HLN -v- East Riding of Yorkshire Council (anonymity order)

Administrative CourtHigh CourtKing's Bench DivisionAnonymity Order

Claim number: AC-2025-LDS-000235

In the High Court of Justice
King’s Bench Division
Administrative Court

29 September 2025

Before:

His Honour Judge Saffman

Between:

THE KING on the application of
HLN (by his litigation friend) HWM

-v-

East Riding of Yorkshire Council

Order

ORDER by His Honour Judge Saffman sitting in retirement as a judge of the High Court on 29 September 2025

It is ordered

(a) Under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and pursuant to s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998:
i) the Claimant’s name and that of the litigation friend are to be withheld from the public and must not be disclosed in any proceedings in public; and
ii) the Claimant is to be referred to orally and in writing as “HLN” and the litigation friend as “HWM”.
b) Pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, there must be no publication of the identity of the Claimant or litigation friend or of any matter likely to lead to their identification in any report of, or otherwise in connection with, these proceedings.
c) Pursuant to CPR 5.4C(4):
i) the parties must within 7 days file and serve a redacted copy of any statement of case already filed, omitting the name, address and any other information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant and/or litigation friend;
ii) if any statement of case subsequently filed includes information likely to lead to the identification of the Claimant/litigation friend, a redacted copy omitting that information must be filed at the same time and must then be served with the unredacted version;
iii) unless the Court grants permission under CPR 5.4C(6), no non-party many obtain a copy of any unredacted statement of case.

Reasons for anonymity

  1. The court is conscious of the principle that an anonymity order is exceptional because it is a fundamental precept that the administration of justice takes place in public. An anonymity order is a derogation from the principle of open justice.
  2. The court is further conscious of the fact that an anonymity order ought not to be made merely because the parties consent to it.
  3. In this case an anonymity order is appropriate because it is necessary to protect the interests of a child and it is necessary to extend the order to the litigation friend because failure to extend the order in this way would enable identification of the child.