FA -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)
Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order
Claim number: AC-2024-LON-001957
In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court
11 June 2024
Before:
The Hon. Mr Justice Chamberlain
Between:
The King on the application of
FA
-v-
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Order
On the claimant’s application for urgent consideration, interim relief and directions
Following consideration of the documents lodged by the claimant
ORDER by the Hon. Mr Justice Chamberlain:
1. Anonymity:
a. Pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction, CPR 39.2(4) and s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
i. the claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
ii. there is to be substituted for all purposes in these proceedings, in place of references to the claimant by name, and whether orally or in writing, the letters “FA”.
b. Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
c. Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
i. the parties must, when filing any statement of case, also file a redacted copy of that statement of case, omitting the name, address and any other information which could lead to the identification of the claimant; and
ii. unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
d. Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application to the Court, served on each party.
2. Permission and further interim relief are to be considered at a hearing on 18 June 2024, with a time estimate of 1 hour.
3. Time for filing and serving an AoS, together with any response to the application for further interim relief, is abridged to 12 noon on Monday 17 June 2024.
4. Until the conclusion of the hearing referred to in paragraph 2, the defendant must provide accommodation and support to the claimant in the form and to the extent provided at the time when the application for interim relief was made.
5. The defendant has liberty to apply to vary or discharge paragraph 3.
PARAGRAPH 4 OF THIS ORDER IS A MANDATORY INJUNCTION BREACH OF WHICH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY THE COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 5***
Reasons
At this stage, and in advance of considering any response from the defendant to the letter before claim (sent on 23 May 2024) and the subsequent letter (sent on 4 June 2024), the grounds set out in the Statement of Facts and Grounds are sufficiently cogent, and the information about the claimant’s vulnerability sufficiently strong, to justify abridging time for the defendant’s response. Whether it is sufficiently arguable for the purposes of permission will be determined after considering the defendant’s response.
The interim relief sought is rightly characterised as a mandatory injunction. The court will normally be wary of granting such relief for any substantial time other than after a hearing. I have accordingly directed that the question of interim relief be considered, together with permission, at a hearing on 18 June 2024. However, the test for interim relief (including mandatory relief) must reflect the extent and duration of the relief sought. In this case, I am persuaded that the Statement of Facts and Grounds advances a sufficient case for the grant of interim mandatory relief of very short duration, to hold the ring pending the hearing referred to in paragraph 2 of my Order.