HFE -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2026-LON-001374

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

26 March 2026

Before:

The Hon. Mr Justice Mould

Between:

The King on the application of
HFE

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

On an application by the Claimant for urgent consideration, interim relief and directions

Following consideration of the documents lodged by the Claimant

ORDER by the Hon. Mr Justice Mould:

  1. Anonymity:
    (a) Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
    (i) the Claimant’s name is to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
    (ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “HFE”.
    (b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or of any matter likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
    (c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
    (i) the parties must within 7 days file and serve a redacted copy of any statement of case already filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant;
    (ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time and must then be served with the unredacted version;
    (iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.
    (d) Any person wishing to vary or discharge this Order must make an application, served on each party.
  2. Prohibitory injunction: The application for an interim prohibitory injunction is refused.
  3. The Defendant must make a statement to the French authorities that the Claimant may need medical assistance including mental health assessment or care upon his return to France.
  4. Costs reserved.

Reasons

Anonymity: Given the high public profile and controversy of applications for interim injunctions in cases in relation to the Treaty, I am satisfied that there are compelling reasons for the limited derogations from the principle of open justice in paragraph 1.

Prohibitory injunction:
1) The Claimant is an Eritrean national who arrived in the UK by small boat on 19 January 2026 and claimed asylum. On 29 January 2026 he was referred into the National Referral Mechanism (NRM). On 4 February 2026 he was notified of the Defendant’s decision that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that he is the victim of trafficking. On 14 February 2026 the Claimant was examined for the purposes of a Rule 35 report and gave an account of physical and sexual abuse and forced labour in Sudan and Libya en route to Europe and the UK. The Rule 35 Report notes physical scarring consistent with that abuse and recommended further investigation. The Claimant reported nightmares and flashbacks and was referred for mental health assessment. He was assessed as an adult at risk at level 2 and an indication given that the information in the Rule 35 report would be referred to for review of the negative RG decision.
2) On 5 March 2026 the Claimant was notified that his asylum and protection claims had been declared inadmissible pursuant to section 80B of the NIAA 2002, on the basis that France, to which he has a relevant connection, is a safe country. He was informed that he was not entitled to a reconsideration of his negative RG decision. The Defendant also refused his human rights claim and on 6 March 2026 indicated her intention to remove the Claimant to France in accordance with the Agreement between the UK and France on the Prevention of Dangerous Journeys (the Treaty). He is due to be returned to France on a flight leaving on Thursday 26 March 2026.
3) The Claimant has brought a claim seeking permission to apply for judicial review of the Defendant’s (i) negative reasonable grounds decision and (ii) inadmissibility decisions. The Claimant advances three grounds of challenge: (1) that the Defendant adopted an unlawfully high standard of proof in reaching her negative reasonable grounds decision: (2) that the amendment to the Modern Slavery Statutory Guidance removing the right to reconsideration of a negative RG decision is unlawful and in breach of the Defendant’s Tameside duty of reasonable inquiry; (3) that the certification of the Claimant’s human rights claim fails to take account of relevant evidence with regard to alleged breaches of A3/A4 ECHR; and (4) that the Defendant’s decisions are premature pending his recommended medical assessment.
4) The correct approach to determination of an application for an interim prohibitory injunction in a public law context such as this was stated by Cranston J in R(Medical Justice) v SSHD [2010] EWHC 1425 (Admin) at [12]. There are two stages : (1) does the claim raise a serious issue to be tried; and (2) if so, where does the balance of convenience lie? As to the second stage, the American Cyanamid principles are modified in the way described by Cranston J in that paragraph of Medical Justice.
5) The Claimant’s second proposed ground is essentially the first of the “common issues” considered by Sheldon J at [5(1)] in R(AYA) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 552 (Admin). For the reasons given at [84]ff in AYA, Sheldon found that to raise a serious issue to be tried. It is to be determined at a “common issues” hearing beginning on 28 April. I reach the same conclusion in this case. I am also prepared to find that the Claimant’s proposed ground (1) also raises a serious issues to be tried: the threshold is relatively modest for that purpose. I do not consider that grounds (3) and (4) add substantially to the issues raised under the first two grounds.
6) The critical issue, therefore, is where the balance of convenience lies.
7) As to that issue, I respectfully agree with and follow the principled approach stated by Sheldon J at [101]-[104] in AYA. On that approach, the question is whether the Claimant’s circumstances are such as to outweigh the public interest in the Defendant being entitled to further her policy of seeking to deter small boat crossings by, among other things, removing persons to France under the Treaty.
8) In paragraph 58 of his Statement of Facts and Grounds, the Claimant acknowledges the principled approach stated by Sheldon J in [101] of AYA. The Claimant nevertheless submits that the Claimant would suffer irremediable prejudice if returned to France by virtue of the flawed approach to reasonable grounds assessment by the Defendant and the absence of any opportunity for reconsideration of the Claimant’s case whilst he remains in the UK. That argument is essentially addressed by [104] in AYA with which I respectfully agree. The terms of the Treaty enable the Claimant to pursue his claim for judicial review from France and, if vindicated, to secure appropriate relief (including if found justified, his return to the UK). See AYA at [9]. In the event that the court finds the Defendant’s assessment to have been unlawful as alleged in the proposed judicial review claim, the question whether the Claimant must then be permitted to return to the UK for fresh assessment under the NRM may arise for determination.
9) I have taken careful account of the concerns raised in the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and Grounds about the impact of his return to France on his mental health due to difficulties in accessing appropriate health care in France. I have carefully considered the Rule 35 report. He reported nightmares and flashbacks. He denied any current thoughts of self-harm. He was referred for further assessment to the mental health team. I take account of the detailed analysis and conclusions of Sheldon J at [97]-[98] in AYA. The evidence does not suggest that the Claimant is suffering from mental health problems that are of sufficient severity to render him particularly vulnerable if returned to France.
10) Overall, although I have found the Claimant’s grounds to raise serious issues to be tried, they do not weigh substantially in the balance of convenience. I conclude that this is a case in which the public interest in the Defendant being entitled to further her policy objectives by removing persons to France under the Treaty outweighs the impact on the Claimant pending determination of his claim for judicial review. The application for interim relief is accordingly refused.