GNB -v- London Borough of Bexley and another (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-004249

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

8 April 2026

Before:

Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC

Between:

THE KING on the application of
GNB

-v-

(1) LONDON BOROUGH OF BEXLEY
(2) OXLEAS NHS FOUNDATION TRUST (BEXLEY CAMHS)

Order

Following consideration of the issue of anonymity of the Court’s own motion

AND following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant, First Defendant and Second Defendant

ORDER BY BENJAMIN DOUGLAS-JONES KC, SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

  1. Anonymity:
    (a) Pursuant to CPR 39.2(4) and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and/or s.6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the Claimant’s name and that of her son are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public;
    (ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “GNB”; and
    (iii) the Claimant’s son is to be referred to orally and in writing as “GLP”.
    (b) Pursuant to s.11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or her son or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or her son in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
    (c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
    (i) the parties must within 7 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or her son;
    (ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or her son, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time;
    (iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
    (d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
  2. Parties: By CPR 19.4, Oxleas HNS Foundation Trust (Bexley CAMHS) shall be added as the second Defendant to the Claim and removed as an Interested Party.
  3. Permission:
    (a) Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
    (b) The application is certified as totally without merit.
  4. Costs: No order as to costs.

Reasons

(1) Anonymity: This claim involves the Claimant’s son, a child, his sensitive mental health information, and allegations regarding his care. As Oxleas NHS Foundation Trust (Bexley CAMHS) (“the Trust”) helpfully submits through its summary grounds for contesting the Claim (“SGCC”), I must determine whether to grant an anonymity order of my own motion to protect the Claimant’s son’s Article 8 ECHR rights. The claim’s reliance on personal medical information in which the child has a reasonable expectation of privacy gives rise to compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1 of the order. By anonymising the Claimant as “GNB” and the child as “GLP”, the child’s privacy is protected.
(2) Urgency: The Claimant had filed an N463 application for urgent consideration when lodging her claim for permission to apply for judicial review. The Claimant had sought intervention from the Court in light of a Child Protection Conference Review which was listed for 25 November 2025. On 27 November 2025 the matter was placed before the Senior Legal Manager who requested that the Claimant confirm what had happened at the Conference (which had by then taken place) and whether the Claimant believed the claim was still urgent. The Claimant responded submitting there was still an urgency. Ultimately, no order was made at that stage. The Interested Party, by an email dated 10/12/2025 also submitted that they did not consider the matter to be urgent.
(3) Parties- Defendants: the Trust shall be joined as the Second Defendant in these proceedings. The Claimant, through her Statement of Grounds, specifically criticises the Trust’s clinical decision-making. Specifically, the Claimant challenges alleged refusals by the Trust to discharge GLP and alleges failures by the Trust to rectify GLP’s medical records. These are not collateral matters. They are central to the Claimant’s case regarding the lawfulness of the ongoing Child Protection Plan (“CPP”) and the Trust’s safeguarding actions. As the Trust is the public body responsible for the impugned decisions regarding GLP’s mental health treatment, it is appropriate for the Trust to be a party to the litigation. In the event that this Claim is further litigated, this will allow the Trust to defend its actions directly and will ensure the Court has all relevant evidence and submissions from the relevant parties.
(4) Parties – Interested Parties: The substance of this claim fundamentally affects GLP’s Article 8 ECHR rights to private and family life, his medical treatment, and his care arrangements. He is the person most directly affected by the Child Protection Plan and the dispute between his mother and the Defendants. It is essential that his position is protected in these proceedings, particularly given the conflicting accounts regarding his capacity and wishes. In the event that the Claimant’s application for permission be renewed, an application should be made for GLP to be an interested party. I do not add him at this stage as he will need to have a litigation friend and consideration would need to be given as to who might be an appropriate person to act for GLP in that capacity in pursuance of CPR 21. There is a potential conflict of interest between the Claimant and GLP. Consequently, the Claimant cannot act as
GLP’s litigation friend. Any litigation friend appointed must be independent to ensure GLP’s best interests remain the paramount consideration, separate from the Claimant’s stated grounds of challenge.
(5) Permission:
Ground 1: Illegality and fettering of discretion
(a) The Claimant seeks to challenge the continuing decisions of the Defendant to: (a) maintain GLP on a CPP for neglect; and (b) to “… require or coerce ongoing CAMHS involvement and refuse clinical discharge, notwithstanding his age (16), capacity and explicit refusal”. These decisions are said to be recorded in the Initial Child Protection Conference and Review Child Protection Conference minutes, and in particular in the Child Protection Review Conference Worker’s Report dated 18 November 2025.
(b) The Claimant argues that the London Borough of Bexley (“the Council”) and the Trust have adopted an illegal “circular approach”. She contends that the Council treated the Trust’s refusal to discharge GLP as the sole determinative factor for maintaining the CPP, while the Trust indicated it could not discharge GLP because social services remained involved. She submits this circularity fetters the discretion of both bodies and prevents them from exercising independent judgment.
(c) This ground is unarguable because the multi-agency coordination between the Council and the Trust is not “circular” but is a requirement under the Working Together to Safeguard Children guidance. It is not arguable that the agencies’ approach was not consistent with their having exercised independent professional judgement based on cumulative safeguarding concerns. It is not arguable that they were merely deferring to one another or that any unlawful fettering of discretion has occurred.
Ground 2: Irrationality and failure to base decisions on evidence
(d) The Claimant asserts that the continued involvement of CAMHS and the maintenance of the CPP are inconsistent with clinical records—specifically the CAMHS Home Treatment Team (HTT) discharge letter of 28 July 2025. She argues that there is no cogent evidence GLP is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm that justifies the state’s interference, particularly given that he is under the care of a private psychiatrist and has an agreed safety plan.
(e) This ground is unarguable because the Claimant misinterprets the 28 July 2025 discharge letter as a definitive clinical assessment of capacity, when it was a time limited statement from a short-term intervention team. The Defendants’ decisions are based on a comprehensive view of GLP’s broader clinical presentation and ongoing safeguarding risks, which provide a rational evidence basis for maintaining the Child Protection Plan.
Ground 3: Failure to have regard to GLP’s age, capacity, and wishes
(f) The Claimant relies on section 8 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, arguing that as a 16-year-old, GLP is entitled to consent to or refuse medical treatment. She submits that CAMHS has previously assessed GLP as having the capacity to make such decisions and that the Defendants have failed to give proper weight to his explicit withdrawal of consent.
(g) This ground is unarguable because of lawfully held concerns of the Defendants concerning the provenance and validity of the letter through which GLP purported to withdraw consent. Given the significant discrepancy between the sophisticated tone of the letter and GLP’s assessed writing and comprehension age, the Defendants were entitled not to have taken it at face value as a genuine, informed expression of the child’s wishes. It is not arguable that the Defendants’ insistence on a formal capacity assessment is unlawful. It is a prima facie necessary pathway to verify whether GLP truly has the capacity to refuse medical treatment or whether his purported wishes are in fact those of the Claimant.
Ground 4: Disproportionate interference with Article 8 ECHR
(h) The Claimant argues that the ongoing CPP and the alleged compulsion for GLP to engage with the Trust constitute a disproportionate interference with her right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). She contends that given the “low risk” assessment, the intrusive nature of the CPP is not a necessary or proportionate measure
(i) This ground is unarguable because the interference with the Article 8 rights of the Claimant and GLP is both lawful and proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting a vulnerable child from significant harm. Given the history of potentially dangerous, unmonitored medication use, the Defendants’ safeguarding interventions fall well within the margin of appreciation and are a necessary response to the identified risk of Fabricated or Induced Illness (FII).
Ground 5: Procedural fairness and data accuracy
(j) The Claimant challenges the accuracy of the records relied upon by the Council and the Trust. She argues that these records contain factual inaccuracies and disputed allegations, and that the failure of the Trust to rectify or clearly to annotate these records renders the decision-making process procedurally unfair and unlawful under the Data Protection Act 2018 and the UK GDPR.
(k) This ground is unarguable because the Trust has already taken reasonable steps by appending the Claimant’s letter recording the assertion that the records are inaccurate and disputed to GLP’s clinical record. This satisfies the requirements for transparency. Furthermore, judicial review is a remedy of last resort, and the Claimant has an adequate alternative statutory remedy under s.167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 to pursue any specific claims regarding the rectification of data.
(6) Totally without merit: Having reviewed each of the above grounds, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to certify the claim as being totally without merit. I do not consider that it is appropriate to make a civil restraint order but even if this claim had not been certified as totally without merit on the substantive grounds, I would have been minded to transfer it to the Family Division or dismiss it on the basis that the Administrative Court is the wrong forum for resolving these questions of child welfare.
(7) Costs: Neither Defendant applies for its costs. In those circumstances I make no order for costs.