Committal for Contempt of Court: Thurrock Council -v- Watts

County CourtCommittal for Contempt of Court

Claim Number: L00BQ097

In the County Court at Basildon

26 July 2024

Before:
His Honour Judge Duddridge

Between:
Thurrock Council
-v-
David Watts

Judgment – Contempt of Court

Before His Honour Judge Duddridge sitting at the County Court at Southend, The Court House, 80 Victoria Avenue, Southend-on-sea, Essex, SS2 6EU.

Upon hearing Counsel for the Claimant and Counsel for the Defendant

JUDGMENT – CONTEMPT OF COURT

IT IS ORDERED THAT

  1. On 14 February 2024 DJ Callaghan granted an injunction against Mr Watts. The injunction included terms prohibiting Mr Watts from being in a number of excluded areas, including Fredrick Andrews Court, Silverlocke Road, Grays, RM17 6EA. Frederick Andrews Court is a sheltered housing scheme. The evidence before the District Judge was that Mr Watts was not a tenant or legal occupant of any property in that scheme and that
    the exclusion zone was required to protect vulnerable female residents from domestic and other abuse and exploitation. The injunction was continued by order of HHJ Holmes on 13 March 2024. Dated 26 July 2024
  2. On 17 July 2024 Mr Watts was arrested at an address in Frederick Andrews Court. He was produced before DDJ Williams sitting at the County Court at Basildon on 18 July. The Deputy District Judge’s order recited that Mr Watts admitted breaching the injunction. The Deputy District Judge adjourned the hearing until today and remanded Mr Watts in custody.
  3. This is the sixth occasion on which Mr Watts has been arrested at Frederick Andrews Court since the injunction was granted and the third occasion on which he has appeared before me to deal with such breaches. On 17 May 2024 I ordered that Mr Watts be committed to prison for a total of 28 days for four breaches of the injunction. Following his release he was arrested at the premises again on 7 June 2024 and remanded in
    custody. On 24 June 2024, I determined that the appropriate penalty for the breach was committal to prison for a period of one month but released him on that date taking account of the 16 days he had spent on remand.
  4. On each occasion Mr Watts admitted the breach in question at the earliest opportunity, as he did before DDJ Williams last week. However, he could not sensibly deny it as he was arrested within the exclusion zone.
  5. I have considered the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Christopher Lovett v Wigan Borough Council (2022] EWCA Civ 1631 that the objectives in sentencing for contempt of court are, in this order: (i) ensuring future compliance with the order; (ii) punishment; and (iii) rehabilitation. I have also considered the range of possible orders set out in paragraph 40 of the Court of Appeal’s judgment and the CJC’s guidelines reproduced at paragraph 54 of that judgment.
  6. Although I have imposed previous custodial penalties, Mr Watts has continued to breach the order. It is clear that he does not intend to obey it.
  7. The matters that I consider most relevant to culpability are: the first breach for which Mr Watts was arrested was on 5 April 2024, less than four weeks after the order dated 13 March 2024; Mr Watts has persistently breached the injunction despite being arrested and brought before the Court; he has continued to breach the injunction despite having been committed to prison on two previous occasions; the most recent breach was less than four weeks after he appeared before me on 24 June 2024; and on that occasion I warned him that he could expect to receive a substantial custodial penalty if he breached the injunction again.
  8. Although I recognise that Mr Watts is homeless, that does not reduce his culpability. He is clearly aware of the terms of the injunction and knows that going to Frederick Andrews Court is in breach. On both 17 May 2024 and 24 June 2024 the Claimant told me that he had failed to engage with support they had offered him. I have been told by Counsel today that he has not tried to obtain such support from the Council since 24 June 2024. I told him on both 17 May 2024 and 24 June 2024 that his circumstances did not excuse him breaching the injunction . Mr Lancaster told me that Mr Watts had gone to the property to retrieve personal possessions and fell asleep. Although I have no evidence to contradict that, it is not a reasonable excuse for breaching the order, in particular when the consequences of doing so had been made clear.
  9. Given the frequency and persistence of the breaches despite previous arrests and committals I find that this breach falls within bracket A for culpability.
  10. So far as harm is concerned, there is no evidence that Mr Watts caused any specific harm to any particular resident on this occasion and Mr Lancaster submitted that he had not caused any harm, but I note that he was found at the home of one of the female residents of Frederick Andrews Court. The injunction was granted precisely to protect such residents from him. Furthermore, it is in the nature of the harm that the injunction seeks to protect such residents from that it may not be reported and is difficult to detect.
  11. I therefore find that harm is high category 2 because the breach undermines the very purpose of the injunction and places vulnerable residents at risk of the harm that the injunction seeks to protect the from.
  12. The starting point for category A2 in the CJC guidelines is an immediate custodial penalty of 3 months, with a range of adjourned consideration to 6 months.
  13. Although I have taken into account the persistence of Mr Watts’ breaches in respect of the culpability category, the repeated breaches in the face of the previous committal orders and clear warnings of the consequences of breach is a substantial aggravating factor.
  14. So far as mitigation is concerned, Mr Watts’ admission at the earliest opportunity attracts little credit given he was arrested on the premises and therefore could not sensibly deny the breach, and that he has repeatedly defied the order and shown that he does not intend to keep it. His homelessness is not a mitigating factor in circumstances where he has not taken any steps to obtain support to address it.
  15. I find that the appropriate penalty is within the upper part of the range given for category A2. Before taking into account the time spent on remand in custody, I would impose a penalty of 20 weeks. I am satisfied that an immediate custodial penalty is required and that the penalty should not be suspended, given the past breaches despite previous custodial penalties and that Mr Watts will, in my judgment, inevitably breach the order again if any penalty is suspended. Mr Watts has spent one week in custody so I will reduce the penalty to 18 weeks to reflect that. Under the law as it currently stands, Mr Watts will serve half of that time in prison.
  16. I have given Mr Watts a copy of this decision today.
  17. As my order will record, Mr Watts has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal without needing permission.

Order

Before His Honour Judge Duddridge sitting at the County Court at Southend, The Court House, 80 Victoria Avenue, Southend-on-sea, Essex, SS2 6EU.

UPON hearing Counsel for the Claimant and a Solicitor for the Defendant

AND UPON the Defendant being produced to the Court following his arrest for breaching the Anti-Social Behaviour Injunction made by District Judge Callaghan on 14 February 2024 and continued by order of HHJ Holmes dated 13 March 2024

AND UPON the Defendant have been arrested on 17 July 2024 and produced before DDJ Williams on·18 July 2024 who adjourned the proceedings to today and remanded the Defendant in custody

AND UPON the Defendant having admitted to DDJ Williams that he breached the injunction, the breach being that he entered the exclusion zone at Frederick Andrews Court

AND UPON this being the sixth occasion on which the Defendant has been arrested for breaching the Anti-Social Behaviour injunction

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

  1. The Defendant be committed to prison for 18 weeks.
  2. The Defendant has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal against this order without requiring permission.