DSM -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtCivilHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: CO/4276/2022

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

25 January 2023


Dan Squires KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge


The King on the application of


Secretary of State for the Home Department

Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for permission to apply for judicial review (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and the Acknowledgement of Service filed by the Defendant

ORDER by Dan Squires KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge

  1. The application for permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
  2. No order for costs.
  3. The Claimant is granted anonymity and is to be known in these proceedings as DSM. Pursuant to CPR 39.2 there shall be no publication of the name or address of the Claimant or any particulars of the case likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant without the leave of the court.


  1. The Claimant is an asylum seeker who arrived in the UK on 5 December 2021. She claimed asylum and support pursuant to s 95 of Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (“IAA 1999”) on the same day. The application for s 95 support was granted on 4 August 2022.
  2. The claimant has been in her current accommodation, provided initially under s 98 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, since 5 December 2021. She remains in the accommodation now pursuant to s 95. It is the Claimant’s case that the failure to disperse her to adequate long-term accommodation is a breach of the statutory duties contained in s 95 IAA 1999, breaches the Defendant’s Guidance and/or is unreasonable.
  3. I do not consider the challenge to be arguable.
  4. The Claimant states she has been in “initial temporary accommodation” since December 2021 and has continued to be held in such accommodation after August 2022 when her s 95 application was granted. There is, however, no legal requirement under IAA 1999 ss 95 or 98 to provide “longer term” accommodation, nor any legal obligation to provide different accommodation when support ceases to be provided pursuant to s 98 and is provided instead pursuant to s 95. The Defendant’s obligation is to provide “adequate” accommodation (see s 95(3)(a) which defines an individual as “destitute”, and thus entitled to s 95 support, as those without “adequate accommodation”). If the accommodation provided by the Defendant is “adequate” she is acting lawfully whether or not the accommodation is considered to be “long term” and whether or not it is different to accommodation
    previously provided under s 98. That is so pursuant to the relevant statute, the Defendant’s Guidance and any obligation to act reasonably. The Claimant must therefore establish that the present accommodation is inadequate to succeed in her claim.
  5. I do not consider the Claimant has established that the accommodation being provided is arguably not adequate. Her case is that the accommodation is “not suitable” on the basis that she has a diagnosis with haemorrhoids and the “food provided at the hostel is very spicy which aggravates her haemorrhoids” and she is “unable to cook and prepare her own meals”. I do not consider it arguable that is sufficient to render the accommodation inadequate. As set out in the Defendant’s Acknowledgement of Service, there are complaint mechanisms to deal with issues such as food which do not appear to have been utilised. That is the appropriate avenue to deal with the matter, at least in the first instance, rather than a judicial review.
  6. The Defendant states in its Acknowledgement of Service that it is working to secure dispersal accommodation to the Claimant and hopes to make an offer soon. The fact that it has failed to secure accommodation to date is not, in my view, arguably unlawful and nor does it render the current accommodation inadequate.
  7. I have granted the Claimant anonymity on the papers pending further order. She is seeking asylum and it is often appropriate for anonymity to be made in relation to asylum seekers. I note, however, that no explanation has been provided as to why anonymity is sought in her particular case. As the Supreme Court made clear in Kambadzi v SSHD [2011] UKSC 23 (see [5]-[7]), it is not the case that all asylum seekers, as a class, are entitled to anonymity, and the making of such an order must be justified in each case. If the Claimant renews her judicial review application to an oral hearing, the Judge may consider whether, if no further basis for anonymity is put forward, continued anonymity is justified.