Committal for Contempt of Court: Thirteen Housing Group -v- Gerard Shaw
Claim No: L00MB107
In the County Court at Middlesbrough
8 January 2025
Before:
His Honour Judge Robinson BEM
Between:
Thirteen Housing Group
-v-
Gerard Shaw
Judgment
1. This is a judgment in proceedings in respect of contempt of court following a hearing held in public today.
2. The Respondent has not attended today. I am grateful for the attendance and assistance of his Counsel. The Respondent was aware of today’s hearing. I note from the submission made that he was spoken to yesterday by his legal team. However, the telephone message which his Counsel has received today was that he has the flu and has been informed by his GP to stay at home. However, there is no evidence of the same before the Court and I note it was not a matter referenced to his legal team yesterday. These proceedings have already been adjourned last month. I determined earlier in this hearing today to proceed in the absence of the Respondent. I have balanced his right to a fair hearing, but a fair hearing has been afforded to him by plenty of notice of today’s hearing and by the previous adjournment. Furthermore, the Respondent does have the benefit of Counsel representing him today who confirmed he is able to make meaningful submissions. I also note the number of occasions at which the Respondent has not attended hearings in these proceedings. The impact of adjourning further, even with a bench warrant issued, will lead to delay and further costs. Balancing all those matters together, I am satisfied to proceed in the Respondent’s absence today.
3. By way of the briefest background, the Applicant social housing provider was granted an injunction against the Respondent pursuant to the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Police Act 2014 by Deputy District Judge Armstrong on 8 February 2024.
4. The application for contempt now before the court for alleged breaches of that injunction was supported by a witness statement of Ms Darley who is an “ASB Resolution Lead” for the Applicant, and her statement, dated 12 September 2024, sets out a number of allegations.
5. In previous hearings the Respondent’s capacity was explored, and directions were given in relation to that. It has since been confirmed by Dr Green (a Consultant Forensic Psychologist) that the Respondent does have capacity to engage in these proceedings.
6. This case came before me on 17 December 2024 and on that occasion, and by agreement, I adjourned the matter until today on account of the Respondent making a report to police at the time of the hearing, and accepting the submissions before me that the Respondent was vulnerable and required police assistance at that time.
7. The Respondent has provided a statement in response to the application for contempt of court, in which he makes the following admissions, and such admissions are accepted by this Court and are therefore found to be proven breaches:
a. On 2 August 2024 the Respondent played excessively loud music, was abusive to staff and threw rubbish in communal areas.
b. On 5 August 2024 the Respondent played excessively loud music, was abusive to staff and threw rubbish in communal areas.
c. On 6 August 2024 the Respondent played excessively loud music, was abusive to staff and police and threw rubbish in communal areas.
d. On 27 August 2024 the Respondent played excessively loud music.
e. On 29 August 2024 the Respondent played excessively loud music.
f. On 11 September 2024 the Respondent played excessively loud music and intimidated other residents by knocking on doors and shouting at 4am.
g. On 12 September 2024 the Respondent played excessively loud music.
8. One breach which was not pursued today, and was not admitted, is in relation to the Respondent’s arrest following the allegations of breach of the injunction. I agree with the Respondent’s response that such an arrest was not a breach of the injunction, and rather it was a consequence thereof.
9. In therefore having accepted those admissions and the breaches being proven, I must go on to consider matters of sentencing.
10. On behalf of the Applicant it was submitted that there is a high level of culpability given persistent breaches. It was said that whilst there is no serious harm, this is not a case where there is simply minor harm either. I was invited to consider extending the injunction in any event.
11. On behalf of the Respondent it was submitted that the Respondent had admitted his guilt at the first time of asking (because matters of capacity had first been explored). I was helpfully taken to the medical evidence before the Court, and submissions were made on the same. It was submitted further that ‘the lightbulb’ moment for the Respondent has occurred just before Christmas, when the Respondent had been the victim of a theft or robbery with a degree of intimidation and threats of violence, and the Respondent has now engaged fully with the police to provide a statement and support a prosecution, as he now has insight that he has been taken advantage of. It was submitted his previous lack of insight and vulnerabilities are linked to his previous behaviours which are the subject of these proceedings. As to the level of offending, it was submitted that on its own it would not amount to a criminal offence, albeit the breach of Court orders is itself serious. I was invited to draw back from any immediate custodial sentence, particularly given Dr Green’s report about the impact of custody on the Respondent. It was also submitted that the Respondent cannot meaningfully argue against an extension of the original injunction given the breaches.
12. I thank both Mr. Ross and Mr. Wood for the careful submissions, and their assistance in these proceedings.
13. At the outset I remind myself of the purpose of sentencing, which is firstly to ensure compliance with Court Orders, notably reinforcing the injunctive order made, secondly as a form of punishment for the breaches admitted and found and then thirdly it is for rehabilitation. I weigh those in the balance as I consider sentence and will return to them shortly.
14. The starting point is to consider the Respondent’s culpability. The Respondent says his actions were in protest of his girlfriend not being permitted to stay. I find that demonstrates an entirely selfish and self-absorbed response. In seeking to protest he must have known his actions would cause harm to others, as else his purported protest would have been meaningless. Even if I were persuaded the Respondent did not appreciate the impact of his behaviour, it was reckless, particularly when looking at the times he was playing loud music – he must have known it would have had a detrimental impact on others who would have been reasonably sleeping or otherwise resting at those times. The injunctive order was plain as to what he must not do, yet he chose to proceed nonetheless. When assessing by the guidelines in Lovett v Wigan CC [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, I do not consider it can be classified as high culpability given the nature of the breaches, but nor is it lower. It falls somewhere between the two. I find that the classification is therefore at B, being deliberate breaches falling between the higher and lower end.
15. When next coming to consider matters of harm, the breaches, whether individually or collectively, have negatively impacted on the lives of many people, and on one occasion at 4am in the morning. Such behaviour impacts on people’s quiet enjoyment of their homes, it disrupts sleep, their lives and productively. The Respondent’s actions have profound consequences. There have been repeated breaches. Taking all the circumstances into account, the level of harm cannot be said to be minor, but equally it is not at the higher end, and once again falls somewhere within the middle, at category 2 on the Lovett classification.
16. On this assessment the starting point is 1 month in custody, but with a range of adjourned consideration to 3 months in custody.
17. I have considered whether there should be any sentence at all, but such is the nature of the culpability and harm as I have set out, that no sentence would undermine the rule of law and would fail each purpose of sentencing as I have set out.
18. I have considered whether sentencing should be adjourned today but given that the Respondent has admitted the majority of breaches in advance of today, noting that the parties are represented, to adjourn would only be to delay – and I already adjourned given the Respondent was unable to attend the hearing in December as I have already set out. I have the evidence before me today in which to be able to proceed. There is no unfairness in proceeding, and leaving the issue hanging over the Respondent may be more detrimental to him, and equally it may be detrimental to the Applicant as it would leave uncertainty as to resolution as well as incurring further costs in returning.
19. The next potential option available to me is a fine or confiscation of assets. I do not consider that a fine is appropriate in this case. The Respondent is of limited financial means and has a number of health problems such that his earning capability is currently limited. A fine would likely exacerbate social mobility and his ability to meet basic daily needs, particularly given the economic climate and the general cost of living. It would be disproportionate to place him in that position. I have considered more nuanced orders for confiscation of assets, such as the equipment which may be the cause of the noise, but to do so would firstly not necessarily prevent further breaches, unless every possible device was removed (and even, then there would be nothing preventing the Respondent from obtaining replacements). Such devices, including a television, are a means of accessing information, they can bring enjoyment and they are part of modern living – an Order stripping them from the Respondent’s home would likely isolate and may negatively impact upon his mental health.
20. I therefore turn to custody. As noted above, the threshold is crossed, and the starting point is 1 month in custody.
21. I consider aggravating factors in this case. I do consider the repeated breaches are an aggravating factor in this case in addition to the failure to adhere to warnings and support being offered to change his behaviour.
22. In respect of mitigation, I note the Respondent’s mental health and learning difficulties. I note that the Respondent accepts his behaviour and that he accepts that it will not be tolerated. Further mitigation is that the Respondent has seemingly been exploited.
23. I find the aggravating and mitigating factors offer a cancellation effect to one another, and therefore I am not persuaded to deviate from the starting point I have set out.
24. I must step back and consider sentence for each individual breach. The first 3 breaches occurred in relatively close proximity to each other, and a sentence of 3 days imprisonment is appropriate for each breach. Thereafter, for the remaining breaches, and noting the escalation, a period of 7 days per breach is appropriate. Then when standing back and looking at the totality, I find the appropriate total sentence is one of 30 days imprisonment, which again corresponds with that starting point I have just set out.
25. I do consider whether this sentence should be reduced to reflect what is effectively an early guilty plea. The Respondent did provide his statement dated 15 November 2024 in which admissions are made as I have set out. There was understandably a delay in the sense that issues of capacity need to first be explored. In all the circumstances, I take a reduction of third for his early plea, which would make a final sentence of 20 days.
26. Stepping back and looking holistically again at the sentence, I consider that is an appropriate sentence in response to the breaches.
27. I must finally consider whether I should suspend the sentence. I have already referenced the Respondent’s mental health and learning difficulties. They do not provide an automatic pass to avoid a custodial sentence, but I link back to where I started in terms of the objectives of sentencing. In view of those difficulties which the Respondent has, alongside his admissions and his acceptance of his behaviour, and noting that he has a positive relationship with his social worker – there is real scope for meaningful rehabilitation. The sentence, being suspended, will also act as a meaningful deterrent to the Respondent, whilst also punishing him. Conversely, if an immediate custodial sentence was offered all the good work with his social worker might be undone, along with any other support which he is accessing, for example the support from the police I have referenced. A custodial sentence would therefore lead to a disproportionate punishment, punishing him by way of deprivation of his liberty but then further by eroding all the progress made in respect of his private life. Balancing all those matters together I will therefore suspend the sentence today until 4pm on 8 January 2026, and in doing so I also make a further Order extending the injunction until the same date. I find such an extension is reasonable, proportionate and necessary in the circumstances and notably given the repeated breaches, and by way of context it provides protection to the Applicant for 12 months from today and is an 11 month extension on the original injunction granted. A copy of that injunction will be drawn up today and the Applicant can arrange personal service of the same on the Respondent along with this judgment, which I will provide in written form to enable him to read what I have said.
28. I do pause and say directly to Mr. Shaw, albeit he will need to read this or have it read to him, I have provided you an opportunity today to avoid going straight to prison. I urge you to reflect on your past behaviours, to continue your positive relationship with your social worker, to build positive working relationships with those at Thirteen Housing Group and not to be back in Court. You need to focus on all the good things and surround yourself with good people. You are in control of your behaviour, and I sincerely hope I do not see you in the dock again.
29. The Respondent is at liberty to appeal without permission within 21 days, and those who represent him today will be able to advise him further in that respect.
30. A copy of this judgment will be made available on the website for the judiciary of England and Wales.