HAB -v- Hampshire County Council (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Case number: AC-2025-LON-001500

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

In the matter of an application for judicial review

29 September 2025

Before:

Richard Wright KC,
sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court

Between:

The King
on the application of
HAB

-v-

Hampshire County Council

Order

Notification of the Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant, and the Defendant’s Summary Grounds of Defence

ORDER BY RICHARD WRIGHT KC SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE

  1. Anonymity: Pending further order, and with liberty to any person to apply to vary or discharge this Order, the Claimant is to be anonymised as HAB.
  2. Litigation Friend: The Claimant has permission to litigate without a litigation friend.
  3. Permission: Permission to apply for judicial review is refused.
  4. Costs: No order as to costs.
  5. Renewal directions: Where the Claimant makes a valid request for reconsideration (see notes below), the following directions apply:

(a) The permission hearing is to be listed with a time estimate of 30 minutes, including submissions by the parties and an oral judgment by the judge. If the Claimant considers that more time should be allowed, the time estimate must be included with the request for reconsideration of permission.

(b) Within 21 days of the service of this Order, the Claimant must file and serve an electronic copy of the Permission Hearing Bundle, prepared in accordance with the guidance on the Administrative Court website and containing the following documents:

(i) the Claim Form, Statement of Facts and Grounds and any evidence or other documents filed with the Claim Form;

(ii) any Acknowledgment of Service, Summary Grounds of Defence and any accompanying documents served by any Defendant and/or Interested Party;

(iii) any Reply or other document served by any party to the proceedings at the paper permission stage;

(iv) this Order;

(v) the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review (on Form 86B);

(vi) any other document the Court would be likely to consider material to its decision on permission to apply for judicial review.

(c) If the Claimant fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), permission will be determined on the basis of the renewal notice and the documents before the Court at the paper stage, unless at the hearing the Court otherwise directs.

(d) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, the Claimant must file and serve:

(i) a skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages;

(ii) an electronic bundle containing any authorities which the Court needs to read at the hearing (the Authorities Bundle: see para. 22.1.2 of the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide); and

(iii) if requested by the Court, a hard copy version of the Permission Hearing Bundle and Authorities Bundles.

(e) At least 7 days before the date listed for the hearing, any party other than the Claimant intending to participate in the hearing must file and serve any skeleton argument, maximum 10 pages.

(f) If a party fails to comply with sub-paragraph (b), (d) and/or (e), the Court may have regard to the failure when considering any question about costs at the hearing.

REASONS

(1) Notwithstanding their position on the merits the Defendant does not oppose the application for anonymity which is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of someone who is said to be a child.

(2) Given their claimed age it is not necessary for the Claimant to litigate by a litigation friend.

(3) The claimant, who arrived in the United Kingdom as an asylum seeker in February 2024 asserts that he was born on 7th February 2008 and is a child. A Merton compliant age assessment was conducted by the Defendant and on 1st August 2024 the Defendant determined that the Claimant was an adult with a date of birth of 7th February 1999. There has been no challenge to the age assessment by the Claimant and he concedes that any challenge would be out of time. This Claim is instead brought on the basis that the Defendant has was wrong to refuse to re-open the age assessment after the Claimant provided a photograph of a translated birth certificate extract. The Claimant argues that the refusal to reconsider the earlier age assessment was irrational and seeks an order from the Court directing the Defendant to conduct a reconsideration in the light of that ‘new’ material. The Defendant opposes the grant of permission on the basis that the ‘new’ material is nothing of the sort. The birth certificate was considered by the assessors and factored into the 1st August determination of age and the translation changes nothing and would not have led to any different decision. The Defendant characterises this claim as a device by which to re-open the original age assessment that was not challenged at the appropriate time.

(4) This claim is brought on conventional public law grounds as a challenge to the decision of the Defendant to refuse to reconsider its age assessment and the test for permission is the usual test of whether there is an arguable ground for judicial review that has a realistic prospect of success.

(5) I do not consider that the Claim is arguable. The ‘new’ material relied upon t found the claim is not in fact new material at all. It is plain that the certificate was considered as part of the original age assessment and the fact it was written in French but has now been translated is not material. The concerns that were expressed about the document were not related to the language in which it was written but related to the fact that it was partial and not an original document. The document, whether translated or otherwise, was but one part of a comprehensive assessment that was undertaken and in my Judgement it cannot be described as irrational for the Defendant to have decided that even if considered the ‘new’ material would not have led to a materially different decision. Permission therefore also refused on the basis that it is highly likely that the outcome for the Claimant would not have been substantially different even had the materially been considered in accordance with s.31 (3D) Senior Courts Act 1981.

(6) I make no order for costs because I have not been asked to do otherwise.

Signed: Richard Wright KC
Date: 29 September 2025