Committal for Contempt of Court: The Local Authority -v- B
Case Number: SE22C50343
In the High Court of Justice
Sitting at Leeds
Family Division
2 October 2025
Before:
Mr Recorder Howe KC
Between:
The Local Authority
-v-
B
Order
RECORDER HOWE KC:
1. This is an application brought by a Local Authority. I am saying “a Local Authority” as the purpose of the orders that, on 9 September 2025, I found the Defendant to be in breach of, was to protect the anonymity of the child and the confidentiality of those proceedings. Holding this hearing in public would defeat the purpose of the orders made. The Local Authority applied pursuant to Rule 37.8(4) for the contempt hearing to be held in private. I accepted those submissions on 9 September, and I determined that that hearing should be heard in private. The same application was made today, which I granted for the same reasons as those given on 9 September. In summary, to identify either the Local Authority or the child by hearing the case in public, or by giving a judgment that is not suitably anonymised, defeats the object of the orders.
2. The hearing on 9 September was not attended by the Defendant. I took some time tracing through the evidence before me, to satisfy myself that the Defendant had been properly served with notice, firstly, of the order of 23 December 2023 itself, and then secondly, with notice of a hearing that took place before Henke J on 29 July. She was satisfied the Defendant had been properly served and had notice, and he did not attend. Having reviewed the evidence concerning service on him of the 9 September hearing, I too was satisfied that the Defendant had been properly served. He failed to attend despite having written to the Local Authority about that hearing, and indeed, having written to the Court. However, he did not attend to pursue any application to adjourn, and I determined it was appropriate to proceed in his absence.
3. I then scrutinised the evidence provided by the Local Authority. The author of the affidavits in support of the application attended remotely and gave some brief oral evidence. I found 13 of an alleged 47 breaches to be proved. It was only 13 as I took the view that, as the alleged breaches were all of a very similar nature involving the use of social media to publish photographs and information about the child and/or the proceedings, it was not necessary to make findings on all 47 allegations. It was my view findings on more than a selection opf sample allegations was unlikely to affect sentence. The Local Authority reviewed its position and pressed a reduced number of allegations. I found 13 of those allegations to be proved, and I found two not to be proved.
4. I then adjourned the proceedings from 9 September to today, 2 October, for sentence. My order provided, as had been directed previously, that the order would be served on the Defendant by substituted service to his email address and by WhatsApp. I listed the sentencing hearing at 10.30am today, 2 October, with a time estimate of two hours. The order states this at paragraph seven:
“In the event that [the Defendant] does not attend the hearing, he may be sentenced in his absence for the contempt the Court has found to be proved. That sentence may include the Court imposing a custodial sentence, imposing a fine or making an order for the seizure of assets.”
5. A direction was made for the Defendant to provide a statement of mitigation. It did not compel him to do so. This is a contempt hearing with quasi-criminal sanctions. He has a right to public funding because he faces, potentially, a custodial sentence, and has a right to silence. Therefore, my order was permissive and for him to file a statement in support of any mitigation he wished to raise. Indeed, paragraph nine of my order states that any statement would be in addition to any mitigation presented orally to the Court. The order, at paragraph 10, invited the Defendant to obtain legal representation.
6. The Local Authority was directed to serve a copy of the order on the Defendant, together with a letter reminding him of his entitlement to free legal representation. I have the affidavit of service. The email serving the Defendant was sent at 12.30 pm on 15 September. I also have copies of the WhatsApp messages, also on 15 September at 17.09, so, one hour and nine minutes beyond the time restriction that I imposed, but given the emails were sent earlier in the day, the delay of one hour and nine minutes to the duplicate service by WhatsApp, in my judgment, causes no prejudice. There has been a period between that service and today’s hearing of two weeks and three days.
7. I find that the Defendant has been properly served with my order and has notice of today’s hearing. Indeed, the Defendant has responded by email to the service of the order. I will turn to the contents of those responses shortly, but it is clear that the Defendant is aware of the content of the order and is aware of this hearing today. In an email that he sent to the Local Authority at 17.33 on 15 September, he says this:
“I take the liberty of sending this to Leeds Court, who are now a party to your fraud. See attached letter dated 4 September 2025 notifying me of the hearing on 9 September 2025, expecting me to have time to get a solicitor and prepare a defence after no advance notice. I believe there was a hearing on 29 July 2025. Nobody informed me of any judgment in that hearing until 10 September 2025. I rest my case!.”
8. The only credible reading of that paragraph is that the Defendant is aware of the content of the order. It is in an email chain in which the order was served. On 9 September, I considered the emails sent by the Defendant prior to reaching my conclusions. I was satisfied that he did have ample notice of the hearing, and as I said in my judgment that day, whilst he expressed the desire for that hearing to be adjourned in emails to the Local Authority and to the Court, he did not make any application formally to adjourn. Certainly, no order to adjourn the proceedings was made. He has not attended today. I do not see, in the emails attached to the affidavit produced by the Local Authority proving service of the order for this hearing, that there is even the suggestion by the Defendant of an application that would be made by him to adjourn the hearing today. My clerk has attended public areas in this building. The order is clear; it is in this building that this hearing is to take place. The Defendant is not here.
9. I have read written submissions on behalf of the Applicant Local Authority. The Local Authority does not press for any particular sentence to be imposed. I asked the Local Authority what it would identify as the aggravating features of this case and of the contempt. Fairly, in my judgment, the submissions on behalf of the Local Authority have been that it simply wants the Defendant to comply with the order. The Local Authority is unhappy with the content, and the constant flow, of communication it receives from the Defendant, but that is not, as was accepted by counsel for the Local Authority, a breach of the order and is not a Contempt of Court.
10. Also, the Local Authority points out that the content of the emails, sent by the Defendant in response to receipt of the order, identifies his belief that this Court has no authority over him. He has not attended today to make that case to me. He has not made any formal application in response to the order of 9 September. I have to consider whether it is fair to proceed to sentence him in his absence. Having found that the order of 9 September has been validly served, and that the Defendant is aware of its terms and has communicated the same via email to the Applicant, yet has failed to attend, I am satisfied that it is necessary and fair to proceed in his absence. I found him to be in contempt of court. This is the third hearing in these contempt proceedings he has failed to attend despite each judge being satisfied that he had valid notice.
11. Turning to the sentencing task, I am reminded of the appropriate approach to this task by considering a judgment given by Mr Justice Cobb, as he was then. In Elkndo v Elsyed (Committal: Sentence) [2024] EWHC 2230 (Fam) at paragraph 11 onwards, the learned judge provides a summary of the approach that the Court should take. He says:
“11. I have had regard to the provisions of Part 37 of the Family Procedure Rules (‘FPR 2010’). I have considered the guidance offered by Hale LJ, as she then was in Hale v Tanner [2000] 2 FLR 879. I have further studied the judgments of Peel J in Bailey v Bailey (Committal) [2022] EWFC 5; of Nicklin J in Oliver v Shaikh[2020] EWHC 2658 QB (QB) (at [14]-[21]); and of MacDonald J in Allami v Fakher [2023] EWFC 29.
12. I approach my task having regard to the following points:
i) There are two objectives in contempt of court proceedings. One is to mark the Court’s disapproval of the disobedience to its order. The other is to secure compliance with that order in the future. Thus, the seriousness of what has taken place is to be viewed in that light as well as for its own intrinsic gravity (Hale v Tanner (above) at [29]);
ii) The disposal of this application must be proportionate to the seriousness of the contempt;
iii) In imposing the penalty, I have wide powers of sanction: per Rule 37.4 and Rule 37.9(1) FPR 2010;
iv) I may impose a sentence of up to two years’ imprisonment (Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 14(1)), or a fine of an unlimited amount. If I impose a sentence of imprisonment, it is open to me to order that execution of the committal order can be suspended for such period or on such terms as I consider appropriate (Rule 37.28 FPR 2010);
v) The length of any sentence of imprisonment should be decided without reference to whether or not it is to be suspended;
vi) The length of the committal has to bear some reasonable relationship to the maximum of two years which is available;
vii) I have not assumed that imprisonment is the automatic punishment for breach of a Family Court order;
viii) I have not assumed that a contemnor should not be imprisoned for a ‘first offence’; each case turns on its own facts;
ix) Where imprisonment is contemplated, the Court needs to be satisfied that the contemnor’s conduct is so serious that no other penalty is appropriate. Imprisonment is a measure of last resort.”
12. I found the Defendant to be in contempt of court on 13 separate matters. Those dates range from 23 December 2023, so just a few days after the order was made, until 22 May 2025. It is, in my judgment, an aggravated feature of the Defendant’s contempt that he has been in repeated breach of the order over such a significant period of time. I have, this morning, again reviewed the postings of each of those 13 occasions. They are posted from the Defendant’s social media account. They post photographs of the child, naming the child as the child of the Defendant, clearly identifying the child in that way. They identify the Court which was conducting the Family Court proceedings. They name the social worker involved in those proceedings, and they name the judges involved in those proceedings and in any appeals conducted from those proceedings. Those postings are clear. They identify the child, they identify the proceedings, and they identify the court where the proceedings are taking place. They identify professionals involved in those proceedings.
13. I do not treat what is said about the judges as an aggravating feature. Litigants often have clear views about judges that find against them. The purpose of the order was to protect the child and protect the confidentiality of the proceedings. The purpose of the order was not to protect judges from criticism, however unwarranted that criticism might be. However, I note that there have been no successful appeals from the orders made in the proceedings. Indeed, the Defendant was made the subject of an extended civil restraint order on 21 March 2024. Within that order, the Defendant was reminded of the need to comply with the order of 19 December 2023. It is, in my judgment, an aggravating feature that, despite that very clear warning, some four months after the original order was made, that the Defendant continued to breach it.
14. It is clear to me that the Defendant has very strong views about the outcome in the Family Court proceedings. He has very strong view as to the fairness of those proceedings and of the conduct of the Local Authority, Local Authority staff and the Judiciary, describing them as “corrupt” at various times. However, there is some mitigation. There has been no further posting, the Local Authority informs me, since 22 May 2025. I have to consider whether the contempt that I found to be proved, despite being “a first offence” for contempt, is so serious that only a custodial sentence is appropriate and meets the aims or the objectives of marking the Court’s disapproval of the Defendant’s disobedience of its orders, and to secure compliance with the orders.
15. Given the prolonged nature of the contempt, in my judgment, only a term of imprisonment is the punishment that meets the needs of this case. The repeated breach of the order when, in my judgment, there can be no doubt that the Defendant knows the terms of the order and whose conduct in breach of the order is deliberate and repetitive irrespective of the consequences, is a very serious matter. Court orders are there to be respected. The purpose of this order was to protect this child’s confidentiality, both in terms of the child’s appearance appearing on social media and in terms of preventing information about the proceedings appearing in public, be that on social media or anywhere else.
16. The Court must mark its disapproval, and the sentence required is a significant one because compliance with this type of order is essential if these most private proceedings are to remain private enough to protect the interests of the children. Details about Family Court proceedings are now more routinely published in the media. However, the identity of the subject children is protected. Breaches of these orders have not protected the identity of this young person. Therefore, the only sanction, having considered the range and having considered the maximum penalty of two years, recognising as I must, that this Defendant has been in repeated breach between 23 December 2023 and 22 May 2025, is a term of imprisonment. In my judgment that should be for a period of four months.
17. I then have to consider whether it is appropriate to suspend that term of imprisonment. The purpose of a suspension in these circumstances is to make clear to the Defendant that this Court expects this order to be complied with. By “this order”, I mean the order of 19 December 2023. To ensure that the Defendant is clear as to the consequences of further breaches when he reads a transcript of this judgment, it is right for me to explain that if there are further breaches that a Court finds proven to the criminal standard of proof, the Defendant will fall to be sentenced for those additional breaches. Additionally, he then faces the suspension of the sentence that I have imposed today being lifted, and, therefore, any term of imprisonment for those new breaches would be in addition to the four months I have today imposed.
18. The emails sent to the Local Authority that are attached to the affidavit of service for today’s hearing demonstrate no understanding by the Defendant that this Court has authority to impose sanctions and shows no understanding that previous applications by the Defendant to challenge orders in family proceedings have failed. Writing to the Local Authority in the terms that he does is not effective in resolving his complaints about the Court and Local Authority decision-making. Although the Defendant’s attitude as evidenced in those emails appears to be poor, he has not breached the order since 22 May 2025. It is now 2 October. That is not an insignificant period of time in the history of these proceedings and the contempt that I have found to be proved. It is for that sole reason that I will suspend the term of imprisonment I have imposed.
19. The order made on 19 December 2023 is an order that expires at 11.59pm on 17 December 2029. It is now October 2025. I have considered whether I should suspend sentence to the very last date of that order, given the extended period over which contempts have occurred. However, the Local Authority could have, and I have to say some might have thought should, have brought contempt proceedings much earlier than they did. That absence of enforcement action seems to have been viewed by this defendant as freedom to breach repeatedly and nothing being done about it.
20. In my judgment, suspending a term of imprisonment for over a four-year period, in my judgment, is not proportionate given there has now been a period of some four and a half months since the last act of contempt. I will, therefore, suspend the term of imprisonment for a period of two years from today.
21. I have found there was 13 breaches of the order. All of them are serious. All of them risk breaching the child’s confidentiality and the confidentiality of the proceedings. I do not consider that any one breach is more or less serious than the other. Therefore, the term of imprisonment shall be four months for each of the breaches to run concurrently.
22. The Local Authority has made an application for costs. The Local Authority relies on the decision of Jackson LJ in Attorney General v Dowie [2022] EWCA Civ 1574, which says the following:
“The award of costs is an exercise of wide discretion governed by the general principles of Part 44 of the Civil Procedure Rules of reasonableness and proportionality. Contempt cases are not in some special category; see Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean [2022] EWCA Civ 661, following Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15. In these cases, and others before them, it was held that costs will normally follow the event in committal proceedings and the contemnor will normally be ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings in addition to any penalty imposed. However, the Court will seek to make an order which is fair and just and reasonable in all the circumstances. It may consider the contemnor’s means when making an order for costs, but it is not required to do so.”
23. I have not been provided with an assessment of costs form that includes the costs of today’s hearing. I did receive a costs form for the hearing on 9 September. I am not sure if that is an oversight or if one has been prepared. On that basis that the form has not found its way to me, the Local Authority is not seeking additional costs today. The Local Authority seek a sum of £5,000 in costs. There have been three hearings in these proceedings. The email traffic generated has been substantial. Counsel has been instructed for each hearing. I did review the statement of costs that was prepared on the last occasion, and, having adjourned sentencing to today, it was not appropriate for me to consider costs until now. I do consider it today. In my judgment, the sum of £5,000 is, in fact, a modest sum to be claimed. For this application, the rates charged in the schedule are reasonable. Counsel’s fees are reasonable. The work undertaken has been necessary. The breaches have been found proved. The Defendant has not attended. In my judgment, it is fair, just and reasonable in all the circumstances to make a costs order against the Defendant in the sum of £5,000.