Committal for Contempt of Court: Universal Leasing Limited -v- Dayrit (T/A Lana T Dayrit LDN)
Case Number: K02EC988
In the County Court at Clerkenwell and Shoreditch
11 August 2025
Before:
His Honour Judge Richard Roberts
Between:
Universal Leasing Limited
-v-
Dayrit (T/A Lana T Dayrit LDN)
Order
HHJ RICHARD ROBERTS:
Introduction
1. This is the hearing of an application for the committal to prison of Lana Theresa Dayrit for breaches of orders of District Judge Bell, sitting at this court on 13 September 2023 and 27 June 2024.
2. There is a committal bundle and reference to page numbers in this ex tempore judgment are to the committal bundle.
3. The claimant, Universal Leasing Limited, is represented by counsel, Mr Joshua Cullen. Ms Dayrit has not attended this hearing. I am satisfied that she was served with notice of today’s hearing in accordance with an order that was made by District Judge Hayes on 24 March 2025 and drawn on 25 March 2025 (pages 81 to 83). I note that she has played no part in these proceedings, and has not attended any hearings. The defendant did not attend the hearing before District Judge Hayes on 24 March 2025 or the hearing before Deputy District Judge Hye-Jong on 7 May 2025, order drawn on 29 May 2025 (77 to 78).
4. Next, I consider is whether there has been service of the amended committal application and evidence upon the defendant. Before me is a witness statement of Bill Stevens, a process server, of 8 December 2023 (46), and he says that:
i) on 29 November 2023 he attended the defendant’s residence to effect service of the order of DJ Bell, dated 13 September 2023 (drawn 23 November 2023) but failed to meet anyone.
ii) On 5 December 2023 at 18:55 he returned to the defendant’s residence but failed to meet her.
iii) On 7 December 2023 he emailed the defendant with the documents to hellolanadavrit@email.com and hello@ldskin.co.uk. He called the mobile number 07891 638622 but received no response.
5. There are three witness statements of another process server, Nigel Walker. His first statement is dated 5 September 2024, and he says he attempted to serve the defendant at her residence at 7 Broomfield, Ferdinand Street, London, NW1 8ED on 16, 21 and 27 July with the order of District Judge Bell of 5 September 2024 when a penal notice was added to the order, but he was unable to serve the defendant. He says that he arranged to see the defendant at her business premises at 123A Kentish Town Road, London, NW1 8BP on 2 September 2024 at 6.30pm. He says he attended as arranged, but the defendant did not attend.
6. Then, there was an application by the defendant for alternative service, and by an order of 25 October 2024 drawn on 9 December 2024, Deputy District Judge Wright ordered,
“1. The claimant be granted permission to serve the orders of District Judge Bell dated 13 September 2024 and 27 June 2024 on the defendant by the following means:
a. By first class post sent to 7 Broomfield, Ferdinand St, London NW1 8ED; and
b. By first class post to unit 4, 123A Kentish Town Rd, London NW1 8PB.”
7. By a letter dated 5 November 2024 (31 and 61), the claimant’s solicitor sent to the defendant at her business premises address, at Unit 4, 123A Kentish Town Road, London, NW1 8BP:
a. The order of District Judge Bell of 13 September 2023
b. The order of District Judge Bell of 27 June 2024;
c. The order of Deputy District Judge Wright of 25 October 2024.
8. Mr Walker, the process server, has provided a second witness statement, dated 18 March 2025 (66 to 67) detailing his attempts to serve the defendant with the order of District Judge Bell dated 27 June 2024, the order of District Judge Beecham of 21 February 2025 (95), and the contempt application (1 to 10):
a) He attended the defendant’s residential premises address on 7, 8 and 11 March 2025. He was unable to obtain a reply.
b) On 7 March 2025, Mr Walker inserted a written note through the letterbox asking the defendant to call him on his mobile number. The defendant did not do so.
c) On 11 March 2025, he inserted a second note through the letterbox asking the defendant to call him on his mobile number. The defendant did not do so.
d) On 12 March 2025, at 3pm, he attended the defendant’s business address. He did not obtain a reply, and he left a written note at the address asking the defendant to call him on his mobile number. Again, she did not do so.
9. The claimant made an application dated 18 March 2025 (35 to 40) for an order that service be permitted by posting the adjourned hearing date and a copy of the claimant’s contempt of court application to the defendant’s residence, complying with CPR 71.3(1). The application was supported by a witness statement of Georgina Hannah-Jolly of 18 March 2025 (41 to 44) and an exhibit “JH1” (45 to 69).
10. By an order of 24 March 2025 (81 to 83) District Judge Hayes ordered:
“3. Permission to the Claimant to serve the amended contempt application, the evidence in support, this order – together with the Important Notice attached – and (if separate from it) any notice of hearing on the Defendant by alternative means namely:
(a) By sending the same by post addressed clearly to the Defendant to Flat 7, Broomfield, Ferdinand Street, London, NW1 8ED; and
(b) By sending the same by post addressed clearly to the Defendant to Unit 4, 123a Kentish Town Road, London 8PB; and
(c) By sending the same by email to the email address for the Defendant held by the Claimant.
Each of the three methods above must be used and the Defendant will be deemed served 2 working days after the last of the steps required by those methods is taken.
4. The Claimant shall serve the documents referred to at 3 above on the Defendant at least 14 days before the next hearing.”
11. Mr Nigel Walker has provided a third witness statement dealing with his attempts to serve the defendant, dated 10 April 2025 (70). He refers to three occasions when he has attempted to serve personally the defendant:
a) On 29 March 2025 at 08.30, he attended the defendant’s residence, but he was unable to obtain a reply. He inserted a written note through the letterbox asking the defendant to call him on his mobile number.
b) On 3 April 2025 at 7.15am, he attended the defendant’s residence, but he was unable to obtain a reply.
c) On 7 April 2025 at 8am, he attended the defendant’s residence but was unable to obtain a reply. He inserted a written note through the letterbox asking the defendant to call him on his mobile number.
12. There are two certificates of service signed by Georgina Hannah Jolly, both dated 1 May 2025. In the first (71) she says she has served by email to the two email addresses of the defendant (hellolanadavrit@email.com and hello@ldskin.co.uk):
a) The court order of 25 March 2025;
b) The amended contempt of court application;
c) The court order of 21 February 2025.
There is also a certificate of the same date (73) that she served the same documents by first-class post to both the defendant’s residence and the defendant’s business premises at Flat 7.
13. I conclude that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that defendant has been served with the amended contempt of court application notice and evidence in support of the application. in accordance with the orders of the Court, and the notifications of all court hearings, including the present hearing.
Non-attendance by defendant
14. The defendant has not attended this hearing. I have considered whether I should adjourn today’s hearing to give the defendant another opportunity to attend. I have considered JSC BTA Bank v Alexander Yu Stepanov [2010] EWHC 794 (Ch), a decision of Roth J. His Lordship said, at paragraph 11:
“The Court has jurisdiction to hear a contempt application in the absence of the defendant in exceptional circumstances. In Lamb v Lamb [1983] FLR 278, Oliver LJ, in his judgment in the Court of Appeal, said this:
‘… I see the danger of hearing any application for committal for contempt, which is, after all, a quasi-criminal proceeding, ex parte. It is, I think, established that it is something that should only be done in exceptional circumstances, but the question is always one for the discretion of the judge who has to hear the matter. He has to balance the desirability of making an immediate hearing, the urgency of the matter, and so on, against the possibility that the evidence before him may not be complete …’”
15. Then, at paragraph 12, he continued:
“Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings, as Oliver LJ there emphasises, and they are criminal proceedings for the purposes of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I was therefore referred to consideration by the House of Lords as to when a criminal trial can take place in the absence of the defendant. This was in the case of R v Jones (Anthony) [2002] UKHL 5 [2003] 1 AC 1. There their Lordships approved, with one qualification, the guidance given in that case in the Court of Appeal in a judgment of the Court delivered by Lord Justice Rose, R v Hayward [2001] QB 862. The Court of Appeal, after noting the general right of a defendant to be present at his trial and indeed to be legally represented, and the discretion of the trial judge to proceed without him, said this (at para. 22):
‘That discretion must be exercised with great care, and it is only in rare and exceptional cases that it should be exercised in favour of a trial taking place or continuing, particularly if the defendant is unrepresented. In exercising that discretion, fairness to the defence is of prime importance, but fairness to the prosecution must also be taken into account. The judge must have regard to all the circumstances of the case …’.
The Court of Appeal then set out various factors to be considered, which I read, omitting the one that was disapproved by Lord Bingham on appeal in the House of Lords:
‘(1) The nature and circumstances of the defendant’s behaviour in absenting himself from the trial or disrupting it, as the case may be and, in particular, whether his behaviour was deliberate, voluntary and such as plainly waived his right to appear;
(2) Whether an adjournment might result in the defendant being caught or attending voluntarily, and/or not disrupting the proceedings;
(3) The likely length of such an adjournment;
(4) Whether the defendant, though absent, is, or wishes to be, legally represented at the trial or has, by his conduct, waived his right to representation.
(5) Concerns an absent defendant’s legal representations, which does not here apply.
(6) The extent of the disadvantage to the defendant in not being able to give his account of events, having regard to the nature of the evidence against him.
(7) Concerns the risk of the jury reaching an improper conclusion about the absence of the defendant, and so obviously does not apply; and (8) refers to the seriousness of the offence.
(9) The general public interest and the particular interest of victims and witnesses that a trial should take place within a reasonable time of the events to which it relates’”.
16. I have borne in mind that this is an exceptional course to take to hear a committal application in the absence of the defendant. It is one for the discretion of the Court. I bear in mind that there has been deliberate and flagrant evasion of all attempts to serve the defendant since 2023. I find that by absenting herself from this hearing and indeed from failing to engage in the committal application at all and by evading service, the defendant has thereby waived her right to appear or be legally represented. I find that this case involves a flagrant and deliberate breach of an order requiring the defendant to return equipment to the claimant. In my judgment, an adjournment would serve no purpose because the defendant would not attend a future hearing. There would be further delay and further expense to the claimant, and it is overwhelmingly likely that one would be in the same position.
17. I say that, having regard to the very long and protracted attempts to serve the defendant, all of which have failed. It seems to me that now is the time to deal with this matter. As is often said, justice delayed any further is justice denied. For these reasons, I consider that it is appropriate for this Court to take the exceptional course and hear this application in the absence of the defendant.
Contempt
18. Dealing with the liability for the contempt, by an order made by District Judge Bell on 13 September 2023, drawn on 23 November 2023 (8 to 9), the defendant was ordered inter alia “to return a HydraFacial, serial number HMD19053206 forthwith”.
19. By an order of 27 June 2024, drawn on 28 June 2024 (23 to 24), District Judge Bell added a penal notice to the previous order stating:
“To the Defendant, Lana Theresa Dayrit T/A Lana T Dayrit LDN, a penal notice is attached to paragraph 1 of this order.
If you, the Defendant, disobey this order you may be held to be in contempt of Court and may be imprisoned, fined or have your assets seized.
Any person who knows of this order and disobeys this order or does anything which helps or permits any person to whom this order applies to breach the terms of this order may also be held in contempt of Court and may be imprisoned, fined or have their assets seized.”
20. The claimant has filed a general form of affidavit from Georgina Hannah-Jolly dated 25 December 2024 (11). At paragraph eight, Ms Hannah-Jolly says, “As the Defendant has not complied with the Order…”, and that is the order of District Judge Bell, “…of 13 September, as subsequently amended to include a penal notice”. Ms Hannah-Jolly says at paragraph 10:
“I exhibit certificates of service in respect of those letters. Despite this, there has been no response from the Defendant. The Defendant is in contempt of Court for not having complied with the Order of District Judge Bell 13 September 2023 and the Penal Notice Order”.
21. I conclude that the claimant has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant has failed to comply with District Judge Bell’s orders of 13 September 2023 and 27 June 2024 and has not returned to the claimant the HydraFacial equipment and is thereby in contempt of court.
Sentence
22. As District Judge Bell’s order is an injunction made by a civil court, the objectives in sentencing for breach are the ones applicable to civil contempt, namely, and in this order:
a) Firstly, ensuring future compliance with the order,
b) Secondly, punishment; and
c) Thirdly, rehabilitation.
23. In Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, Birss LJ, giving the judgment of the court, gave guidance as to sentencing for contempt of court. Birss LJ referred at paragraph 54 of his judgment to the guidance of the Civil Justice Council based upon the Sentencing Council’s scheme for breaches of criminal behaviour orders. It can be seen from there that the Court, in looking at a grid, look at the breach in terms of culpability and in terms of harm.
24. In terms of culpability, I find that this case falls within Category B, namely, “Deliberate breach falling between A and C”. In terms of harm, I find that this case falls within the lowest bracket, Category C, “Breach causes little or no harm or distress”. Therefore, the case falls within the grid as follows: starting point: adjourned consideration; category range: adjourned consideration to one month.
25. In this case, I consider that the custody threshold has been passed because this is a flagrant breach of an order of the Court to return equipment to the claimant. The breach is longstanding. The order was made on 13 September 2023, drawn on 24 November 2023 and served shortly thereafter.
26. I consider that the least number of days’ imprisonment that the court can impose before considering mitigating and aggravating factors is 14 days. I consider 14 days to be proportionate, bearing in mind that this is a deliberate and flagrant breach and the defendant has not engaged with the committal proceedings.
27. The defendant has not served any evidence in the committal proceedings. She has evaded service and has not attended this hearing. As a consequence there is no mitigation before the Court.
28. I find that an aggravating factor is the defendant’s evading of service and failure to attend the hearing today. However, I find that these aggravating factors do not provide a good reason to increase the length of the sentence from 14 days.
29. I have considered whether this sentence should be suspended, and I have concluded that it should not. There has been no engagement with the committal proceedings by the defendant at all. There is no evidence from the defendant. The defendant has evaded service and not attended any of the court hearings, including this hearing. I find that suspending the sentence would not be a just outcome and would serve no purpose.
30. I will include in the order an order for the immediate arrest and removal of the defendant to prison to serve the 14-day sentence of imprisonment.
31. The defendant has a right to appeal this order to the Court of Appeal. The defendant does not need to seek permission to appeal, and the time limit for appealing this order is 21 days from today.
32. I direct that this judgment be provided to:
a) The Judicial Office, at Judicialwebupdates@judiciary.uk, for publication on the website of the Judiciary of England and Wales
b) The national media, via the CopyDirect service, (e-mail to alerts.service@pressassociation.com).
33. I order:
1. In respect of the breach of the orders of District Judge Bell, dated 27 June 2024, the Defendant is sentenced to committal to prison for 14 days.
2. The Claimant shall serve a copy of this Order upon the Defendant by:
a. By sending the same by first class post addressed clearly to the Defendant to Flat 7, Broomfield, Ferdinand Street, London, NW1 8ED; and
b. By sending the same by first class post addressed clearly to the Defendant to Unit 4, 123a Kentish Town Road, London 8PB; and
c. By sending the same by email to the email address for the Defendant held by the Claimant.
3. The warrant of committal will be served by the Court upon the Defendant by first class post to the Defendant to Flat 7, Broomfield, Ferdinand Street, London, NW1 8ED and Unit 4, 123a Kentish Town Road, London 8PB.
4. The Defendant is ordered to pay the Claimant’s costs of the court hearings on 7 May 2025 before DDJ Hye-Jong (order drawn 29 May 2025), on 24 March 2025 before District Judge Hayes and on 11 August 2025 before HHJ Richard Roberts. The costs are summarily assessed in the sum of £5,270.30 and are payable by 26 August 2025.
5. There be an expedited transcript of the judgment produced by the Court and published on the website of the Judiciary of England and Wales in compliance with CPR r81.8(8).
6. As this Order was made in the Defendant’s absence, the Defendant may apply to have this Order set aside or varied. Any such application must be made to the County Court at Clerkenwell & Shoreditch by 4pm on 25 August 2025.
7. In accordance with CPR 81.8(7) the Court hereby informs the Defendant that she has a right to appeal this Order to the Court of Appeal without the need to request permission to appeal. The time limit for appealing this Order is 21 days from the date of this order. Pursuant to CPR 52 Practice Direction 52D paragraph 9.1, the Defendant must serve the notice of appeal on the County Court at Clerkenwell & Shoreditch in addition to the Claimant.