December 4, 2025

DGC -v- Chief Constable of Surrey (anonymity order)

Administrative Court High Court King's Bench Division Anonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-003463

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

19 November 2025

Before:

The Hon. Mrs Justice Brunner

Between:

The King
on the application of
DGC
(by her Litigation Friend, DMK)

-v-

Chief Constable of Surrey

Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 23.12, 54.11, 54.12)

On application by the Claimant for permission to apply for judicial review, and for interim relief

and following consideration of documents lodged by both Claimant and Defendant in relation to both applications

ORDER BY THE HON. MRS JUSTICE BRUNNER

Anonymity:

(a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:

(i) the Claimant and Litigation Friend’s name are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and

(ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing by the cipher as DGC, Litigation Friend as DMK.

(b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or Litigation Friend or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of either in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.

(i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or Litigation Friend;

(ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or Litigation Friend, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;

(iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party may obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

(d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.

2. Litigation Friend:

DMK is acting as Litigation Friend, having followed the procedure in CPR 21.5 to become a Litigation Friend without a court order.

3. Permission:

Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.

4. Application for interim order:

The application issued on 29 October 2025 for an interim order requiring the Defendant to take various steps in the investigation is refused.

5. Application for closed material:

The application for DGC’s healthcare plan and other medical records to be withheld from the Defendant is refused.

6. Costs:

The Claimant must pay the Defendant’s costs of preparing the Acknowledgement of Service and Summary Grounds of Defence, summarily assessed in the sum of £2981.76.

7. Further provision as to costs:

(a) Within 14 days of the date of this Order, the Claimant may file and serve a notice of objection (maximum 3 pages) showing why the order in paragraph 6 should not be made. The notice should include any objections to the principle that costs

(b) should be paid and/or as to the amount assessed.

(c) If the Claimant does not file and serve a notice of objection within that period, paragraph 6 is a final order and the Claimant must pay the sum specified within 14 days of the date of this Order (in accordance with CPR 44.7(1)(a)).

(d) If the Claimant files and serves a notice of objection in accordance with (a) above:

(i) the other party may, within 14 days after the date on which the notice is served, file and serve submissions in response (maximum 3 pages);

(ii) if the other party files and serves on the Claimant submissions in response, the Claimant may, within 7 days after the date on which the other party’s submissions in response are served, file and serve reply submissions (maximum 3 pages);

(iii) the Court will determine what costs order to make on the papers;

(iv) any costs ordered must be paid within 14 days of the date of the Court’s order (in accordance with CPR 44.7(1)(a)), unless the Court specifies another date.

8. Renewal directions:

Where the Claimant makes a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below), the following directions apply:

(a) The permission hearing is to be listed with a time estimate of 1 hour, including submissions by the parties and an oral judgment by the judge. If the Claimant considers that more time should be allowed, the time estimate must be included with the request for reconsideration of permission.

(b) Within 21 days of the service of this Order, the Claimant must file and serve an electronic copy of the Permission Hearing Bundle, prepared in accordance with the guidance on the Administrative Court website and containing the following documents:

(i) the Claim Form, Statement of Facts and Grounds and any evidence or other documents filed with the Claim Form;

(ii) any Acknowledgment of Service, Summary Grounds of Defence and any accompanying documents served by any Defendant and/or Interested Party;

(iii) any Reply or other document served by any party to the proceedings at the paper permission stage;

(iv) this Order;

(v) the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review (on Form 86B);

(vi) any other document the Court would be likely to consider material to its decision on permission to apply for judicial review.

(c) If the Claimant fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), permission will be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the Court at the paper stage, unless at the hearing the Court otherwise directs.

(d) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, the Claimant must file and serve:

(i) a skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages;

(ii) an electronic bundle containing any authorities which the Court needs to read at the hearing (the Authorities Bundle: see para. 22.1.2 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide); and

(iii) if requested by the Court, a hard copy version of the Permission Hearing Bundle and Authorities Bundles.

(e) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, any party other than the Claimant intending to participate in the hearing must file and serve any skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages.

(f) If a party fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), (d) and/or (e), the Court may have regard to the failure when considering any question about costs at the hearing.

REASONS

9. The Claimant has made an application for permission to appeal dated 14 August 2025 against the Chief Constable of Surrey Police in relation to alleged failures in the investigation of her allegation of sexual assault.

10. I have made an anonymity order because this claim relates to an allegation of rape made by the Claimant. Victims and alleged victims of such sexual offences are entitled to lifelong anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. The Claimant should not be identified directly or via her mother who acts as her litigation friend. There are accordingly compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice above.

11. The claimant has re-framed and re-numbered grounds in correspondence since August 2025, but there has been no application to amend grounds and I address the matters as set out in the initial application.

12. The Claimant, who is acting through a litigation friend, her mother, reported a sexual assault to police in June 2023. The chronology of the police investigation is as follows. The Claimant gave video-recorded evidence to police in July 2023. The suspect was interviewed in August 2023. In September 2024 the Claimant then reported rape by the same suspect, and gave further video-recorded evidence in October 2024. The suspect was arrested in July 2025 on suspicion of rape and witness intimidation and was granted bail with a condition not to contact the Claimant. In August 2025 the Claimant was asked to provide further evidence by way of a statement.

13. The Claimant has been engaged with the family court, which made a non-molestation order against the suspect in July 2025. The Claimant and suspect gave a cross- undertaking later in July 2025.

14. It is logical to begin with Ground 6, which is an overarching ground alleging substantial failings in the police investigation including delays, absence of safeguarding, retraumatising requests and inadequate communication which, it is said, breach Article 3 ECHR. There is a broad discretion afforded to the police as to how they conduct investigations. The state is obliged under Article 3 to conduct an effective investigation into crimes involving serious violence to a person and there will be a breach if there are egregious and significant errors in the investigation (DSD v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis and others [2018] UKSC 11 [2019]). None of the matters complained of by the Claimant arguably amount, either alone or together, to egregious and significant error.

15. In relation to the delay, it is apparent that some of the delay was the result of necessary procedural steps such as awaiting consent for medical records, and some of the delay was caused by fact that there was only one Detective Constable on the Child Abuse Team at key. There were plainly points where a police force could have acted faster, but that does not arguably amount to an egregious and significant error.

16. In relation to the absence of safeguarding, it is understood that this relates to the police decision not to arrest the suspect until June 2025 (from which point he was under bail conditions not to contact the Claimant). The power of arrest is exercisable under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 if police have reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to arrest the person, including where it is necessary to protect a child or other vulnerable person from the person in question. There is material showing why the police decided not to arrest in 2023, including the police concluding that as three months had passed between the first alleged incident and the first report, with limited further contact since, there was no indication that the Claimant would be at risk of harm if the suspect was not arrested. In 2025, when further allegations including witness intimidation were made, the police position changed and the suspect was arrested and bailed. The police applied the Police and Criminal Evidence Act in their decision not to arrest the suspect, and the subsequent decision to arrest the suspect, and their decisions do not arguably amount to an egregious and significant error.

17. The alleged ‘retraumatising requests’ relate to the police request for a witness statement to produce exhibits. That is a standard police procedure, and is not arguably an egregious and significant error.

18. In relation to communication, it is not in dispute that updates were not provided by police to the Claimant as regularly as had been agreed. However, some information was provided to the Claimant and gaps in communication here were not arguably an egregious and significant error.

19. It follows that permission is refused on Ground 6.

20. I deal with the remainder of the grounds, which engage similar points, in brief.

21. Ground 1 is a complaint of unreasonable delay, which is dealt with above in relation to Article 3. There is no stand-alone aspect of the delay which arguably amounts to a public law ground.

22. Ground 2 alleges a number of breaches of the Victim’s Code. It has been accepted by the Defendant that the code was not followed in one respect, in that updates were not provided to the Claimant as agreed. That shortcoming in the service provided, and other alleged shortcomings do not amount to an arguable stand-alone ground for judicial review.

23. Ground 3 alleges that the police failings forced the complainant into civil proceedings. This is assumed to be a reference to the family court proceedings. This is really a complaint about the effect of the police decision not to arrest and bail the suspect in 2023, which is dealt with in Ground 6 above; there is no stand-alone arguable judicial review ground.

24. Ground 4 alleges that it was irrational for the police to require a ‘duplicate’ statement. Thepolice following evidence-gathering procedures is not arguably irrational.

25. Ground 5 complains about the lack of particularity in the Defendant’s response of 15 September 2025. That alleged deficiency in pre action protocol correspondence is not arguably a ground for judicial review.

26. I have refused the application for DGC’s medical records to be seen only by the court; there is no reason to withhold exhibits from the Defendant. If there was a hearing in this case, further application could be made.

27. The application for interim relief dated 29 October 2025 is refused. That application for a mandatory order was made on an urgent basis which was not appropriate. I am invited by the Respondent to deal with that application at this permission stage; I have various supplementary notes from the Claimant as well as a response from the Respondent. There has been no application to amend grounds, and so the application for interim relief is based on the 14 August 2025 grounds. The first question is whether there is a strong prima facie case. There is not, for the reasons above; there is no realistic prospect of success on any of the grounds. The application therefore fails.

28. There is no reason not to direct payment of the Defendant’s costs on the usual terms. The order for costs is made against the Claimant, who is party to proceedings. However, her litigation friend DMK has given the required undertaking under CPR 21.4(3)(c) to pay any costs that the Claimant is ordered to pay, which now includes the costs ordered herein.

Signed: MRS JUSTICE BRUNNER

Date: 19/11/25