishment appropriate for his contempts, having allowed him time to make representations to the Court relevant to punishment and a final opportunity to apologise in accordance with Crim.PR r.48.10(4). Mr Stamp has not made any such representations, nor has he sought to purge his contempts by way of apology, or, indeed, to comply with the disclosure obligations in the Restraint Order or restitute any of the assets which he has dissipated.
3. As with the hearing of the contempt allegations on 28 May 2025 and 30 June 2025, Mr Stamp failed to appear before the Court today for this hearing. He has, however, caused to be posted to the Court a document entitled “Notice of Objection and Non-Consent” in which he rejects the judgment as unlawful. In another document sent to the Court entitled “Affidavit of Rebuttal of Judgment and Notice of Constructive Trust Fraud” dated 21 July 2025 he says has been forced into exile in “North Cyprus” and makes a number of other claims. Like Mr Stamp’s other “notices” to which I referred in the judgment, these two documents seek to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, and, like his other challenges, much of the two documents are non-sensical and difficult to understand. There is nothing in them worthy of more detailed consideration, observation, or finding by this Court. All they show is that Mr Stamp is willing to engage with this Court only on his terms, but, as I observed in the postscript to the judgment, Mr Stamp is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and he must comply with its lawful orders.
4. What is plain from all this is that Mr Stamp is aware of these proceedings but has chosen voluntarily to absent himself from them, including today’s hearing. As such, I am sure that he has waived his right to be present today. I have considered whether I should adjourn this hearing and issue a warrant for Mr Stamp’s arrest so that he could be brought before the Court. In doing so, I considered the checklist of matters set out by the House of Lords in Jones [2001] QB 862 as a guide to inform my decision. Previously, Mr Stamp had said he was in Indonesia; more lately, he says he is in the north of Cyprus. Whatever the true position, it seems to me highly unlikely that Mr Stamp will return voluntarily to this jurisdiction if indeed he is outside of it, given the findings I have made against him, and if I issued a warrant for his arrest (as Roth J did with the contemnor in Frejek v Frejek [2020] EWHC 1181 (Ch)) there is no information before me as to when or where it might be executed. Considering the general public interest that contempt proceedings should take place within a reasonable time, I consider it is in the interests of justice to proceed today to punish Mr Stamp in his absence.
5. The statutory purposes of sentencing set out in s.57 of the Sentencing Act 2020 do not apply in the civil contempt jurisdiction. In such cases, the purpose of sentencing was explained in JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko [2012] 1 WLR 350, where the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) found that the appropriate sentence for a defendant who had deliberately failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of a freezing order was 21 months’ imprisonment. Jackson LJ (with whom Lord Neuberger MR and Carnwath LJ agreed) explained, at [45], that:
“The sentence for such contempt performs a number of functions. First, it upholds the authority of the court by punishing the contemnor and deterring others. Such punishment has nothing to do with the dignity of the court and everything to do with the public interest that court orders should be obeyed. Secondly, in some instances it provides an incentive for belated compliance, because the contemnor may seek a reduction or discharge of sentence if he subsequently purges his contempt by complying with the court order in question.”
6. The key general principles in relation to sanction for contempt of court were summarised in the judgment of Johnson J in HM Solicitor General v Yaxley-Lennon [2024] EWHC 2732 (KB) at [33]-[44]. There the learned judge (at [45]) cited the approach advocated by the Supreme Court ((Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Hamblen and Lord Stephens JJSC) in HM Attorney General v Crosland [2021] 4 WLR 103:
“1. The court should adopt an approach analogous to that in criminal cases where the Sentencing Council’s Guidelines require the court to assess the seriousness of the conduct by reference to the offender’s culpability and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused.
2. In light of its determination of seriousness, the court must first consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty.
3. If the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will suffice, the court must impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt.
4. Due weight should be given to matters of mitigation, such as genuine remorse, previous positive character and similar matters.
5. Due weight should also be given to the impact of committal on persons other than the contemnor, such as children or vulnerable adults in their care.
6. There should be a reduction for an early admission of the contempt to be calculated consistently with the approach set out in the Sentencing Council’s Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.
7. Once the appropriate term has been arrived at, consideration should be given to suspending the term of imprisonment. Usually the court will already have taken into account mitigating factors when setting the appropriate term such that there is no powerful factor making suspension appropriate, but a serious effect on others, such as children or vulnerable adults in the contemnor’s care, may justify suspension.”
7. Those general principles were also summarised by Dame Victoria Sharp P and Chamberlain J in National Highways Limited v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078, at [49].
8. Crim.PR r.48.10(4) also provides that, in deciding how to deal with Mr Stamp, I must take into account the gravity of the contempt, the extent of any admission of the conduct and the stage at which that admission was made, and any apology and the stage at which that apology was offered.
9. As the Court held in Solodchenko, any deliberate and substantial breach of the restraint provisions or the disclosure provisions of a freezing order – which, I note, is an order akin to a restraint order – is a serious matter which normally attracts an immediate custodial sentence, although there may be circumstances in which a substantial fine is sufficient, e.g. if the contempt has been purged and the relevant assets recovered. Where there is a continuing failure to disclose relevant information, the court should consider imposing a long sentence, possibly even the maximum of two years, in order to encourage future co-operation by the contemnor, and may see fit to indicate what portion of the sentence (a) should be served in any event as punishment for past breaches, and (b) might be remitted in the event of prompt and full compliance thereafter, although such indication, while persuasive, would not be binding on a future court. I shall take that approach.
10. I turn to consider Mr Stamp’s culpability and the harm caused, intended, or likely to be caused.
11. In my judgment Mr Stamp’s culpability is high: there are nine separate contempts covering non-compliance with the disclosure requirements under the Restraint Order and the dissipation of significant assets. These are fundamental requirements to ensure that a Restraint Order is an effective remedy. Mr Stamp has behaved deliberately and intentionally from an early stage, in full knowledge of the requirements of the Restraint Order.
12. As far as harm is concerned, there is clear harm to the rule of law and the administration of justice. As Johnson J said at [27] in Yaxley-Lennon:
“In a democratic society underpinned by the rule of law, court injunctions must be obeyed. A party who has lost a case is entitled to appeal, or to disagree with the result, or to criticise the decision. But they are not entitled to disobey a court injunction. Nobody is above the law. Nobody can pick and choose which laws, or injunctions they obey, and which they do not. Even if a person is convinced that an injunction was wrongly granted, or is contrary to their views, or is contrary to what they regard as the weight of the evidence, they must comply with the injunction unless or until it is discharged. They are not entitled to stand as a judge in their own cause. Otherwise, the administration of justice and the rule of law would inevitably break down. It is in the interests of the whole community that court injunctions are obeyed, so that the rights and freedoms that are enjoyed by individuals can be protected and enforced.”
13. Mr Stamp considers that the Restraint Order does not apply to him. His contempt harms the administration of justice.
14. His conduct has and continues to frustrate the purpose of the Restraint Order, which is to ring fence assets so that they might one day be available for confiscation. He has dissipated significant assets on luxury items, as a result of which any future confiscation order or compensation order may be rendered less effective. His contempts are continuing.
15. Mr Stamp was born on 31 December 1965. He is 59 years old. He has no previous convictions. There is no evidence before me of any previous positive good character aside that. He has not admitted his contempts. Rather, much to the contrary, he has pursued an untenable argument that the Restraint Order does not apply to him. He has shown no remorse, nor has he attempted to purge his contempts by restoring the assets dissipated or complying with the requirements of the disclosure obligations.
16. These contempts are so serious that only custodial sentences can be justified for them. I am therefore going to pass sentences of imprisonment. These will be the shortest which match the seriousness of Mr Stamp’s contempts and the mitigating factors in his case.
17. The nine separate contempts fall broadly into two categories. The first six are failures to comply with the disclosure obligations of the Restraint Order. The last three are dissipating assets in breach of the Restraint Order. The appropriate sentence for each for the first six contempts is 4 months’ imprisonment for each contempt, concurrent on each to reflect totality.
18. The seventh contempt – dissipating realisable property on living expenses – is in breach of paragraph 9 of the Restraint Order. The sentence for this contempt is 1 months’ imprisonment. The eighth and ninth contempts are more serious. The eighth contempt concerns breaches over a five day window in July 2023, and a sum of £2,377.34. The ninth contempt involves behaviour over a much longer period, some 15 months, and a significant amount of money, some $320,000. The sentence for the eighth contempt is 1 months’ imprisonment. The sentence for the ninth contempt is 8 months’ imprisonment. The sentences for the seventh to ninth contempts will be served concurrent to each other but consecutive to the first six contempts to reflect totality and to achieve a just sentence overall to properly reflect Mr Stamp’s contemptuous behaviour.
19. The total sentence therefore is one of 12 months’ imprisonment.
20. I considered whether I should suspend the term of imprisonment, but there is nothing before me to justify taking that course.
21. I must consider what portion of that sentence should be served in any event as punishment for past non-compliance and what portion might be reduced or discharged in the event of prompt and full compliance in the future. As Jackson LJ said in Solodchenko at [66]-[67], the shorter the punitive element of the sentence the greater the incentive on the contemnor to comply. There is, however, a public interest in requiring contemnors to serve a proper sentence for past non-compliance with court orders, even if those contemnors are in continuing breach. The punitive element of the sentence both punishes the contemnor and deters others from disregarding court orders.
22. In my judgment, the punitive portion of the sentence in respect of Mr Stamp’s past non-compliance should be 4 months’ imprisonment. It remains open to Mr Stamp in the event of prompt and full compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Restraint Order in the future and to restitute what he has wrongly dissipated to apply to the Court to vary the sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.
23. The total period of committal is 12 months’ imprisonment. Mr Stamp will serve one half of that sentence in prison, pursuant to s.258(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The sentence will not begin to run until Mr Stamp is taken into lawful custody, whether that be of his own choice or otherwise. I will issue a bench warrant for his arrest.
24. Mr Stamp has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) pursuant to s.13(2)(bb) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, read with s.53(2)(b) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. He does not require leave to appeal against this judgment.