HHB -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LON-002619

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

21 August 2025

Before:

John Halford

Between:

The King on the application of
HHB

-v-

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Order

Notification of Judge’s Decision (CPR 54.11, 54.12)

Following consideration of:

  1. of the documents filed by the Claimant;
  2. the Article 8 ECHR right of the Claimant to respect for private and family life, and the Article 10 right to freedom of expression; and
  3. the anonymity application and it appearing that non-disclosure of the identity of the Claimant is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in order to protect the interests of the Claimant and that there is no sufficient countervailing public interest in disclosure of his identity.

ORDER BY JOHN HALFORD SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE

  1. Mandatory injunction
    (a) Upon receipt of this order, the Defendant shall immediately re-enter the Claimant into the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract and shall continue to provide him with services and support under that contract until these proceedings are resolved or further order.
    (b) As this order has been made without a hearing, the Defendant may apply to vary or discharge paragraph 1(a) above, any such application to be served on the Claimant.
    NOTE: THIS IS A MANDATORY INJUNCTION. BREACH MAY GIVE RISE TO PROCEEDINGS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT. IT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH UNLESS AND UNTIL IT IS SET ASIDE BY A COURT, EVEN IF AN APPLICATION TO VARY OR DISCHARGE IT HAS BEEN MADE UNDER PARAGRAPH 1(a) ABOVE.
  2. Anonymity (pursuant to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and CPR rules 5.4C, 5.4D and 39.2(4))
    (a) The identity of the Claimant as a party to these proceedings is confidential and shall not be published.
    (b) For the purposes of this order ‘publication’ includes any speech, writing, broadcast, or other communication in whatever form (including Internet and social media), which is addressed to the public at large or any section of the public.
    (c) ‘Publication’ for the purposes of this order includes any further publication (as defined in paragraph 3(b) above) from the date of this order, even if such information is derived from a previous stage or stages of these proceedings.
    (d) Pursuant to CPR Rule 39.2(4), there shall not be disclosed in any report of these proceedings or any other publication the name or address of the Claimant, or any details (including other names, addresses, or a specific combination of facts) that could lead to the identification of the Claimant as a party to these proceedings. The Claimant shall be referred to as set out in paragraph 2(e) of this order.
    (e) The Claimant shall be referred to as HHB.
    (f) Any of the details which, on their own or together with other information publicly available may lead to the identification of the Claimant shall be redacted before publication.
    (g) Pursuant to CPR rules 5.4C and 5.4D:
    (i) A person is not a party to the proceedings may not obtain a copy of a statement of case, judgement or order from the court records unless the statement of case, judgement or order has been anonymized in accordance with subparagraph 2(d) and (e) above.
    (ii) If a person who is not a party to the proceedings applies (pursuant to CPR rule 5.4C (1B) or (2)) for permission to inspect or obtain a copy of any other document or communication, such application shall be on at least seven days’ notice to each party’s solicitors, trustee or deputy.
    (h) The Claimant’s solicitors shall file with the court and electronic (PDF bundle) of the statement of case that has been anonymized in accordance with paragraph 2(e) above within 14 days of the date of this order and refiled in the event that any statement of case is amended within 21 days of any such amendment being approved.
    (i) The court file shall be clearly marked with the words “an anonymity order was made on this case on 21 August 2025 and any application by a non-party to inspect to obtain a copy document from this file must be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the order.”
    (j) Pursuant to the ‘Practice Guidance: Publication of Privacy and Anonymity Orders’ issued by the Master of the Rolls dated 16 April 2019, a copy of this order shall be published on the judicial website of the High Court of Justice. For that purpose, a court officer will send a copy of the order by email to the judicial office at judicialwebupdates@judiciary.uk
    (k) Any interested party, whether or not a party to the proceedings may apply to the court to vary or discharge this anonymity order provided that any such application is made on seven days notice to each party’s solicitors, trustee or deputy.
  3. Costs
    Costs in the case.

Observations and reasons

(1) I have carefully weighed the considerations for and against making an interim mandatory order requiring the Claimant to be re-entered into the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract.
(2) I consider this judicial review claim raises a strong prima facie case notwithstanding the reasons given for the decision under challenge and what the Defendant has since said in her Pre Action Protocol Response.
(3) The balance of convenience, having regard to the public interest as well as the circumstances of the Claimant, warrants making an order. There is no dispute the Claimant is a vulnerable, mentally unwell person. It is clear there is a meaningful distinction between services and support provided under the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract and those the Claimant can access through Reach-In. Dr Heke’s report indicates he is at real risk of self-harm which will be mitigated if he has access to and attends at recommended mental health services. Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract support and services exist to facilitate such access and attendance by victims of modern slavery. There also appears to be a risk of homelessness which support and services can reduce or eliminate. On the evidence I have seen, Reach-In is not materially reducing these risks to the Claimant and is unlikely to do so because it primarily offers signposting to those who are then able to access statutory and third sector services. The evidence the Claimant cannot is prima facie compelling. What the Defendant says about the Claimant accessing appropriate services already and being adequately accommodated and able to cope with any accommodation difficulties that might arise is very hard to reconcile with Dr Heke’s assessment and conclusions and, strikingly, does not engage with them.
(4) There is no significant countervailing prejudice to the Defendant in providing the services and support the Claimant seeks under the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract pending the outcome of the claim especially as an expedited timetable is likely to be appropriate (though that will be a matter for the permission Judge).
(5) I have considered whether abridgement and expedition would be an appropriate alternative to a mandatory interim injunction and concluded they would not. Even were they grated, it is unlikely this claim would be determined for months and the risks mentioned above would not be mitigated in the meantime.
(6) Anonymity for the Claimant is wholly appropriate given his background and vulnerability.