GOB -v- The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (anonymity order)
Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order
Claim number: AC-2025-LON-003279
In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court
14 March 2026
Before:
Matthew Butt KC
Between:
THE KING on the application of
GOB
-v-
THE ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA
and
GDL
(Interested party)
Order
Notification of the Judge’s decision on the application for permission to apply for judicial review (CPR 54.11, 54.12)
Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant and the Acknowledgement of Service filed by the Defendant.
ORDER by Matthew Butt KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court
- the Claimant (GOB) and the Interested Party (GDL) must not be disclosed in these proceedings
- The Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing by the ciphers set out at (a) above.
- Pursuant to section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identities of the Claimant, her two children, her mother, or her younger brother, or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of those persons in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
The Claimant must within 3 days file a redacted copy of any statement of case filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or IP;
If any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant or the IP, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time; and
Unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non party may obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case or other document in the case. - The application for permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
- No order as to costs.
Reasons
- The Claimant (named here as GOB) is the mother of the Interested Party (named here as GDL). GOB lives in a home rented from the Defendant and so does GDL.
- GDL lacks capacity. GOB applied for accommodation under the Housing Act 1996 (the Act) on the basis that her former accommodation was unsuitable for GDL. GOB was the sole tenant but by a deed of assignment dated 22.12.23, GFL became a joint tenant of the property.
- In 2024, GOB applied on GDL’s behalf to join D’s Common Housing Register so that she might secure independent accommodation. D rejected this application on 02.10.24 and again upon review on 09.12.24. Both decisions were made on the basis that GDL lacked capacity.
- It seems that both parties accept that a person who lacks capacity cannot make an application for homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Act. It also seems that both parties accept that this principle must also apply to an application under Part 6 of the Act. I agree.
- It is also common ground that a deputy could be appointed by the Court of Protection to make an application under Part 6 or Part 7 of the Act. I agree.
- What is between the parties is that GOB claims she has authority from the Court of Protection to make any decision in relation to GDL’s property and housing situation and D argues that the order only applies to authorising GOB to sign documents necessary to make GDL a joint tenant of the property at §2 above. They say that §6 of the order upon which C relies is ancillary to §5.
- I agree with D’s submissions in this regard and cannot see on the material before me how C’s case is arguable. The order from the Court of Protection must have been made on the basis that the court was satisfied that it was in GDL’s best interests to become a joint tenant at the current address and for her to reside there. Reading the order as a whole I do not consider that it authorises GOB to make an application on GDL’s behalf to join the common housing register.
- D correctly points out that GOB cannot be the Claimant in this case. If the claim is to proceed then it must be on the basis that GOB is acting as GDL’s litigation friend. If GOB wishes to apply to renew her application for permission then she must also apply to be appointed as GDL’s litigation friend and for the claim to be amended accordingly.
- D is also correct that this claim is out of time. Had I come to a different view on the merits I might have been sympathetic to the application to extend time, however, as I have refused permission upon the construction of the order from the Court of Protection it is not necessary to come to a conclusion on this point.
- Permission to bring a claim in judicial review is therefore refused.
- In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. This reflects the difficult circumstances of GDL and GOB and the complexity of the Court of Protection Order to a litigant in person.